CP 5

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT. This is a civil rights action brought to vindicate the plaintiff's rights under the United States Constitution, the Connecticut State Constitution, and under the statutory laws of the United States and Connecticut. The plaintiff, Francis C. P Knize,, a 52-year old lifetime Connecticut citizen, and U.S. Citizen is an established documentary producer, markets monorail systems, and is involved in other entrepreneurial ventures dealing with Space Development/NASA. Relief under Rule 60(b)(3) may be granted when the motion is substantiated by clear and convincing evidence that the court "acted with 'an intent to deceive or defraud the court,' by means of a 'deliberately planned and carefully executed scheme.'" Yapp v. Excel Corp., 186 F.3d 1222, 1231 (10th Cir. 1999). The burden is met by the movant to establish fraud and to show that the movant would have had a good claim or defense in the main action. See Wilkin 3

v, Sunbeam Corp., 466 F.2d 714, 717 (10th Cir. 1972). Mr. Knize argues fraud and deliberate indifference against proper reading of contracts to defraud Mr. Knize of his property are specific in nature and show specific allegations against the court that were never answered. . The Connecticut courts certainly did abuse its discretion by denying reasonable interpretation of Mr. Knize’s Shareholders Agreement in OK Art Exhibitions LTD, and the couple’s mutual Prenuptial Agreement, and their House Agreement of 1991. See, e.g., Jennings v. Hicklin, 587 F.2d 946, 948 (8th Cir. 19). Surrounding Incident, Post Judgment: On May 19, 2006, in Waverly Knize V. Francis Knize, I, then defendant, had most of my property illegally seized (See App 6 and 9) on two unconstitutional counts ; my mother’s near fatal accident was not deemed a just cause to file late for a Motion For Reconsideration in the Supreme Court, DENIAL on 05/05/06, even though it happened at the precise time the Motion was due (Equal Protection Violation against right for family emergencies and excuse for due diligence.), and the issues raised about due process of fundamental rights, specifically, application of Strict Scrutiny upon the same rights identified in pleaded Connecticut’s Election Law Reform, were never addressed in any finding (Abuse of Discretion; the ruling was not consistent with the allegations) by the courts it was alleged. Brief Page limitations were challenged by the defendant on the basis that the rules violate associational and content rights, principles of FRCP VI; Trials Rule 50-52 ; the courts under the color of law violated the right to an open hearing on the matter. Due process was clearly and convincingly violated. This first impression issue needs to be determined by this court; Denials in whole deprived the defendant of rights to the obligation of contracts. The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions holds that government may not grant a benefit on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right, See App 9. Does this apply to the KNIZE Case?
2. Whereas the HISTORY of the KNIZE CASE shows the Conn. Supreme Court was not faithful to the Law. upon Motion to Vacate Orders Sept 22, 05. Sept 6, 05 Demand, Oct 13, 05 Dismissal, Feb 28, 06 Demands for jurisdiction WHICH THEN RELATED TO March 31/April 5, 06 Dismissals for JURISDICTION, STAY, REVIEW and Motion for Reconsideration May 05, 06 For more than a century, the central meaning of procedural due process has been clear: Please See App 2, Excerpt:
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"Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right, they must first be notified." Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223, 233. See Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274; Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409; Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385. It is equally fundamental that the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard "must be granted at a meaningful time, in a meaningful manner." Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552.

3. Was refusing Mr. Knize an open hearing on several challenges for jurisdiction improper as to the understanding that the Conn. Supreme Court possesses no legal discretion to ignore the challenge? Whereas the KNIZE court showed a violation of well-established principles; "Once challenged, jurisdiction cannot be `assumed' it must be proved to exist". Stuck v Medical Eaminers, 94 Ca.2d 751, 211 P. 2s 389 . The KNIZE Supreme Court failed to place on record its proof of jurisdiction, and failed to provide a hearing on constitutional issues whereby Mr.Knize could present his evidence as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. ARE THE CONN. COURT RULINGS IN KNIZE TO BE DEEMED VOID AB INITIO .
“"Jurisdiction once challenged cannot be assumed and must be decided". "A court cannot confer jurisdiction where none existed and cannot make a void proceeding valid. It is clear and well established law that a void order can be challenged in any court", OLD WAYNE MUT. L. ASSOC. v. McDONOUGH, 204 U. S. 8, 27 S. Ct. 236 (1907)."There is no discretion to ignore lack of jurisdiction." Joyce v. U.S. 474 2D 215."The burden shifts to the court to prove jurisdiction." Rosemond v. Lambert, 469 F 2d 416 "Court must prove on the record, all jurisdiction facts related to the jurisdiction asserted." Latana v. Hopper, 102 F. 2d 188; Chicago v. New York 37 F Supp. 150 "The law provides that once State and Federal Jurisdiction has been challenged, it must be proven." 100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980).Other cases also such as McNutt v. G.M., 56 S. Ct. 789,80 L. Ed. 1135, Griffin v. Mathews, 310 Supp. 341, 423 F. 2d 272, Basso v. U.P.L., 495 F 2d. 906, Thomson v. Gaskiel, 62 S. Ct. 673, 83 L. Ed. 111, and Albrecht v U.S., 273 U.S. 1.
Also all confirm, that, “when challenged, jurisdiction must be documented, shown, and proven, to lawfully exist before a cause may lawfully proceed in the courts. Nestor v Hersey, 425 F. 2d 504 acts void absent proof of jurisdiction on record.”
"An officer who acts in violation of the Constitution ceases to represent the government." Brookfield Const. Co. v. Stewart, 284 F.Supp. 94.
“JURISDICTION CANNOT BE ASSUMED AND ANY ORDER ISSUED WHEN A COURT HAS NO JURISDCITION IS A NULLITY” DISTRICT OF NEVADA CASE NO: CV - S-03-0281-LDG-RJJ United States V. SCHIFF, NEUN And COHEN
4. Whereas: Mr. Knize challenged the state’s brief size limitations on content and associational infringements in all the courts and corresponding rules for being unconstitutionally vague.
“When a vague law reaches activity protected by the first amendment, in addition to the due process concerns discussed below, there is a concern that the law will unnecessarily "chill" first amendment rights. See Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law 12-31, at 1033-35 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing the distinction where a case must be heard on the constitutional merits ).“

FACTS: The Supreme Court outright denied an open hearing and finding on a jurisdictional challenge as specifically required by law, leading to the denial on May 5, 06 for a Motion for Reconsideration concerning that challenge.. There is no discretion to not prove jurisdiction (JOYCE). Related to other motions: I almost lost my mother, I had to suddenly travel to her bedside at Jackson Memorial Hospital in Miami; Intensive Care Unit. These were events outside my control. My late filing was not a willful disregard of due diligence. Was it plain error against Equal Protection of the laws to deny under the color of law my Motion to file late and thus allow the KNIZE case to fall to Post Judgment action based on that matter? It deprived plaintiff of guaranteed hearings ON THE MERITS FOR THE ISSUES ON APPEAL.
PROBABLE CAUSES formed at the Connecticut Supreme Court: As a result; my mother’s terrible accident was considered by the Panel “not just reasoning” for a late submission to the Supreme Court. Would their decision would be implying that THERE NEVER WOULD BE ANY REASON to grant anyone a late filing, and is the decision absent of integrity and respect for Equal Protection? Based on integrity and legal standards, the decision is clear and convincing of error because there can be nothing else to explain it, other than the insanity of a ruling. An insane judge would be then removed as incompetent. Citizens expect judges to know the law and keep their rulings legal and ethical. Chief J. Sullivan was unethical
Concerning defendant's Motion for the Reconsideration; concerning the Equal protection application of PB Sec 1-8 Rules, and 60-1 shall be liberally interpreted when in injustice shall occur. A family emergency affected the defendant’s submission date a few days before the due date. It was impossible to enter a timely Request for Extension. In my case, my mother succumbed to being critically injured by an automobile during the pendency period of the Motion For Reconsideration. I was called by my family to immediately go to Miami. At that time my family did not know whether she would live. I requested that the court provide the defendant with relief to be forgiven for this unforeseen event.
Also, The Connecticut Judicial Review Council Denial of June 21st 06 shows violations toward allowance for

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an open hearing on substantive rights and shows misconduct based on the same legal violations. Was it was illegal to deny hearings on clear constitutional matters, and further exercise Strict Scrutiny on content and associational rights? Did the court have in rem jurisdiction over the property and contract? Was Property illegally Seized in violation of 4th, 5th and 14th Am? As a result, I have lost what was rightfully mine, about $1,000,000 of what were mostly PROTECTED ASSETS in a Limited Liability Corp. My power of demand, as I was never allowed to prove in Appeals , for the mentioned company was only $11,500, and I had in good faith gone to Appeals in search for remedy to the baseless figure the trial court had made of $1,500,000. Also, other disputes over the Obligation of Contracts were never heard on appeal on the merits including contracts between the couple; Prenuptial Agreement and Couple’s mutual home agreement of 1991, A Complaint was made against spouse’s Breach of Contract in Trial Court. All parties have a right to a State Appeal. But, after Appellate denials and ignoring jurisdictional challenges (Demand: Sept. 11, 04; the appellate clerk lost the respective jurisdictional challenge), the Supreme Court also denied further Jurisdictional/Strict Scrutiny challenges. This is a violation of the constitutional law implanted in Connecticut Constitution Sec 10 Article First and other sections later mentioned. My allegations were clear to the court about the infringements of substantive rights. I accuse Chief J. Sullivan, and other judges of willful and neglectful avoidance of Constitutional mandates, and desertion of the Constitution, within “Color Of Law” violations. I accuse the court of an evil, tyrannical, and unethical appearance, as have the Conn. Judicial Review Council for Sullivan on July 18 2006.
4b. Mr. Knize requests relief from the May 2004 Memorandum judgment and denials for proof of Subject matter Jurisdiction now invokes Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4), which provides relief from a judgment that is void. Rule 60(b)(4) "provides a mandatory remedy that is not subject to any particular time limitation." Wilmer v. Board of County Comm'rs, 69 F.3d 406, 409 (10th Cir. 1995). The court therefore cannot err by denying any motion on the basis that it was not brought within a reasonable time.
“ We have held that "[f]or a judgment to be void under Rule 60(b)(4), it must be determined that the rendering court was powerless to enter it." V.T.A., Inc. v. Airco, Inc., 597 F.2d 220, 224 (10th Cir. 1979).
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That occurs when the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction or jurisdiction over the parties, when the "court's action involves a plain usurpation of power or if the court has acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law." Id. at 224-25 (footnotes omitted); see also Orner v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1307, 1310 (10th Cir. 1994) ("[A] judgment may be void for purposes of Rule 60(b)(4) if entered in a manner inconsistent with due process."). Mr. Knize further argues that a claim of fraud on the court is also not subject to the "reasonable time" limitation of Rule 60(b). "'[f]raud on the court . . . is fraud which is directed to the judicial machinery itself; shown by deprivations of due process and contract obligations.
5. Whereas: Were there the following Violations through said denials? It is an abuse of discretion and perhaps power for one or more persons acting under color of law to willfully deprive or conspire to deprive another person of any right protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. 5 (a) I claim Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law U.S. Code Title 18 Section 242 and other following Codes:
5 (b) Were there Violations? Title 18, U.S.C., Section 241 Conspiracy Against Rights, U.S. Code Title 18 Section 241 This statute makes it unlawful for two or more persons to conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person of any state, territory or district in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him/her by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, (or because of his/her having exercised the same) 18 US Code Sec. 2511 (d)(20) A conspirator is responsible for the acts of other conspirators who have left the conspiracy before he joined it, or joined after he left it; statutes of limitations tolled for previous acts when each new act is done. US v. GUEST, 86 S.Ct. 1170; US V.COMPAGNA, 146 F.2d 524.
The Supreme court Panels which consistently denied and dismissed Jurisdictional challenges, did so under the appearance and reality of conspiracy or at least showed a historic Pattern of Improprieties, with respect to recent Judicial Reform initiatives started by Conn. Governor Rell and consisting of three task forces formed, and a Legislative committee set up to examine the improprieties of Chief Justice Sullivan; who also presided over the Supreme Court Panel in KNIZE:
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VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY BY C.J. Sullivan; showing a pattern.
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE : April 24, 2006 STATEMENT OF LT. GOVERNOR KEVIN SULLIVAN ON SENIOR JUSTICE BORDEN’S LETTER ““Sadly, today’’s disclosure by Senior Associate Justice David Borden of possibly improper and unethical conduct by outgoing Chief Justice William Sullivan with respect to the pending nomination of Justice Peter Zarella to head the Connecticut Supreme Court is a very serious matter. Chief Justice Sullivan’’s apparent manipulation of the Supreme Court’’s reporting of its divided decision in a case that causes added controversy to the already suspect timing of Governor Rell’’s undue haste and pressure to confirm her new Chief Justice. The allegations demand a thorough and proper investigation by the State Legislature’’s Judiciary Committee. ““Chief Justice Sullivan’’s action is all the more curious because it appears to have occurred prior to Governor Rell’’s public announcement of her appointment of Zarella and raises further questions about why this entire process has been so highly pressured politically. Under the circumstances, it would also only be appropriate for Governor Rell to withdraw, clearly without prejudice, Justice Zarella’’s pending nomination and to wait on any interim appointment until the legislative investigation is complete.”” END See APPENDIX 3 for more.

Also please note, The Conn. Judiciary under Chief Justices Macdonald and Sullivan and J. Zarella has moved to dismantle what is clear public policy to adhere with the community: ABA’s Public Trust and Confidence Initiatives THIS “TRUST VIOLATION” IS WORSE THAN J. SULLIVAN’S ALLEGED IMPROPRIETIES CONCERNING JUDICIAL NOMINATIONS. After Chief Justice Callahan had initiated a great start-up program, Sullivan and Zarella moved to kill it a few years ago. That was not faithful to our Policy.
In the light of all the current events surrounding a need for greater examination upon the Connecticut judicial system, the court rules and acts of Judges concerning fairness and due process, I am sorry to present for U. S. Supreme Court review of Questions Raised of what are great injustices concerning the KNIZE case and the rampant willingness of some of our Judges to overlook constitutional law when applying practice book regulations. In the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Sullivan headed the Panel for my case. I have little faith in the competence of that judge at this point after reading the news. Clearly, he had power to influence the KNIZE panel decision. This doesn’t excuse others for their independence of the same wrongful decision. I rested all my faith upon my infringement claims in defense, so the question to this court is whether the court willfully and maliciously disposed of them, leaving me to wolves of post-judgment and judicial chaos?

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Practice Book regulations can be unconstitutionally vague, and are rarely challenged by parties involved in a lawsuit. However, Pro Se are more apt to challenging for vagueness, without the restraint of lawyer fees. I have had to do so concerning the 35 p. limitation rules for briefs of lower and higher courts; the reason founded on sensibilities that I had a right to raise all the issues and facts of Law, and claim of plain errors on 44 issues. That is what Open Court means by its most basic definition; HEARING ALL RELEVANT ISSUES ON THEIR MERITS. On that point the KNIZE record shows judicial excuses (Findings of Tierney) for brief repetition and excess, or shows outright Dismissals without oral hearings on Subject Matter Jurisdictional Challenges and demands for use of Strict Scrutiny. I have pleaded that repetition and excess are no excuses that supercede a proper examination of fundamental rights (Am X, U.S. Const.); A SEPARATION OF POWERS QUESTION OF LAW. The Plaintiff wishes to Certify this important question with this court. QUESTION before this court is whether or not any law which limits associational rights and content rights and which must undergo a Strict Test, should be then considered void; never to have had any enforceable power, that its effects never legally took hold once it was determined those laws are presumed unconstitutional. Inalienable rights as defined by Blacks Law Dictionary are:"Rights which are not capable of being surrendered or transferred without the consent of the one possessing such rights e.g., freedom of speech or, religion, due process, and equal protection of the laws." [Morrison v State, Mo App., 252 S.W2d 97, 101.] "Once jurisdiction is challenged, the court cannot proceed when it clearly appears that the court lacks jurisdiction, the court has no authority to reach merits, but, rather, should dismiss the action." Melo v. US, 505 F2d 1026.
PROBABLE CAUSE , Did J. Tierney at SUPERIOR COURT target a Pro Se Defendant, discreet group / Legal Advocate? : “When hearing the matters of pro se litigants to construe the rules of practice liberally in favor of such parties.” See, e.g., Alexandru v. Strong, 81 Conn. App. 68, 79,837 A.2d 875, cert. denied, 268 Conn. 906, 845 A.2d 406 (2004) (pleaded). My pleadings were put down through intimidation and then I was finally jailed until I was forced to sign over assets. Are these judicial improper or malicious acts which
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take an "undemocratic, tortured" interpretation of law? Liberally construed, my pleadings bring a general constitutional challenge to Connecticut's 35 page limitations, which were never answered on its face from Trial Court to The Supreme Court.
"We conclude then that government regulation that indirectly and incidentally calls for a choice between securing a governmental benefit and adherence to {freedom of expression} is wholly different from governmental action or legislation that criminalizes religiously {expression} inspired activity or inescapably compels conduct that some find objectionable for religious (Associational) reasons. Although the denial of government benefits over religious objection can raise serious Free Exercise problems, these two very different forms of government action are not governed by the same constitutional standard. A governmental burden on {conscience} liberty is not insulated from review simply because it is indirect, Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717-718 (1981) (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, at 404); [476 U.S. 693, 707] but the nature of the burden is relevant to the standard the government must meet to justify the burden." Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693

Denials act as an indirect way the court can subvert liberties, but due process has authority over unconstitutional policies like clerk-office denials given without reason. Those inactions prove lack of faithfulness to the law and do not support the Constitution, and show an appearance of anti-constitutional collusion. Under Conn’s PB 84-3, the decision of the Appellate or Supreme Court may change the position of the defendant in relation to having his issues finally heard. The Connecticut Constitution Sec 8 Article 1st: Section 5: AND: ARTICLE XXIX of U.S. Constit. “ No person shall be ...deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law...20 Am ”No person shall be denied the equal protection of the law. There was no Equal Protection. Was there? If a State Supreme Court panel makes an unanimous decision which outright breaks constitutional law, then that can only be proof of collusion; unless we believe none in a panel need apply any substantive law?
5 (c) Whereas did violations exist of Title 18, U.S.C., Section 245 Federally Protected Activities A. Laws: Cases and Codes U.S. Code Title 18 Section 245 ? 1) This statute prohibits willful injury, intimidation, or interference, or attempt to do so, by force or threat of force of any person or class of persons because of their activity as: b) a participant in any benefit, service, privilege, program, facility, or activity provided or administered by the United States; 2) Prohibits willful injury, intimidation, or interference or attempt to 11

do so, by force or threat of force of any person because of race, color, religion, or national origin and because of his/her activity as: b) a participant in any benefit, service, privilege {Plaintiff was Violated of ABA Public Trust and Confidence Initiatives of 1998 “To support the Constitution” }, program, facility, or activity provided or administered by a state or local government; 3) Prohibits interference by force or threat of force against any person because he/she is or has been, or in order to intimidate such person or any other person or class of persons from participating or affording others the opportunity or protection to so participate, or lawfully aiding or encouraging other persons to participate in any of the benefits or activities listed in items (1) and (2), above without discrimination as to race, color, religion, or national origin. END
CLAIM for right of legal Advocacy: The plaintiff claims his national origin as a U. S. Citizen in observance and within certain ethical beliefs of protecting constitutional rights; was a factor of the court’s discrimination. His privileges and immunities to exercise those privileges for investigation of Public Confidence and Trust initiatives were illegally prevented through the omission of an appropriate hearing to address the substantive issues raised. The plaintiff had undue force placed upon him by being falsely imprisoned until assets not even owned by the plaintiff were transmuted to mean relieving assets that Judge Winslow had protected for Mr. Knize in her Decision. The plaintiff was not legally liable for assets out of his reach and was aggrieved by actions which sought to then attack his order-protected livelihood (shown in Decision order number 27). This violation leads and relates to the next allegation:
5 (d) Whereas: Was there a violation of Section 2236 Laws: Cases and Codes |U.S. Code Title 42 Section 1983 and Sec. 1985: Civil action for deprivation of rights? Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
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redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. Allegation: a declaratory decree was violated and/or declaratory relief was unavailable concerning the granting of the Plaintiff’s stock assets to the plaintiff under J. Winslow’s Memorandum of Decision Number 27 and reinforced by Judge Winslow’s Articulation dated May 26 04 and July 30th 04 and yet the defendant was forced under false imprisonment to hand over those assets against his right to property enumerated in the Constitution Am 14 and others. It was IMPOSSIBLE by obligation of contract for the plaintiff to have paid award to the spouse out of the OK Art Exhibitions, LTD because of the stipulations contained in the Shareholder’s Agreement did not permit a $400,000 demand but only a $11,500 power of Demand, and that right of first refusal by members would only elicit $11,500. Judge Winslow ruled that the wife had no expectancy to those assets. Thus, the actions of J. Tiernery and Conn. Supreme Court, who presided after J. Winslow was removed by the Judiciary from divorce cases, constitute false imprisonment, deprivation of property rights, illegally seized property, and color of law violations.
See App 5 and 6 Thus the continued allegation:
5 (e) Whereas; Did there exist an appearance and reality of impropriety for Pattern and Practice Laws: Cases and Codes U.S. Code Title 42 Section 14141? This civil statute was a provision within the Crime Control Act of 1994 and makes it unlawful for any governmental authority, or agent thereof, or any person acting on behalf of a governmental authority, to engage in a pattern or practice of conduct by judges and law enforcement officers that deprives persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
WAS THERE PROBABLE CAUSE BY ALL COURTS: PATTERNS OF VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY?
“Former chief justice files motion to fight legislative subpoena
By Stephanie Reitz, Associated Press Writer | June 23, 2006
HARTFORD, Conn. --Former state Supreme Court Chief Justice William J. Sullivan asked a judge Friday to quash a subpoena that would force him to explain to legislators why he delayed the release of a court decision to help a fellow justice. Sullivan filed a complaint in Waterbury Superior Court to challenge the subpoena, which the co-chairmen of the General Assembly's
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Judiciary Committee issued to force Sullivan's appearance on Tuesday. A hearing on Sullivan's complaint is scheduled Monday. The issue creates the potential for a rare constitutional showdown between the legislative and judicial branches of Connecticut's government.
Lawmakers want to know why Sullivan delayed the release of a ruling earlier this year to help shield Justice Peter Zarella -- Gov. M. Jodi Rell's nominee for chief justice -- from criticism as he faced legislative confirmation hearings. Rell withdrew Zarella's nomination until hearings into the matter are complete.” END Excerpt Also please note, The Conn. Judiciary under Chief Justice Sullivan and J. Zarella has moved to dismantle what is clear public policy to adhere with the community: ABA’s Public Trust and Confidence Initiatives. THIS “TRUST VIOLATION” IS WORSE THAN SULLIVAN FIXING JUDICIAL NOMINATIONS.
PROBABLE CAUSES. DETAILS OF UNLAWFULNESS Judge Tierney has constructed a finding that places indirect intrusions upon a substantive right claim, through an OMISSION of that consideration. That’s a well known ploy if one is with power to achieve undue influence upon the CONSENT of another and knows a challenge on substantive rights would threaten the judicial status quo. At least J. Tierney had some sort of finding: The higher courts refused to even hear the issue and dismissed it. All of it caused Post-Judgment havoc. I am terribly aggrieved by these actions, and it shows clear cause and right for favorable ruling for reversal and further actions for damages by U.S. Supreme Court.
1097 FIRST DIVISION September 27, 2004 No. 1-03-1615 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appeal from the Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 86 CR 16841 ) ) Cook County.v. CLIFFORD ANDERSON, ) Honorable) Michael Toomin Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding :” There are sound policy reasons not to transform the measured prerogative of sua sponte dismissal, containing the safeguards of notice and the opportunity to be heard in response, into the drastic prerogative of summary dismissal without those safeguards. As pointed out in Huminski, although "a claim may be entirely spurious on its face, the court cannot know, without hearing the parties, whether the plaintiff may be able to amend the *** [pleading] sufficiently to state a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief." Huminski, 173 Vt. at 519, 787 A.2d at 492. Thus, summary dismissal can deny a litigant the opportunity to cure a defective pleading. Lease Partners Corp., 329 Ill. App. 3d at 76-77, 768 N.E.2d at 59. Moreover, as pointed out in Osborn, pro se litigants, such as petitioner, are especially likely to be prejudiced by summary dismissals because their lack of legal acumen contributes to poor pleading. See Osborn, 848 P.2d at 241; accord Palmer, 53 Ill. 2d at 484, 292 N.E.2d at 382 (discussing how inmates' lack of sophistication can lead to their choice of the wrong kind of pleading). Additionally, it has been pointed out that summary dismissal deprives the courts of review of a complete record, possibly facilitating appeals of otherwise meritless cases and leading to overbroad appellate decisions.See Huminski,173 Vt. at 520, 787 A.2d at 492; Osborn, 848 P.2d at 241.”

Above was done by J.Tierney with the recent Motions For A New Trial and others. This was done by the
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Supreme Court with a “Chilling Effect” on content rights of numerous denials on brief matters.
The cases above highlight the probable cause of judicial misconduct in KNIZE rulings. J. Winslow, the original trial Judge, was “suddenly transferred” (Ethics Violations?) out of the Superior Court, and this fact has placed extraordinary undue burdens upon Pro Se Motions which would request of her to explain why she broke from well-founded laws about Limited Liability Shareholders Agreements, and about Contract Law. Contract Law is exceedingly complicated and the court must allow a reasonable opportunity for parties to present the history of cases and detailed analysis. But the defendant found 44 issues based on Error, the worst was that SHE EVALUATED WHAT WAS WORTH $11,000 (Shareholders Agreement) AS $1,500,000 AND FORMED ALL FINANCIAL ORDERS ON THAT LATTER FIGURE. I have been terribly burdened for years from this judgment with alimony. Has misconduct in all the courts led to unconstitutional taking most of my financial holdings, all because of “sleights of indirect attacks” upon my fundamental rights; ignoring mandated Scrutiny?
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS FOR A BRIEF: I would need at least three pages for each issue, and perhaps a 20 minutes cap on oral argument time in the court for each one. We must consider that a reasonable request for pleading rights. It falls within the protections of associational and content rights out of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. These are within the same breed of challenges that came before Connecticuts’ Election Reform cases as I have pleaded. {T}he application of the strict scrutiny test is required to any {Constitutional} infringement it may suffer. Roth v. Weston 789 A.2d 431, 441 (Conn.2002). J. Tierney remained numb to the claim as he sat in the courtroom. Strict Scrutiny is what the courts in my case fought to NOT HAVE HEARD. It was COLLUSION. Judge Tierney said in the open courtroom that my constitutional defenses were merely “Buzz words.” I responded by saying our National Constitution construction is certainly not buzz words. We see from this the demeanor of the court of Connecticut to ridicule and resist the premise of our fundamental rights. It seems almost a conspiracy, with judges protecting themselves from error claims in lieu of protecting the citizen first. OK, I’ll plead it: If seen beyond neglect of law; IT WAS CONSPIRACY. The Courts were Co-Conspirators of KNIZE. Conspiracy is
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unethical behavior which undermines the government. Treason is unethical. CERTIFY: WAS IT CONSPIRACY?
5 (f) Whereas: Did Title 42, U.S.C., Section 14141, make it unlawful for state or local law enforcement agencies to allow officers of the court or public officials (judges) to engage in a pattern or practice of conduct that deprives persons of rights protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.? This law is commonly referred to as the officials’ Misconduct Statute. This law gives the U. S Supreme Court and DOJ the authority to seek reversals in cases where it is determined that state Judiciaries have policies or practices which foster a pattern of misconduct by employees and public officials. This action is directed against a unconstitutionally vague state judiciary and involve issues which initiate Pattern and Practice review. KNIZE falls under 14141 CERTIFY: WAS IT PATTERN PRACTICE?
Whereas: The actions against favor of Mr. Knize were part of widespread patterns and practices of the Connecticut Judiciary through abuses in administering denials . The Connecticut Judiciary has denied hearings for hundreds of Connecticut Citizens every year without legal justification; the latest of which (news excerpt above) they have denied probable cause to even the CT Legislature.
6. Wheareas:; Did the court act TO DEPRIVE A CITIZEN OF HIS FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS TO PROPERTY RELATING TO U. S. LAWS, State Laws, cannons broken upon the claims: Conn. Stat. 51-14? "Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right nor the jurisdiction of any of the courts." U.S . Const. Am 14. B) Automatic Presumption for Unconstitutionality of Stat. Sec. 51-15; within the authority of a judge to administer Statute authority to enforce PB rules, or STAT Sec. 51-164t. (a), in relation to and application of PB Sections 4-6 and 62-7, Judgment must use Strict Scrutiny, C) Violation: The U.S. Const. Equal Protection of the Laws D) Violation: Connecticut Constitution Sections 8, Articles 1st and 5th/ Section 14/ Section 10 concerning denials to increase brief size- associational and content rights are claimed/ justice administered to prevent an injustice through Const. examinations and PB 1-8 E) Subject Matter Jurisdictional proofs Violations F) Violation: Article VI of the U.S. Constitution/ Judge Cannons 1, 2, and 3: Const. Law/ PB 1-8 G) Violation: UNDER STATUTE Sec. 51-14, any judge had a duty to cast out Vague Laws reviewed through Strict Test. H) Violation: PB Sec 24-20 - lack of SMJ for
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superceding state laws upon non-negotiable associational rights {Am 10 U.S. Const.} Sec.10-33. Nestor v Hersey, 425 F. 2d 504 acts void absent proof of jurisdiction on record. Violation of 18 U.S.C, 242, 28 U.S.C.A. §§1332, 28 U.S.C.A. §§§§1332, 1332(c), U.S. 1st, 4th, 5th, 14th, 10th, Obstruction of Justice by undermining the government; U.S.C. TITLE 18 > PART I > CHAPTER 73 > § 1505
7. Whereas: Were there Judicial actions AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY (was policy frustrated) for “Spirit of Restraint”? Judicially restrained judges don’t address substantive public policy questions, but only narrower constitutional ones. Their role is only to determine if the Constitution permits a state or locality to make the public policy choice that it did. This policy most abused by power in KNIZE was the right to bring forth legal questions about Conn. Laws that abridge rights.
8. Whereas: KNIZE showed violations of U.S. Const. Am. XlV; U.S. CODE Title 28, Part V, Chapter 131 Release date: 2003-05-1 §§ 2072. Rules of procedure and evidence; power to prescribe. “(b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.” Connecticut Stat. 51-14 reiterates the principle; showing an Equal Protection Claim. CERTIFY: WERE RULES ABRIDGING FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS?
PLEADED: The court must acknowledge judicial notice of a state having jurisdiction to enforce federal law, whenever raised issues were never fully heard in Federal court, and according to the following case: Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 67 S. Ct. 810, 91 L.Ed. 967 (1947) state courts have power and jurisdiction to enforce federal law. Trial court has subject matter jurisdiction over federal due process claims not tried on the merits in the federal courts. 54 CA 178. Even the Tierney trial court admitted he was a Constitutional Court, yet ignored the valid exercise. A Court can TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE of the 1998 ABA National Recommendation:
“The constitutional oath of office sworn to or affirmed by all public officials in the executive, legislative and judicial branches alike, embraces a commitment to the "spirit of restraint" that should dominate all interbranch relationships in fulfillment of their varied obligations to "support the Constitution." An Independent Judiciary Report of the ABA Commission on Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence.1999" http://www.abanet.org/govaffairs/judiciary/report.html

Violation of Conn. LOCAL PUBLIC POLICY: Report on Judicial site: ROBERT J. CALLAHAN PRESIDED AS CHIEF
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JUSTICE JUNE 3, 1999 supporting policy for "spirit of restraint" that should dominate all interbranch relationships in fulfillment of their varied obligations to "support the Constitution." The courts in Connecticut continue to violate the spirit of restraint to outright break our Constitutional laws doing things like NOT PROVING JURISDICTION with a finding and, if demanded, with Strict Test. “During his tenure as leader of the Conn. Judicial Branch, Chief Justice Callahan has also recognized that public confidence in the judicial system must be matched by and built upon a strong internal foundation.” The internal foundation of the Stamford Superior Court up to the Supreme has seemed to have collapsed, at least with the KNIZE case and J. Tierney is ruining the internal foundation at Stamford. The broad problem centers on ignoring fundamental rights. Please CERTIFY that question.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS AND THE CONCEPT OF LEAST RESTRICTIVE REMEDY: The famous GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) case, tested the relationship of marriage to fundamental rights and alerted Connecticut concerning the formation of unconstitutional laws which attack the sovereignty of marriage {and individual} rights. MR. Justice Douglas:
"....that a ‘governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation {or for that matter to a rule formed through common law} may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.’” NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307. "We ordinarily read statutes {law} to avoid, rather than to create, constitutional questions." In re Valerie D., 223 Conn. 492, 534, 613 A.2d 748 (1992). {In the absence of inherent legislation, there should be strong motivation for the KNIZE court to also have avoided, rather than to create, constitutional questions.} "To satisfy strict scrutiny, the State must show that [a law] furthers a compelling state interest by the least restrictive means practically available. Bernal v. Fainter 467 U.S. 216, 227 (1984)"
9. Whereas: Did the court violate Mr. Knize's rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Tenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; Article 1, Sections 10 and 12 of the Connecticut Constitution; as well as rights to be free from false habeas seizing, illegal imprisonment and gender discrimination under the laws of the United States and the State of Connecticut? As a result of the court’s unconstitutional and unlawful actions, Mr. Knize has suffered loss of income, has incurred damages from the court impairing the obligation of his contracts, has suffered and continues to suffer severe emotional distress and damage to his reputation. He seeks a declaration that the courts violated his rights 18
through stated abuses.
10. JURISDICTION; Whereas this action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. ' 1983 and the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and the laws of the State of Connecticut. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the federal claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 1331, 1343 (3-4). Supplemental jurisdiction is asserted over state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C ' 1367.
11. Whereas Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 1391(b) in that the plaintiff's claims arose in the State of Connecticut. Whereas TITLE 42 > CHAPTER 126 > SUBCHAPTER IV > § 12202 State immunity A State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
12 Whereas Jurisdiction to grant declaratory judgment is conferred by 28 U.S.C. '' 2201, 2202. An award of court costs and fees is authorized pursuant to 42 U.S.C. ' 1988.
12b) Whereas Jurisdiction of this court is invoked under the provisions of Title 42,CHAPTER 136 , SUBCHAPTER IX,PART B, Sec. 14141. - Cause of Action (a) Unlawful conduct) of the United States Code."Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipotent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious, If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means ... would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine, this Court should resolutely set its face." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928)(dissenting opinion).' (page 479)
No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All the officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it. It is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man who by accepting office participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives. United States v. Lee 106 U.S. 196, 220
13. Whereas Plaintiff Francis C.P. Knize is a resident of Wilton, Connecticut.
14. Whereas the Defendant is a resident of Brookfield, Conn,
15. Whereas The plaintiff demands a trial by jury on each and every one of his claims.

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16. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS; the plaintiff Francis Knize is a documentary producer for legal affairs and issues of our time, involved in judicial reform in Connecticut. Recent activities include starting a documentary on Governor Jodi Rell’s initiatives for the Borden Task Force; where I attended on behalf of my television show / public’s review on Public Trust and Confidence (Public Access and potentially Court TV.) On June 1st, 2006 I also attended the Committee Governor Rell set up under Att’y Groark, and it is evident Jodi Rell is demanding that the Judiciary undertake an examination of the Separation of Powers and how it applies to judges respecting Constitutional law. The Governor’s action stemmed from the alleged improprieties of Chief Justice Sullivan, ruled in KNIZE.
17. Whereas Connecticut’s Att’y General has declared a party’s rights to Strict Scrutiny: Excerpts
Attorney General's Opinion Attorney General, Richard Blumenthal May 10, 1991 SEE APP 4
As a general rule, whether a statute is subjected to strict scrutiny or the rational basis test is a matter of critical importance. Strict scrutiny places upon the state the heavy burden of demonstrating that a compelling state interest is being served by the statute under challenge.
Thus, a threshold question in any equal protection challenge is whether a fundamental right or a suspect classification is implicated. Statutes containing a residency requirement classify on the basis of the date that someone moves into the state.
Our analysis of the Supreme Court's recent decisions led us to conclude that, in general, where the benefits at stake in a statute containing a residency requirement related to the "basic necessities of life", {which include Contracts} the Court subjected the statute to strict scrutiny .”

OTHER CASES AND CLAIMS:
The statute at issue in Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., like that at issue in Schaumburg, constituted a direct restriction on protected First Amendment activity. Munson, 467 U.S. 950, 967 (1985).
Riley, 487 U.S. (1988). Because the statute mandated speech that the fundraiser would not otherwise make, the Court considered the statute a content-based regulation of speech subject to exacting scrutiny Riley, 487 U.S. at 795-98.
Exacting scrutiny was applied by the Court in Schaumburg, Munson and Riley, because the statutes at issue therein constituted direct restrictions on protected First Amendment activity or constituted content-based regulation. And are directed at and constitute a direct restriction on protected First Amendment speech. This was the case with regulations limiting briefs to 35 pages. Mmm
DOES THE FOLLOWING GENERAL CAUSES OF ACTION EXIST?: Under the "totality of circumstances," the

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behavior of the individual Judicial officers , denying and dismissing plaintiff’s infringement claims amounts to a prima facie case of discrimination against fathers (sex discrimination), Pro Se, and Legal Advocacy Groups which, unless adequately rebutted by the Connecticut Judiciary constitutes a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The circumstances giving rise to this claim include, inter alia, the fact that responsibility of judicial officers to allow a party a reasonable opportunity to be heard is one that involved mere ministerial duties (Clerk office denials} broad discretionary decision making by which; dismissals at issue here, cannot be justified on the basis and principles of fairness. Judicial liability rests further upon the fact that policymakers within the ABA "know to a moral certainty" that officers of the court will confront as to whether there is a justifiable basis to deny substantive claims; that in the exercise of such discretionary decision making such officers act upon their individual experience, instincts and attitudes -- including their personal prejudices; that there is a history within in the Conn. Judiciary mishandling discretion to Deny a party of a fair hearing and of wrongfully contempting fathers until they pay amounts before the fathers have fully rested their case, and that the failure for the Conn .Judiciary to support the Constitution show prejudice and bias, and amounts to deliberate indifference and/or Abuse of Power toward the constitutional rights of individuals.
“Apprising (to give notice to) a judge he acts in absence of jurisdiction, vitiates (impairs) his absolute immunity “Dykes v. Hoseman, 743 F.2d 1488 (11th, 1984).
The Conn. courts are out of their jurisdiction because my fundamental right to be fully heard at my option is in the Constitutional Jurisdiction and the rule of Common Law in consideration well-settled Constitutional interpretation, and it is not a States’ jurisdiction to form laws which compromise the intent of the Constitution and my fundamental rights. It is clear that when a State Law is challenged for Strict Scrutiny through a Demand of Proof for Power; the legal mandate is to appropriately answer the inquiry, not through a denial with no explanation, but through a rational response citing superseding authorities. If that is not done, then they have broken the law, are obstructing justice, causing undue burdens upon
parties, are breaking their oath of service, and shirking a duty of care.
21
“Proceeding without jurisdiction, particularly after a formal notice and demand for proof of jurisdiction have been completely ignored, is a criminal denial of due process of law, in violation of the Fifth Amendment, and 18 U.S.C. 242.” Stump v. Sparkman
"To satisfy strict scrutiny, the State must show that [a law] furthers a compelling state interest by the least restrictive means practically available. Bernal v. Fainter 467 U.S. 216, 227 (1984)"

WHEREFORE, the plaintiff requests that this Court:
1. Assume jurisdiction over the KNIZE matter; and the the Supreme Court lacked of subject matter jurisdiction on content and associational rights, they could enforce but not override the Constitution.
2. Issue a declaration that Connecticut violated the plaintiff's right under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution to be free of unreasonable seizures of life, liberty, and property.
3. Issue a declaration that Connecticut violated the plaintiff's right under Article 1, Section 10 of Connecticut Constitution to be free of unreasonable seizure and sale by being denied the ability to present a case on issues raised, and denied an ability to Cure Defects on the merits; and that Connecticut’s page limitations are unconstitutionally vague as to content and associational rights,
4. Issue a declaration that Connecticut violated the plaintiff's right under Connecticut law to be free from false imprisonment under consideration of the totality of circumstances; Conn. void laws.
6. Issue a declaration that the court violated the plaintiff's right under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution to equal protection of the laws and to be free of sex and advocacy discrimination; and that the court’s denial to file late was improper because one’s mother suffering a near fatal car accident was clearly and ethically just cause for a son to file late the Motion For Reconsideration, or that the Motion was never late in the first place being given timely to a Conn. judicial clerk just before he left to see his mother in Miami.
7. Issue a declaration that Connecticut developed and maintained practices, policies and/or customs exhibiting deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of its citizens, IN PARTICULAR failure to incorporate the Strict Test on content and associational rights; which caused the violations of Mr. Knize's rights, in violation of 42 U.S.C. ' 1983 and other codes fore-mentioned.
8. Reserve the right to later Order the State of Connecticut and/or individual Judges to pay compensatory and punitive damages to the plaintiff;
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9. Issue a declaration that the Supreme Court of Connecticut did not prove it’s jurisdiction according to the well-founded principles of Law, that there is no discretion to ignore SMJ.
10. Issue a Declaration that Conn. abused and frustrated Social Policies and privileges on supporting the Constitution.
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177, that "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." Every state legislator and executive and judicial officer is solemnly committed by oath taken pursuant to Art. VI, cl. 3, "to support this Constitution."...
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=287&invol=378 No state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it. Chief Justice Marshall spoke for a unanimous Court in saying that: "If the legislatures of the several states may, at will, annul the judgements of the courts of the United States, and destroy the rights acquired under those judgements, the constitution itself becomes a solemn mockery..." 9 U.S. 115 United States v. Peters

11. Issue a declaration that rulings to prevent a brief from being over 35 pages by a finding for excess and repetition do not supercede a proper examination of fundamental rights to free association and content. As well, declare that rulings must consider those rights for a just reasoning to increase oral argument time. Declare that Rulings must recognize ample pages and oral argument based on each issue, for proper defense of each reasonable issue raised. Declare the standard of review is first of federal jurisdiction of which states have the authority to enforce but not override. Declare that the Connecticut Supreme Court Orders, denials and dismissals against KNIZE Plaintiff’s Motions to hold to above-stated accountability are Void, and therefore all orders that followed off the void order are also void.
12. Issue a declaration that Connecticut’s Judicial Review Council erred by not finding probable cause of misconduct by judges ignoring and breaking Strict Scrutiny protocol, and that they failed strict scrutiny yet one more time. Declare the definition of Misconduct to include unlawfulness and unfairness which is always subject to De Novo review. See APP 8.
13. Issue a declaration there is a Pattern of Judicial Abuse in Connecticut Courts from the evidence presented and violation of Section 1985 of Title 42 U.S.C.
14. Issue a declaration that all courts proceeded without jurisdidiction: “Proceeding without jurisdiction,
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particularly after a formal notice and demand for proof of jurisdiction have been completely ignored, is a criminal denial of due process of law, in violation of the Fifth Amendment, and 18 U.S.C. 242."
“Once challenged, jurisdiction cannot be ‘assumed’ it must be proved to exist”.
Stuck v Medical Eaminers, 94 Ca.2d 751, 211 P. 2s 389 “Jurisdiction once challenged cannot be assumed and must be decided”.
Main v. Thiboutot, 100 S.Ct. 2502 “...federal jurisdiction cannot be assumed, but must be clearly shown”. Brooks v. Yawkey, 200 F. 2d 633
"A court cannot confer jurisdiction where none existed and cannot make a void proceeding valid. It is clear and well established law that a void order can be challenged in any court", OLD WAYNE MUT. L. ASSOC. v. McDONOUGH, 204 U. S. 8, 27 S. Ct. 236 (1907).
"The burden shifts to the court to prove jurisdiction." Rosemond v. Lambert, 469 F2d 416.
"Court must prove on the record, all jurisdiction facts related to the jurisdiction asserted." Lantana v. Hopper, 102 F2d 188; Chicago v. New York, 37 F Supp 150.
"A universal principle as old as the law is that a proceedings of a court without jurisdiction are a nullity and its judgment therein without effect either on person or property."
Norwood v. Renfield, 34 C 329; Ex parte Giambonini, 49 P. 732.

15. Issue a declaration that all courts proceeded to use Denials to conceal, and cover up by trick the underlying complete body of issues presented in the Defendant’s Appellate Brief. Nothing was heard in Appeals on the merits. Declare Conn. Supreme CT conducted itself willfully and with deliberate indifference.
TITLE 18 > PART I > CHAPTER 47 > § 1001 Statements or entries generally
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and willfully- SEE APP 7
(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact;
(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation; or
(3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry; shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both. 16. Order Connecticut to pay court fees, and other related fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. ' 1988; and 17. Grant any other relief the court deems appropriate, (TITLE 42 > CHAPTER 126 > SUBCHAPTER IV > § 12202 State immunity A State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment.)
FRANCIS C. P. KNIZE Unknown whether Waverly Knize
Plaintiff Sui Juris/ Pro Se Will be represented by Counsel
50 Sunset Pass/Wilton, Ct/06897 Address’ 13 Johns Street
203 544 9603 24 Brookfield, Conn. 06804

APPENDIX:
APP 1: LII / Legal Information Institute

The vagueness doctrine is to require precise standards for enforcement. "A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.44

Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95, 97 (1948) . ““Vague laws offend several important values. First, because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warnings. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory applications.”” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108––09 (1972) , quoted in Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982) .
App 2: Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right, they must first be notified." Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223, 233. See Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274; Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409; Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385. It is equally fundamental that the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard "must be granted at a meaningful time, in a meaningful manner." Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552.
The primary question in the present cases is whether these state statutes are constitutionally defective in failing to provide for hearings "at a meaningful time." The Florida replevin process guarantees an opportunity for a hearing after the seizure of goods, and the Pennsylvania process allows a post-seizure hearing if the aggrieved party shoulders the burden of initiating one. But neither the Florida nor the Pennsylvania statute provides for notice or an opportunity to be heard before the seizure. The issue is whether procedural due process in the context of these cases requires an opportunity for a hearing before the State authorizes its agents to seize property in the possession of a person upon the application of another.
The constitutional right to be heard is a basic aspect of the duty of government to follow a fair process of decision making when it acts to deprive a person of his possessions. The purpose of this requirement is not [p81] only to ensure abstract fair play to the individual. Its purpose, more particularly, is to protect his use and possession of property from arbitrary encroachment -- to minimize substantively unfair or mistaken deprivations of property, a danger that is especially great when the State seizes goods simply upon the application of and for the benefit of a private party. So viewed, the prohibition against the deprivation of property without due process of law reflects the high value, embedded in our constitutional and political history, that we place on a person's right to enjoy what is his, free of governmental interference. See Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552.
The requirement of notice and an opportunity to be heard raises no impenetrable barrier to the taking of a person's possessions. But the fair process of decisionmaking that it guarantees works, by itself, to protect against arbitrary deprivation of property. For when a person has an opportunity to speak up in his own defense, and when the State must listen to what he has to say, substantively unfair and simply mistaken deprivations of property interests can be prevented. It has long been recognized that fairness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided determination of facts decisive of rights. . . . [And n]o better instrument has been devised for arriving at truth than to give a person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it. Joint Ant-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170-172 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
If the right to notice and a hearing is to serve its full purpose, then, it is clear that it must be granted at a time when the deprivation can still be prevented. At a later hearing, an individual's possessions can be returned to him if they were unfairly or mistakenly taken in the first place. Damages may even be [p82] awarded to him for the wrongful deprivation. But no later hearing and no damage award can undo the fact that the arbitrary taking that was subject to the right of procedural due process has already occurred. "This Court has not . . . embraced the general proposition that a wrong may be done if it can be undone." Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 647.
This is no new principle of constitutional law. The right to a prior hearing has long been recognized by this Court under the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments. Although the Court has held that due process tolerates variances in the form of a hearing "appropriate to the nature of the case," Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313, and "depending upon the importance of the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings [if any]," Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378, the Court has traditionally insisted that, whatever its form, opportunity for that hearing must be provided before the deprivation at issue takes effect. E.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542; Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254; Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. at 551; Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., supra, at 313; Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 152153; United States v. Illinois Central R. Co., 291 U.S. 457, 463; Londoner v. City & County of Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385-386. See Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550-551. FUENTES v. SHEVIN 407 U.S. 67 (1972)
App 3 Sullivan improprieties

APP 4 Attorney General's Opinion Attorney General, Richard Blumenthal May 10, 1991
Dr. Andrew McKirdy; Executive Director; Board of Trustees of Community Technical Colleges
61 Woodland Street
Hartford, CT 06105

As a general rule, whether a statute is subjected to strict scrutiny or the rational basis test is a matter of critical importance. Strict scrutiny places upon the state the heavy burden of demonstrating that a compelling state interest is being served by the statute under challenge. By way of contrast, the rational basis test requires the state to show that the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest and deference has traditionally been given to the rationale a state puts forth.
Thus, a threshold question in any equal protection challenge is whether a fundamental right or a suspect classification is implicated. Statutes containing a residency requirement classify on the basis of the date that someone moves into the state. Although the Supreme Court has consistently recognized a constitutional right to interstate travel; {KNIZE; right to contract} recent decisions by the court have differed as to whether the right to travel is a fundamental right independent of the equal protection clause or simply one aspect of the equal protection clause. As a result, the standard of review, i.e., strict scrutiny or the rational basis test, has differed from case to case.
Our analysis of the Supreme Court's recent decisions led us to conclude that, in general, where the benefits at stake in a statute containing a residency requirement related to the "basic necessities of life", {Contracts} the Court subjected the statute to strict scrutiny .
Very truly yours,
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL
ATTORNEY GENERAL
APP 5: United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)(misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken under color of law).
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 107-11 (1945)(officers performing official duties, whether they misuse their lawful authority, act under color of law).
Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97, 99-100 (1951)(misuse of lawful authority can constitute action taken under color of law).
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183-187 (1961)("under color of state law" includes misuse of power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law).

APP 6: Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (1989)
(claims that law enforcement officials have used excessive force in the course of a "seizure" of a person are more properly characterized as invoking Fourth Amendment protection and must be judged by reference to Fourth Amendment "reasonableness standard").
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985)(to determine whether a seizure is reasonable, the extent of the intrusion on the suspect's rights under the Fourth Amendment must be balanced against the governmental interest in law enforcement).
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111 (1975)(probable cause standard of arrest).
United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 800 (1966)(statute precludes interference with all rights protected by Constitution or federal statutes).
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961)(§§ 242 is satisfied by allegation of facts constituting a deprivation under color of law of a right guaranteed by the Fourteenth

APP 7 Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979)(an inference that a person normally intends the consequences of his voluntary acts is permissible).
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 106 (1945)("[t]he fact that the defendants may not have been thinking in constitutional terms is not material where their aim was not to enforce local law but to deprive a citizen of a right and that right was protected by the Constitution. When they so act they at least act in reckless disregard of constitutional prohibitions or guarantees.").
United States v. Ragsdale, 438 F.2d 21, 23-26 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 919 (1971)(an instruction regarding ordinary consequences of voluntary acts is appropriate).
United States v. Stokes, 506 F.2d 771, 776-77 (5th Cir. 1975)(to act willfully is to act with the intent to deprive another of his constitutional rights).
United States v. Love, 767 F.2d 1052, 1059-60 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1081 (1986)(upheld instruction regarding inference that one normally intends the consequences of voluntary acts).
United States v. O'Dell, 462 F.2d 224, 232 n. 10 (6th Cir. 1972)(the defendants need not have known specifically that they were violating constitutional rights).
United States v. Gwaltney, 790 F.2d 1378, 1386 (9th Cir. 1986) ("it is not necessary for the Government to prove that the defendant was thinking in constitutional terms at the time of the incident, for a reckless disregard for a person's constitutional rights is evidence of specific intent to deprive that person of those rights.")

TITLE 42 > CHAPTER 126 > SUBCHAPTER IV > § 12202 State immunity A State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 155 (1966), cited also in Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649.644
"Constitutional 'rights' would be of little value if they could be indirectly denied."

APP 8: Where the classification impinges upon a fundamental right or impacts upon an inherently suspect group, it will be subjected to strict scrutiny and will be set aside unless it is justified by a compelling state interest; State v. Matos, 240 Conn. 743, 760-61, 694 A.2d 775 (1997).
“A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases. But our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness.”” In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) .
"[T]his presumption of constitutionality imposes upon the trial court, as well as this court, the duty to construe statutes, whenever possible, in a manner that comports with constitutional safeguards of liberty." State v. Floyd, 217 Conn. 73, 88, 584 A.2d 1157 (1991). Also, our precedents lead us to use a strict scrutiny test of governmental acts that infringe upon fundamental rights.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS AND THE CONCEPT OF LEAST RESTRICTIVE REMEDY: The famous GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) case, tested the relationship of marriage to fundamental rights and alerted Connecticut concerning the formation of unconstitutional laws which attack the sovereignty of marriage rights. Emphasis added, MR. Justice Douglas: "....that a ‘governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation {or for that matter to a rule formed through common law} may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.’” NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307. END That would be the protected freedom of contract.
"We ordinarily read statutes {law} to avoid, rather than to create, constitutional questions." In re Valerie D., 223 Conn. 492, 534, 613 A.2d 748 (1992). In the absence of inherent legislation, there should be strong motivation for the KNIZE court also to avoid, rather than to create, constitutional questions. "To satisfy strict scrutiny, the State must show that [a law] furthers a compelling state interest by the least restrictive means practically available. Bernal v. Fainter 467 U.S. 216, 227 (1984)"
STANDARD DEFINED: The U.S. Supreme Court has dictated the standard of "least restrictive remedy" as a guideline to protect against a state's intrusion of constitutional protections. The clear intent of such high court dicta lays the groundwork for lower divorce courts to recognize that their common law rulings should not be "flamboyant" or “made up”.

APP 9: THE doctrine of unconstitutional conditions holds that government may not
grant a benefit on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional
right, even if the government may withhold that benefit altogether. ... The
"exchange" thus has two components: the conditioned government benefit on the one hand and the affected constitutional right on the other. ... We mustl first unravel possible meanings of coercion in three seminal decisions that extended unconstitutional conditions doctrine to speech and religious exercise:
Speiser v. Randall, Sherbert v. Verner, and Shapiro v. Thompson. ... While unconstitutional conditions doctrine thus is hardly unique in deeming some offers of benefit coercive, the concept of coercion will depend just as inescapably on independent conceptions of utility, autonomy, fairness, or desert
in the unconstitutional conditions context as in other contexts. ... The other invalidated the regulations, reasoning that whatever the government's power to control the use of federal funds, it had here "go[ne] beyond a mere refusal to subsidize" and had imposed an "unconstitutional penalty" on the use of
nonfederal funds to advocate, counsel, or encourage abortion. ... Second, an unconstitutional condition can skew the distribution of constitutional rights among rightholders because it necessarily discriminates facially between those who do and those who do not comply with the condition. ...
HIGHLIGHT: Basic constitutional jurisprudence dictates that courts subject most government benefit decisions to minimal scrutiny, but scrutinize government actions that directly burden preferred liberties more closely. Unconstitutional conditions problems arise at the boundary between these two directives: when government conditions a benefit on the recipient's waiver of a preferred liberty, should courts review the conditioned benefit deferentially, as a benefit, or strictly, as a burden on a preferred liberty?

























FA-02-0190291-S Family : U. S. SUPREME COURT PENDING
AC 25532 Appellate/Supreme
WAVERLY KNIZE :
VS.
FRANCIS C. P. KNIZE : JULY 3 , 2006

MOTION FOR LEAVE Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (Rule 14); Motion for Leave to File a Bill of Complaint and Brief in Support (Rule 17.3);
Plaintiff; Francis Knize is seeking to proceed in forma pauperis files a motion for leave to do so, together with the party’s notarized affidavit or declaration (in compliance with 28 U. S. C. § 1746) in the form prescribed by the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, Form 4. I state for the record that this leave to proceed in forma pauperis was not sought in any other court
2. This leave to proceed in forma pauperis is sought for the purpose of filing documents, briefs , the motion complies with Rule 21. As provided in that Rule, it suffices to file an original and 10 copies.

FRANCIS C. P. KNIZE Unknown whether Waverly Knize
Plaintiff Sui Juris/ Pro Se Will be represented by Counsel
50 Sunset Pass/Wilton, Ct/06897 Address’ 13 Johns Street
203 544 9603 Brookfield, Conn.








FA-02-0190291-S Family : U. S. SUPREME COURT PENDING
AC 25532 Appellate/Supreme
WAVERLY KNIZE :
VS.
FRANCIS C. P. KNIZE : JULY 3 , 2006

PROOF OF SERVICE AFFIDAVIT

Pursuant Rule 29 (c) a notarized affidavit or declaration in compliance with 28 U. S. C. §§ 1746, reciting the facts and circumstances of service in accordance with the appropriate paragraph or paragraphs of this Rule, whenever service is made by any person not a member of the Bar of this Court and not an attorney appointed to represent a party under the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, see 18 U. S. C. §§ 3006A(d)(6), or under any other applicable federal statute.
SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT
The Plaintiff, Francis C. P.Knize declares in compliance with 28 U. S. C. §§ 1746, that the facts and circumstances of service in accordance with the appropriate paragraph or paragraphs of Rule 29, That I personally delivered the Petition of Certiori to Attorney O’Sullivan within 3 days of July 3, 2006 and left it at the door of her office. I declare that all facts to the petition are true and accurate and placed in good faith in accordance with the law.
Francis C. P. Knize

Plaintiff
50 Sunset Pass
Wilton, Ct 06897
203 544 9603




STOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOP FA-02-0190291-S : U. S. SUPREME COURT PENDING
WAVERLY KNIZE : JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF STAMFORD/NORWALK
VS. :
FRANCIS C. P. KNIZE : JULY 3 , 2006

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