CP 3

File an appearence forms
FORMA PAUPERIS COMPLAINT FORM and leave financial affidavit
Notice of removal needs orig summons complete file AFFIDAVIT and
form mot to


Notice of pending motions

Third parties added on by Motion to file a3rd Party Complaint members

petition for removal at the state Court. Before pleadings are due

no limit on pages complaint
“Relief under Rule 60(b)(3) and (4) may be granted when the motion is substantiated motion to suppress under Rule 12.
add third parties

no appendix

Mot to dismiss

Rule 41(e) motion

All pleadings must be prepared in conformity with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Each such pleading shall be punched with two holes, 2-3/4" apart, each centered 7/16" from the
upper edge, one being 2-7/8" from the left edge and the other being 2-7/8" from the right edge,
each being 1/4" in diameter. Pleadings shall be double-spaced, on 8-1/2" by 11" paper with a left
margin of at least 1" free from all typewritten or printed material, shall have page numbers in the
bottom margin of each page after page 1,

J..William J Sullivan Supreme Court
J.. David M. Borden Supreme Court
J. Fleming l. Norcott Supreme Court
J. Joette Katz Supreme Court
J. Rich M. Palmer Supreme Court
J. Christine S Zerteseuille Supreme Court
J. Peter T. Zarella Supreme Court
State of Connecticut a party

Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), civil rico





UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2nd CIRCUIT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT Phone: (203)579-5861 Fax: (203)579-5867
FORMA PAUPERIS COMPLAINT FORM
Case No.___

____________________


Francis C. P. Knize, Et AL
PendingThird Party Defendants OK ART EXHIBITIONS, LTD Et AL
v.
Wavery Knize Plaintiff

In eventual Process of Third Party Defendants in special relationships
Judge Heidi Winslow Superior Court
Judge Kevin Tierney Superior Court
Judge William Sullivan Supreme Court
Judge Fleming l. Norcott Supreme Court
Judge Joette Katz Supreme Court
Judge Rich M. Palmer Supreme Court
Judge Christine S. Zerteseuille Supreme Court
Judge Peter T. Zarella Supreme Court
Judge Barry R. Schaller Appellate Court
Judge C. Ian McLachlan Appellate Court
Judge Lubbie Harper Appellate Court
Judge Thomas A. Bishop Appellate Court
Judge Alexandra B. Dipentima. Appellate Court
Attorney Christine O’Sullivan; Plaintiff Wavery Knize’s Attorney
State of Connecticut

A. PARTIES
1.Defendant: Francis C. P. Knize a citizen of Connecticut who
presently resides at 50 Sunset Pass, Wilton. Ct 06897
1b.Third Party Defendants by application of they being Creditors of OK ART EXHIBITIONS, LTD through first right to purchase shares and being blood relatives.
Mr. Peter A. Knize as President of the Corporation and as member
Mrs. Lili Knize, Christine Knize, Fred M. Knize, Fred Knize, Jr. Chris Knize, Daniel Knize
2a: Defendant: Judge Heidi Winslow is a citizen of Connecticut
whose address is Stamford/Norwalk Judicial District,123 Hoyt Street, Stamford, CT 06905

2b. SUPREME COURT PANEL:New Third Party Defendants by application of fraud.
Defendant: Judge William J. Sullivan Supreme Court
Defendant: J. Fleming l. Norcott Supreme Court
Defendant: J. Joette Katz Supreme Court
Defendant: J. Rich M. Palmer Supreme Court
Defendant: J. Christine S Zerteseuille Supreme Court
Defendant: J. Peter T. Zarella Supreme Court
All are citizens of Connecticut-231 Capitol Avenue, Hartford, CT 06106

2c APPELLATE COURT PANELS
J. Barry R. Schaller,
J. C Ian McLachlan,
J. Lubbie Harper
J. Thomas A. Bishop,
J. Alexandra B. Dipentima.
All are citizens of Connecticut-231 Capitol Avenue, Hartford, CT 06106

2d.Defendant; Attorney Christine O’Sullivan is a citizen of Connecticut, 13 Hermit Lane, Westport, 06880

2e Defendant Judge Heidi Winslow is a citizen of Connecticut-
Stamford/Norwalk Judicial District,123 Hoyt Street, Stamford, CT 06905

2e. Defendant (as newly charged party) Judge Kevin Tierney is a citizen of Connecticut-
Stamford/Norwalk Judicial District,123 Hoyt Street, Stamford, CT 06905

2f. State of Connecticut; C/O Attorney Richard Blumenthal whose address is:
Office of the Attorney General, 55 Elm Street, Hartford, Connecticut 06106
B. JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of this court is invoked pursuant to “Federal question jurisdiction”. The complaint is based on federal law (which may be the Constitution or a statute); pursuant to Article III, Section 2, U.S. Constitution, 28 U.S.C. § 1331: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. secs. 1337, 1343(a), and 1367(a); Whereas this action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.1981/1982/1983/1985(3)/ 1986 (neglect to prevent), 1988 (proceedings in vindication of civil rights); Fourteenth Amendment as implemented by Section 1 of the third Civil Rights Act, Act of April 20, 1871, 17 Stat. 13, jurisdiction being asserted to lie in the District Court by virtue of the Judicial Code as amended, .and the Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and the laws of the State of Connecticut. Also, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the federal claims pursuant to 28 USC Sec. 1395, 28 U.S.C. ' 1343 (a) (1-4). Supplemental jurisdiction is asserted over state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C ' 1367.Rooker Feldman Doctrine does not apply. Petitioner’s desire to exercise rights under Title 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, et seq. §§ 1345 Whereas Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1391(b) in that the plaintiff's claims arose in the State of Connecticut. Whereas 42 U.S.C 126 > SUBCHAPTER IV > § 12202 State immunity A State shall not be immune under the ninth amendment to the Constitution of the United States and there is no immunity for public officers where they break the law in their private capacity, especially where they acted in a ministerial duty. Whereas a state is not immune to suit under Am 9 U.S. Constitution. Whereas Jurisdiction to grant declaratory judgment is conferred by 28 U.S.C. 2201, 2202. An award of court costs and fees is authorized pursuant to 42 U.S.C. ' 1988. Whereas Jurisdiction is 11 USC § 549/11 USC § 548 and other sections under the Bankruptcy code. Whereas Jurisdiction of this court is invoked under the provisions of 1341-1350 and Title 42, CHAPTER 136, SUBCHAPTER IX,PART B, Sec. 14141. - Cause of Action (a) Unlawful conduct) of the United States Code .The U.S. District Court has jurisdiction in cases involving questions arising under the Connecticut or United States Constitutions. Title 18, U.S.C., Section 241 Conspiracy Against Rights, {T}his statute makes it unlawful for two or more persons to conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person of any state, territory or district in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him/her by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, (or because of his/her having exercised the same). 18 US Code Sec. 2511 (d)(20) and under violations outlined in 18 U.S.C 371 and 1346.. A conspirator is responsible for the acts of other conspirators who have left the conspiracy before he joined it, or joined after he left it; statutes of limitations tolled for previous acts when each new act is done. US v. GUEST, 86 S.Ct. 1170; US V.COMPAGNA, 146 F.2d 524. The issues presented herein all concern the fundamental legal matter of due process of law denied through judicial corruption and thus, should be reviewed de novo, In re Bell, 225 F.3d 203, 209 (2d Cir. 2000). Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. Section 1400 (a) because all defendants reside in this District and committed alleged acts here. Since Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), it has been settled that the Eleventh Amendment provides no shield for a state official confronted by a claim that he had deprived another of a federal right under the color of state law. Mr. Knize requests relief from the May 2004 Memorandum judgment and denials for proof of Subject matter Jurisdiction now invokes FRCP. 60(b)(4) and 5 U.S.C. 556(d) which provides relief from a judgment that is void. Rule 60(b)(4) "provides a mandatory remedy that is not subject to any particular time limitation." Wilmer v. Board of County Comm'rs, 69 F.3d 406, 409 (10th Cir. 1995). The court therefore cannot err by denying any motion on the basis that it was not brought within a reasonable time. However, The U.S. Supreme Court holds pending Petition No: 06-9419.
Mr. Knize reserves the right to work with Atty’s of the United States for claim of Title 18 RICO Laws, Hobbs Act (18 U.S.C. §§ 1951 and others ) but CIVIL RICO claims, 18 U.S.C. 1341; 18 U.S.C. 1511 (obstructing enforcement of state law); and 18 U.S.C. 1961 (and statutes cited therein) through 1968 . are pertinent which are heard in the District Court; a .person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of Section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefore in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit. because the language of Racketeer Influenced and Corruption. The Organizations Act authorizes suit by any person injured in his business or property by reason of violation of Act tracks section 4 of Merryweather Act, rules established in cases for identifying proper complaints should be applied to RICO, too. Both requirements of Rule mandating particularity in pleading of fraud and liberal notice pleading philosophy of federal rules apply to RICO claims based upon fraud. The cardinal question is whether defendants have committed one of enumerated acts under 18 USC 1961, this case would be under section 1344 (relating to financial institution fraud, forcing control of Mr. Knize’s stocks), section 1503 (relating to obstruction of justice, 18 U.S.C. section 1951 (relating to interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion), section 1957 (relating to engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity). Relying on a fraud to one's detriment and resulting injury to property or business is injury cognizable within Civil Rico, as with Mr. Knize’s case: In Re:: HAZEL-ATLAS GLASS CO. v. HARTFORD-EMPIRE CO., 322 U.S. 238 (1944) Fraud Case; “{It is} proper for the court to permit the filing of the bill in the District Court where the rights of the parties to summon, to examine, and to cross examine witnesses, and to have a deliberate and orderly trial of the issues according to the established standards would be preserved” “ Conferring: violating the Petition Clause, Due Process Rights and 42 USC 1985. Appellate Jurisdiction is in this court pursuant to FRCP Rule 54(b) and 28 USC 1291.Complaint is timely pursuant to 60(b)(4); the judgment is void; and relevant pursuant (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding, or to grant relief to a defendant not actually personally notified as provided in Title 28, U.S.C., § 1655, (Other OK ART members) or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action. Reasonable Attorney Fees are sought under 42 USC 1988. In Re: Federal judges can set aside or overturn state courts to preserve constitutional rights. MITCHUM V. FOSTER, 407 US 225 (1972). 18 US Code Sec. 2511 (d)(20) A conspirator is responsible for the acts of other conspirators who have left the conspiracy before he joined it, or joined after he left it; statutes of limitations tolled for previous acts when each new act is done. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, Appellants have established standing to pursue their Rule 41(e) motion; A person aggrieved by the deprivation of property may move the district court for the district in which the property was seized for the return of the property on the ground that such person is entitled to lawful possession of the property. Mr. Knize further argues that a claim of court’s fraud on the court is also not subject to the "reasonable time" limitation of Rule 60(b). "'[f]raud on the court ...is fraud which is directed to the judicial machinery itself; shown by deprivations of due process and impairs contract obligations.”““A federal court has removal jurisdiction if the plaintiff's claims are either exclusively federal or there is a separate and independent federal question. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441. By filing a complaint under authority of a federal statute, known as federal question jurisdiction, the complainant is stating a claim upon which relief can be granted. In spite of the clear face of the federal question, (statutory authority), implicit within which is the statement of the claim, judges cannot deny complaints for breach of F.R.C..P. 12(b)(6), a legal and logical impossibility. Any judge who has dismissed a complaint for breach under 12(b)(6) where the complainant has cited a federal statute, has violated 18 U.S.C. § 1961 -- obtaining money by artifice, 18 U.S.C. § 241 -- conspiracy against rights and 18 U.S.C § 1001 -- false statement, 42 USC 1987 commands the U.S. Attorney to prosecute for crimes all persons who violate 18 USC 241/242. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 first appeared as section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which provided: “All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.” INTERFERENCE WITH INTERSTATE COMMERCE 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314.

In United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 1043, 85 L.Ed. 1368, in which Section 20 of the Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C.A. § 52, was under discussion Mr. Justice Stone stated, "Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with authority of state law, is action taken `under color of' state law." In RE: CASES shown; lack of Immunity:.
Title 18 U.S.C.A. 241, 242 are the criminal equivalent of Title 42 U.S.C.A. 1983, 1985 et seq. "Judges have no immunity from prosecution for their judicial acts." BRADLEY V. FISHER, U.S. 13 Wall. 335 (1871)
When a judge acts intentionally and knowingly to deprive a person of his constitutional rights, he exercises no discretion or individual judgement; he acts no longer as a judge, but as a "minister" of his own prejudice." PIERSON V. RAY, 386 U.S. 547 at 567 (1967)
"We should, of course, not protect a member of the judiciary "who is in fact guilty of using his power to vent his spleen upon others, or for any other personal motive not connected with the public good." GREGOIRE V. BIDDLE, 177 F.2d 579, 581.
"Government immunity violates the common law maxim that everyone shall have remedy for an injury done to his person or property." FIREMAN'S INS/ CO. OF NEWARK, N.J. V. WASHBURN COUNTY, 2 Wis.2d 214, 85 N.W.2d 840 (1957)
Immunity fosters neglect and breeds irresponsibility, while liability promotes care and caution, which caution and care is owed by the government to its people." RABON V. ROWEN MEMORIAL HOSP., INC, 269 NSI. 13, 152 S.E.2d 485, 493 (`1967)
"Actions by state officers and employees, even if unauthorized or in excess of authority can be actions under 'color of law'. " STRINGER V. DILGER, 313 F.2d 536 (U.S. Ct. App 10th Circ. - 1963 as defined by
"A judge is not immune from criminal sanctions under the civil rights act...State officials acting in their official capacities, even if in abuse of their lawful authority , generally are held to act "under color" of law. This is because such officials are " clothed with the authority" of state law, which gives them power to perpetrate the very wrongs that Congress intended Section 1983 to prevent. " EX PARTE VIRGINIA, 100 U.S. 339, 346-347 (1879)
"The language and purpose of the civil rights acts, are inconsistent with the application of common law notions of official immunity. . . " JACOBSEN V. HENNE, 335 F.2d 129, 133 (U.S. Ct. App. 2nd Circ. - 1966) Also see" ANDERSON V. NOSSER, 428 F.2d 183 (U.S. Ct. App. 5th Circ. - 1971) "Governmental immunity is not a defense under (42 USC 1983) making liable every person who under color of state law deprives another person of his civil rights." WESTBERRY V. FISHER, 309 F.Supp. 95 (District Ct.- of Maine - 1970
“Judicial immunity is no defense to a judge acting in the clear absence of jurisdiction." BRADLEY V. FISHER, U.S. 13 Wall. 335 (1871)
As long as a defendant who abridges a plaintiff's constitutional rights acts pursuant to a statute of local law which empowers him to commit the wrongful act, an action under the Federal Civil Rights statute is established. 42 U.S.C.A. 1981 et seq.; LAVERNE V. CORNING, 316 F.Supp. 629

C. NATURE OF THE CASE : (Starting Note: This complaint cannot be rejected pursuant Picking v. Pennsylvania Railway, 151 F.2d. 240, for not being brief. See Count Xl, whereby I claim civil rights as Pro Se and federal rights in this court. Since State Judges used law to deprive the defendant, he needs the full law to defend.)
Constitutional Violations :Secure against unreasonable seizures; Mr. Knize had his property and papers seized unreasonably, because contracts were not properly interpreted by J. Winslow of Superior Court in Stamford. Injury would not have occurred 'but for' the various Judges’ negligence, misrepresentations, breach of duty, and crimes. The errors, implicated under Jurisdiction above, occurred when judges failed to act, and the remedy will be in damages, and to restore the defendant to the position he would have occupied if the judges had taken reasonable steps to fulfill obligation and oath of office to support the U.S. and State Constitutions. “The "probable harm" necessary to obtain reversal on an evidentiary ruling means that the error would likely have effected the result. State v. Butler, 36 Conn. App. 525, 532 (1995)
Amendment IV: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
“The moment the idea is admitted into society that property is not as sacred as the laws of God, and there is not a force of law and public justice to protect it, anarchy and tyranny commence. Property must be sacred or liberty cannot exist." John Adams.
"Personal liberty, or the Right to enjoyment of life and liberty, is one of the fundamental or natural Rights, which has been protected by its inclusion as a guarantee in the various constitutions, which is not derived from, or dependent on, the U.S. Constitution, which may not be submitted to a vote and may not depend on the outcome of an election. It is one of the most sacred and valuable Rights, as sacred as the Right to private property...and is regarded as inalienable. " 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, Sect.202, p 987
Marbury v. Madison (1803) OPINION EXCERPTS: ”The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.
The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection. [The] government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right. . . .”

The KNIZE case holds the following elements: (1) deliberate violation of law; (2) fraud and conspiracy; (3) intentional violation of due process of law; (4) deliberate disregard of material allegations; (5) judicial acts without jurisdiction; (6) blocking of a lawful conclusion of a case; and (7) deliberate violation of the Constitutions of the state or the United States. ....All caused an injury of millions of dollars.

When the Constitution was enacted in 1787, it brought into existence the national government. But there was one stipulation: the national government's powers were limited to those enumerated in the Constitution. If a power was not specifically listed, government officials were not permitted to exercise it. If public officials did attempt to exercise illegal powers, it would be the duty of the Federal Court to declare their actions unconstitutional. One role of the District Court is to decide an issue of lacking state power: The 10th Amendment to the Constitution emphasized that those powers not granted to the national government belonged to the states and to the people. But state powers themselves were restricted by express language in the Constitution. For example, states were prohibited from impairing the obligation of contracts. Mr. Knize had contracts, was injured through impairment, he has rights vested in the Constitution; claims protection of the laws and the duty of the court to afford that protection and remedy to the injury, as his property was unconstitutionally taken by a government of men and not of laws:
“The common business and callings of life, the ordinary trades and pursuits, which are innocuous in themselves, and have been followed in all communities from time immemorial, must therefore be free in this country to all alike upon the same conditions. The right to pursue them, without let (To let is to grant a charter or contract to a person or group who has made a proposal) or hindrance, except that which is applied to all persons of the same age, sex, and condition, is a distinguishing privilege of citizens of the United States, and an essential element of that freedom which they claim as their birthright....All grants of this kind are void at common law, because they destroy the freedom of trade, discourage labor and industry, restrain persons from getting an honest livelihood, and put it in the power of the grantees to enhance the price of commodities. They are void because they interfere with the liberty of the individual to pursue a lawful trade or employment.- Butcher’s Union Slaughterhouse and Livestock Company v. Crescent City Livestock Landing and Slaughterhouse Company - Decided May 5, 1884 - U. S. Supreme Court 111 U. S. 746
“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion;” (of substantive rights) Article IV, Section 4, Constitution for the United States of America
“There can be no limitation on the power of the people of the United States. By their authority the State Constitutions were made, and by their authority the Constitution of the United States was established” - U. S. Supreme Court - Hauenstein vs Lynham (100 US 483)

Relief under Rule 60(b)(3) may be granted when the motion is substantiated by clear and convincing evidence that the court "acted with 'an intent to deceive or defraud the court,' by means of a 'deliberately planned and carefully executed scheme.'" Yapp v. Excel Corp., 186 F.3d 1222, 1231 (10th Cir. 1999). See also 60(b)(4). However, as a civil case: Breach of Fiduciary Duty of a court controlling the enforcement of contracts, is a civil matter, not a criminal offense. As a civil offense, the elements of proof required for conviction are considerably simpler than for criminal fraud, and it is not necessary to prove wrongful intent. The Connecticut Superior Court exceeded its bounds of limited judicial power by overriding the U.S. Constitution. The Defendant’s claims were primarily legal in nature, through also equitable as to personal rights to said below contract, showing “fraud on the Constitution”.
Paramount to the case is how all judges and the plaintiff’s attorney deceived the true nature of the defendant’s Limited Liability Shareholders Agreement (OK ART EXHIBITIONS, LTD, abbrv. OK ART) and ordered Mr. Knize responsible for $1,500,000 when he was legally responsible for only $11,500 according to corporate bylaws, if that. J. Heidi Winslow, the central conspirator, made a decision through deception, which is a legal statement which all parties were bound to, ie; parties relied on it and by law were forced to act on it. It was a false statement, done wilfully and intentionally; “an inference that a person normally intends the consequences of his voluntary acts is permissible” Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979). It was a ministerial duty to exercise LLC, UCC, and Constitutional Statutes and Law; there was no right to a judge’s discretion to ignore the law, and thus Judicial Immunity can be overcome if a judge's actions are nonjudicial or were taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction; Forrester v. White, 484 U.S., at 227 -229; Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S., at 360 . [502 U.S. 9, 12]. Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. Id., at 356-357; Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall., at 351. These acts can only be described as unprofessional, dishonorable, or immoral conduct. Other terms that apply are willful or wanton misconduct, malpractice, gross violation of one's professional duties, gross misconduct in the practice of the profession, or grossly unprofessional conduct of a type likely to deceive or defraud. Malpractice in KNIZE occured when the defendant was injured by bad or unskillful practices of law shown by the failure to do something that a reasonably careful judge would do, or doing something a reasonably careful judge would not do, under the same circumstances. Mmalpractice is a deviation from an established standard of practice——a failure to exercise the required degree of skill, care, and diligence or follow accepted rules. It was willful or due to lack of skill or neglect to disobey the law; it was accomplished in single acts and was something occurring over the course of proceedings.
Blocking of a Lawful Conclusion of a Case: If there was a dispute over OK ART, the jurisdiction was the State of Florida, where the OK members and the corporation, who have standing in this case issue, were given process and could claim their interest and rights, and where they agreed Florida was the proper state of Forum if a member or court was to dispute corporate issues. By J. Winslow’s assigning, through divorce court, a right to the underlying assets for a non-member spouse, that spouse’s shifted-interest claim can only be properly heard in a Florida jurisdiction, and further, not awarded through means of other assets the defendant held, his public stocks, and overstep direct payment from the entity in question through some unexplained “mosaic of distribution”, or as J. Winslow did, counting in the unattainable assets anyway. SEE UCC Article 9-311 provision in agreement prohibiting any transfer.

‘‘The maker of a fraudulent misrepresentation is subject to liability for pecuniary loss to another who acts in justifiable reliance upon it if the misrepresentation, although not made directly to the other, is made to a third person and the maker intends or has reason to expect that its terms will be repeated or its substance communicated to the other, and that it will influence his conduct in the transaction or type of transaction involved.’’ 3 Restatement (Second), Torts § 533 (1977)
The crux of the Winslow statements were that Mr Knize was responsible and owned/controlled the underlying assets of the corporation, which were statements knowingly or recklessly false. The truth is the Corporation owns the underlying assets and Mr. Knize owns only an interest in equity, a chose in action for which there was a mere expectancy for the realization of the underlying assets, and he was harmed substantially by over three million dollars actual damages. In Conn., through a judge’s discretion, a decision based on a “mosaic” of marital distribution can take into account all available assets of a party, but through “trick”, J. Winslow then distributed assets that she first granted as the defendant’s sole assets. This is constructive fraud glazed over. It was a bait and switch scheme. We can be sure transfer involved either a granting to the wife of LLC assets that were legally out of her reach, or public stocks of the defendant, that J. Winslow ruled at first were non-contributed to by the wife; therefore the defendant’s own. Simple deductive reasoning makes it conclusive there were no other assets which could justify a $400,000 award to the plaintiff. Any competent jury will be able to see through the judgment (Pierce the veil of the judgment) and deduce this. Mr. Knize finds that a reasonable jury could conclude from the Appellants' evidence that the Judges breached a duty of care to regarding lawful conclusions. A jury could further conclude that the breach of that duty was a proximate cause of the harm suffered by Mr. Knize and that allegedly negligent inactions contributed to injury.
“'Questions of negligence, due care, proximate cause and concurrent negligence present issues of fact for jury determination when the evidence pertaining to such issues is conflicting or where the facts, even though undisputed, are such that reasonable men may draw different conclusions from them.' Syllabus Point 5, Hatten v. Mason Realty Co., 148 W. Va. 380, 135 S.E.2d 236 (1964)." Syl. Pt. 3, Mays v. Chang, 213 W. Va. 220, 579 S.E.2d 561 (2003).
There is a higher standard for Judges to know the law, especially a divorce court Judge who must take exceptional care not to deprive someone of their Constitutionally protected property.
“Judges must maintain a high standard of judicial performance with particular emphasis upon conducting litigation with scrupulous fairness and impartiality. 28 USCA §§ 2411; PFIZER V. LORD, 456 F 2d 532; cert denied 92 S Ct 2411; US Ct App MN, (1972). "A judge knows that he lacks jurisdiction, or acts in the face of clearly valid statutes or case law expressly depriving him of jurisdiction, judicial immunity is lost." Id.

CLAIMING RES IPSA LOQUITUR - "the thing speaks for itself." it's assumed that Mr. Knize’s injury was caused by the negligent action of mostly J. Winslow because the misrepresentation was the sort that wouldn't occur unless she was negligent. J. Winslow’s judgment was in essence an act of Fraud, Deliberate Indifference, and Dereliction of Duty. Judges have no judicial immunity for criminal acts, aiding, assisting, or conniving with others who perform a criminal act, or for their administrative/ministerial duties. When a judge has a duty to act, he/she does not have discretion - and is then not performing a judicial act, he/she is performing a ministerial act. If a judge does not fully comply with the Constitution, then his/her orders are void, In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (1888):
“...he/she is without jurisdiction, and he/she has engaged in an act or acts of treason. When judges act when they do not have jurisdiction to act, or they enforce a void order they become trespassers of the law, and are engaged in treason (see below). The Court in Yates v. Village of Hoffman Estates, Illinois, 209 F.Supp. 757 (N.D. Ill. 1962) held that "not every action by a judge is in exercise of his judicial function. ... it is not a judicial function for a judge to commit an intentional tort even though the tort occurs in the courthouse."

When a judge acts as a trespasser of the law, when a judge does not follow the law, the judge loses subject-matter jurisdiction and the judges orders are void, of no legal force or effect. All financial orders were derived out of the wrongful valuation.
“Whenever a judge acts where he/she does not have jurisdiction to act, the judge is engaged in an act or acts of treason. U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed.2d 392, 406 (1980); Cohens v. VA, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed 257 (1821)

Constitution Article 6 implies that the judicial power must be used to protect and defend the authority of the U.S. Constitution with respect to the laws and constitutions of the states which named Judges DID NOT and the District Court NOW MUST DO:
“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”

TREASON: J Winslow had no jurisdiction to trespass upon the Florida Operating Agreement or OK ART EXHIBITIONS, LTD Shareholders Agreement. She trespassed on RUBIN (see below) law and lost jurisdiction, She Unconstitutionally took public stock property anyway after finding it belonged to the Defendant.A 1997 Appellate Court, in People v. Lambert, stated that a judge's "failure to enforce the law invites anarchy." The Respondent suggests that the failure of Judge Winslow to follow the law and the public policy of the State of Connecticut involves her engaging in actions of inviting anarchy. Since subject-matter jurisdiction was never lawfully conferred upon the court, no judge has lawful authority to act in case no. FA 02 0190291S, Judge Winslow has engaged in an act of treason by trying to overthrow my
sovereign rights to contract, and the rights dictated in the U.S Constitution and undermine the power and authority of the Judiciary.
Fraud Defined Pertinent To KNIZE, Judgement-transferred Assets: Gratuity fraud: An illegal gratuity is the giving, receiving, offering or soliciting, after the fact, of any "thing of value" for or because of an official act that has been taken. Extortion occurs when a person or organization obtains something from another individual or organization under color of official office and/or through the use of actual or threatened force or fear, including fear of economic or fiscal loss. Conspiracy occurs when there is the specific intent that a crime be performed; and there is an agreement with another person to engage in or cause that crime to be performed, and one of the conspirators commits an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. At state and local levels, there are various degrees of conspiracy, ranging from misdemeanors to felonies, depending upon the crime that is committed. Under U.S. federal law, conspiracy is a felony. Two or more persons conspire to defraud the United States when they defraud a person under federal color of law statutes. Mr. Knize alleges all in this case, and that the a breach of fiduciary duty occurs when a person, who is employed by (Judiciary Branch in this case) and owes a duty to an organization or another individual, does something that is not in the best financial interest of that organization or individual. The courts are trusted to do their best to disburse assets in divorce according to individual rights. The Organization or Agency of the Judiciary does not benefit from such acts against the integrity and efficiency of Court, nor does it instill the public confidence and trust. Breach of fiduciary duty is a civil matter, not a criminal offense. As a civil offense, the elements of proof required for conviction are considerably simpler than for criminal fraud, and it is not necessary to prove wrongful intent. Failure to Report a Federal Felony to Appropriate U.S. Law Enforcement Authorities: Examples of acts to conceal fraud include: changing, hiding or destroying official records in order to conceal the fraudulent act; suppression of evidence (Mr. Knize’s proofs of the Limit Liability nature of OK ART) regarding the fraudulent act; directly or indirectly causing others to withhold or suppress information pertaining to the fraudulent act; making false statements to investigators regarding the fraudulent act (as did plaintiff’s Atty O’Sullivan) ; or any other affirmative action designed to conceal the fraudulent act from authorities. The Judges and Atty O’Sullivan committed color of law fraud against the United States under Civil RICO.
Under U.S. federal Law, if turned into a crime case, if two or more persons act in collusion to defraud, U.S. federal conspiracy statutes apply; anyone who has knowledge that a felony fraud has actually been committed against the U.S. government; fails to report the fraud to appropriate authorities; and helps to conceal the fraud by giving false information, concealing facts, obstructing justice, or taking some other positive action, is also guilty of a felony. All Judges in KNIZE had the file, they could plainly understand Mr. Knize was being defrauded, They did not report the fraud to U.S. Officials, Judicial Review Council or exercise their own power to deal with it, even when it was brought to their attention with many of my motions. It was ministerial to obey Limited Liability Statute.
CASES:"Judges are not immune for their nonjudicial activities, i.e., activities which are ministerial or administrative in nature." SANTIAGO V. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, 435 F.Supp. 136 "It is not a judicial function for judge to commit intentional tort, even though tort occurs in courthouse." YATES V. VILLAGE OF HOFFMAN ESTATES, ILLINOIS, 209 F.Supp. 757 "There was no judicial immunity to civil actions for equitable relief under Civil Rights Act of 1871. 42 U.S.C.A. 1983 Shore v. Howard. 414 F.Supp. 379 "There is no judicial immunity from criminal liability". Id. "Repeated pattern of failing to advise litigants of their constitutional and statutory rights is serious judicial misconduct."  MATTER OF PEEVES, 480 N.Y.S. 2d 463."When a judge knows that he lacks jurisdiction or acts in face of clearly valid statutes or case law expressly depriving him of jurisdiction, judicial immunity is lost." RANKIN V. HOWARD, 633 F.2d 844. "Judges are not absolutely immune from liability to damages under Civil Rights Act. 42 U.S.C.A. Section 1983 & 1985 PETERSON V. STANCZAK, 48 F.R.D. 426 "Under the common law of England, where individual rights were preserved by a fundamental document such as the Magna Carta, violations of those rights generally could be remedied by a traditional action for damages; violation of constitutional right was viewed as a trespass, giving rise to a trespass action. WIDGEON V. EASTERN SHORE HOSP. CENTER, 479 a.2d. 921 "There is no judicial immunity from criminal liability." SHORE V. HOWARD, 414 F.Supp. 379 "State judges, as well as federal, have the responsibility to respect and protect persons from violations of federal constitutional rights." GOSS V. STATE OF ILLINOIS, 312 F2d. 1279 (U.S.Ct.App. - Illinois - 1963) "Conduct of trial judge must be measured by standard of fairness and impartiality." GREENER V. GREEN, 460 F.2d 1279 (U.S.Ct. App. - Pa. - 1972) "By the plain terms of section 1983, two - and only two - allegations are required in order to state a cause of action under that statute. First, the plaintiff must allege that some person has deprived him of a federal right. Second, he must allege that the person who has deprived him of that right acted under color of state or territorial law." Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980) Fathers' Rights Case Law Title 42 USC 1983 is for (federal) civil rights violations. "Judges may be punished criminally for willful deprivation of rights on the strength of Title 18 U.S.A. 241 and 242."

JUSTICE STEVENS has instructed: “Judicial immunity attaches only to actions undertaken in a judicial capacity. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227 -229 (1988). In determining whether an action is "judicial," we consider the nature of the act and whether it is a "function normally performed by a judge." Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978). ... ordering police officers to use excessive force is "not a `function normally performed by a judge.'" Ante, at 12 (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S., at 362 ).

In KNIZE accepting the allegations of the complaint as true, as the District Court must consider in reviewing, that the petitioner is claiming a fraudulent transfer through the powers of Connecticut court, which is clearly an Abuse of Power. The Winslow decision was not an action taken in a judicial capacity because it was procured under fraud. Ordering transfer of the underlying assets of a Limited Liability Company, for which members (Mr. Knize) have no ownership is NOT a function normally performed by a judge. "Absolute judicial immunity does not apply to non-judicial acts, i.e., the administrative… and executive functions that judges may on occasion be assigned to perform." Memmer v. Marin County Courts, 169 F.3d 630, 634-5 (9th Cir., 1999) Courts have repeatedly ruled that judges have no immunity for their criminal acts. Since both treason and the interference with interstate commerce under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314, Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218 , 80 S.Ct. 270, 274, 4 L.Ed.2d 252, 257 (1960). are criminal acts, no judge has immunity to engage in such acts. Acts in KNIZE include interference with interstate commerce because Mr. Knize, under the actuality of jail-time, was defrauded of his Public Stocks and transference was across state lines and jurisdiction is Hobbs Act: 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951 with respect to the offenses noted: Extortion under color of official right or extortion by a public official through misuse of his/her office is supervised by the Public Integrity Section, Criminal Division. (This Movant’s right to conduct interstate commerce without any restriction has been interfered with by mostly Judge Winslow not complying with Connecticut law.)

First Amendment Fraud: In part, this court must CERTIFY AN IMPORTANT QUESTION of first impression about just how far a court may go to limit grievances (Ist Am, U.S. Const.) to be heard though its limitations on brief sizes before any court can dismiss a case (which ultimately involves Unconstitutional Taking of property) on that basis, Congress shall make no law… abridging ..the right of the people .. to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." The Appellate and Supreme Court denied/dismissed my case by abridgement; that makes them co-conspirators to deprive me of my property and due process of my rights to contracts..Saying “you have only 35 pages” to show 44 issues of error clearly abridges my first Amendment rights. I can live with 3 pages per issue.
"States are not free to avoid constitutional issues on inadequate state grounds, they are given the first opportunity to consider them" O'Connor v. Ohio, 385 U.S. 92 (1966). “Since the state declined to rule on the issue, at any level of the proceedings, the state is then removed from consideration and jurisdiction may be immediately conferred upon the Federal Courts to instruct the state(s) on the appropriate answers or course of action, pursuant to jurisdiction under 28 USC 1331, and removal under 28 USC 1441, et. seq.” “When a vague law reaches activity protected by the first amendment, in addition to the due process concerns discussed below, there is a concern that the law will unnecessarily "chill" first amendment rights. See Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law 12-31, at 1033-35 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing the distinction where a case must be heard on the constitutional merits ).

“JOHN DOE, et al., :V. :ALBERTO GONZALES, CIVIL ACTION NO.: 3:05-cv-1256 (JCH) Page 10 However, ... where the challenged statute or regulation imposes a direct infringement on speech. "Where a plaintiff alleges injury from a rule or regulation that directly limits speech, the irreparable nature of the harm may be presumed." Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. of New York, 331 F.3d 342, 349 (2d Cir. 2003). Therefore, in this case, where the statute directly prohibits speech, the presumption of irreparable harm arises” Case in Conn.

1) Should it be allowed through First Amendment rights and Due Process that a court, which enforces the rules Congress makes, can consider the number of party cited plain errors from a given judge and justify a rightful need for parties to have at least 3 pages for each numbered plain error? Mr. Knize found some 44 plain errors from the original trial court judge, and he needed at least 3 pages for each issue. He believes the Constitution guarantees a right to have ALL of one’s grievances heard BEFORE any Connecticut court can seek to use administrative rules, like PB 67-2 under CGS Sec. 51-14/15, to suppress and abridge any particular grievance. Clearly, the judges don’t give a damn about rights.
. “A right guaranteed to the citizens by the Constitution and so guaranteed as to prevent legislative interference therewith. Delaney v. Plunkett, 146 Ga. 547, 91 S.E. 561, 567; L.R.A. 1917D, 926, Ann.Cas.1917E, 685; Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., West Publishing Co., 1968, p. 385"
The Petition Clause in the First Amendment is rooted in protest, and the U.S. Supreme Court has already held that the Petition Clause is the Right conservative of all other Rights. See Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907). Defendant's pleadings are petitions to government which exercise a Fundamental Right not allowing dubious intrusions of any kind whatsoever. Although a court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure for cases, if the case issues reach the District Court; section 2072(b) clearly prohibits the Connecticut Court from promulgating any rules which might abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right:

2072. Rules of procedure and evidence; power to prescribe (b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. [28 U.S.C. 2072(b)], which aligns with the Connecticut General Statute 51-14 "Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right nor the jurisdiction of any of the courts.” “The general rule is that an unconstitutional statute {or Conn. PB rule}, though having the form and name of law, is in reality no law, but is wholly void, and ineffective for any purpose; since unconstitutionality dates from the time of it's enactment, and not merely from the date of the decision so branding it. No one is bound to obey an unconstitutional law, and no courts are bound to enforce it”. -- 16 Am Jur 2d, Sec 177 late 2d, Sec 256. “Loss of First Amendment Freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury. Though First Amendment rights are not absolute, they may be curtailed only by interests of vital importance, the burden of proving which rests on their government. ELROD V. BURNS, 96 S Ct 2673; 427 US 347, (1976).

It is important to note the defendant claims his Pro Se Civil Rights :Cases

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 520 (1971)
Supreme Court found that pro se pleadings should be held to "less stringent standards" than those drafted by attorneys.

Elmore v. McCammon (1986) 640 F. Supp. 905 ... the right to file a lawsuit pro se is one of the most important rights under the constitution and laws."

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1959); Picking v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 151 Fed 2nd 240; Pucket v. Cox, 456 2nd 233 : [Pro se pleadings are to be considered without regard to technicality; pro se litigants' pleadings are not to be held to the same high standards of perfection as lawyers.]

Maty v. Grasselli Chemical Co., 303 U.S. 197 (1938) "Pleadings are intended to serve as a means of arriving at fair and just settlements of controversies between litigants. They should not raise barriers which prevent the achievement of that end. Proper pleading is important, but its importance consists in its effectiveness as a means to accomplish the end of a just judgment."

Puckett v. Cox, 456 F. 2d 233 (1972) (6th Cir. USCA) “It was held that a pro se complaint requires a less stringent reading than one drafted by a lawyer per Justice Black in Conley v. Gibson (see case listed above, Pro Se Rights Section).

Picking v. Pennsylvania Railway, 151 F.2d. 240, Third Circuit Court of Appeals [The plaintiff's civil rights pleading was 154 paragraphs and must have been over 100 pages and described by a federal judge as "inept". Nevertheless, it was held] Where a plaintiff pleads pro se in a suit for protection of civil rights, the Court should endeavor to construe Plaintiff's Pleadings without regard to technicalities."

Puckett v. Cox, 456 F. 2d 233 (1972) (6th Cir. USCA) [It was held that a pro se complaint requires a less stringent reading than one drafted by a lawyer per Justice Black in Conley v. Gibson (see case listed above, Pro Se Rights Section).

DETAILS: In PICKING v. PENNSYLVANIA R. CO., 151 F.2d 240 (3rd Cir. 1945) PICKING et al. v. PENNSYLVANIA R. CO. et al. No. 8663. Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
“ Mrs. Picking appears pro se .e complaint contains one hundred and fifty-four paragraphs .... The suit was dismissed on the motions of certain of the.defendants. It is appropriate, therefore, to refer to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Polk Co. v. Glover, 305 U.S. 5, 59 S.Ct. 15, 83 L.Ed. 6; and Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194, 55 S.Ct. 187, 79 L.Ed. 281. In the latter case it was said by Mr. Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Cardozo in the concurring opinion, id. 293 U.S. at page 213, 55 S.Ct. at page 193, 79 L.Ed. 281, "We are in accord with the view that it is inexpedient to determine grave constitutional questions upon a demurrer to a complaint, or upon an equivalent motion, if there is a reasonable likelihood that the production of evidence will make the answer to the questions clearer." The court below should have applied the rule of Ghadiali v. Delaware State Medical Society, D.C.Del., 48 F. Supp. 789, 790, and Allen v. Corsano, D.C.Del., 56 F. Supp. 169, 170, that where a plaintiff pleads pro se in a suit for the protection of civil rights the court should endeavor to construe the plaintiff's pleading without regard for
technicalities. As officers of the state, Mr. Knize’s rights were violated by the judges.
2) When Mr. Knize then requested that the various lower courts prove its burden to impede his fundamental rights (1st Am violation claim) under the STRICT SCRUTINY DOCTRINE, and produce a finding on record which will answer to such alleged deprivation, they simply denied and dismissed the case. "{T}he application of the strict scrutiny test is required to any {Constitutional} infringement it may suffer. Roth v. Weston 789 A.2d 431, 441 (Conn.2002)" The burden of proof was upon these same judges to prove page limitation rules are Constitutionally valid, because the proponent of a rule (Connecticut State) has the burden of proving its application in the instant case. See, in particular, 5 U.S.C. 556(d). This was a failure of the Court proving, in part, its Jurisdiction on the record, by providing a competent judge, which is evidence that the judges involved with my Jurisdictional challenges acted outside of their jurisdiction and therefore are not subject to any immunities.as judicial officers. Their rules in my case for page limitations abridge my 1st Am. Rights, created prior restraint on speech. “Such rules, however, must not abridge, enlarge, or modify substantive rights.” In Kohl v US, 1875, 91 US 367, 23 L Ed 449.
In Re: The Intent of The Constitution of the United States Chapter 10 as defined by Common Law: “Among these just and humane provisions, we observe, that ....that no one can be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. The obligation on the legislature not to pass laws inflicting unusual punishments must be considered as subject to some qualification; as Conn. did with CGS Sec. 51-14/15; in relation to and application of PB Rules 4-6 and 62-7 by limiting by pages for brief and then throwing out my case. The prohibition of unusual punishments applies alike, under the qualifications already noticed, to the legislative and to the judicial power. This restriction applies equally to the legislative and to the judicial authority, and for they not to indirectly abuse property.
The protection of the individual against all unnecessary severity in the prosecution of justice, characterizes the greatest part of the fifth, and the whole of the eighth amendment.
Article 10 (1791) declares: “...that the powers not delegated to congress by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people....”
"....that a ‘‘‘‘governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation {or for that matter to a rule formed through policy) may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.'" NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307. "We ordinarily read statutes {law} to avoid, rather than to create, constitutional questions." In re Valerie D., 223 Conn. 492, 534, 613 A.2d 748 (1992). "To satisfy strict scrutiny, the State must show that [a law] furthers a compelling state interest by the least restrictive means practically available. Bernal v. Fainter 467 U.S. 216, 227 (1984)"

None of these laws were respected by Conn. courts, and federal equal protection should hold it accountable. It is a duty of the Conn. Supreme court to address federal Questions.
“”Because the constitutionality of any statute cannot be determined under a 'hypothetical set of facts as yet unproven'; Lehrer v. Davis, 214 Conn. 232, 234-35, 571 A.2d 691 (1990); "and because current sociocultural definitions of "family" {or fundamental individual Rights} are so fluid as to create myriad factual circumstances to which this statute, as we have interpreted it, may apply, we are not prepared to say whether our interpretation of this statute, or a statute of any sort that may be enacted in response to our interpretation, would be constitutional in a given factual circumstance. All we decide today is that, in order to avoid the most obvious constitutional problems that arise from guarantee of equal protection, if a law "impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly secured by the Constitution [it] is presumptively unconstitutional."” Harris v. McRae 448 U.S. 297, 312 (1980)"

3) CONTRACT LAW VIOLATIONS: Written contract Statute of Limitations is 6 years; CGS Section 52-576. 3 years under CFTA. Of course, the time generally runs from the date a cause of action accrues or from the date injury or damages are discovered. Injury was within a year. The original trial court judge (Winslow) failed so many legal precedents (violation of the equal protection) of divorce court rulings, mostly concerning the VERY PUBLIC INTEREST of a citizen’’s rights to contract (violation of Art 1st, Sec 10, U.S. Const. No State shall.. pass any law.. impairing the obligation of Contracts), that the defendant felt compelled to address them all to settle the controversies and conflicts that the court itself created. The over-limitation, but “non-voidable” briefs were denied in several proceedings even though the court was motioned for an extension of pages with an attached Motion for Proof of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, the logic being that the Federal rules encompass the Constitution of the United States, that privileges and immunities of citizens are protected from abridgement, that the lower courts have the jurisdiction to enforce federal rules if not heard first in a federal court, that they do not have jurisdiction or incompetence to overrule a federal rule and in doing so they would be out of jurisdiction and thus not subject to judicial immunity with damages as to a private person
Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 67 S. Ct. 810, 91 L.Ed. 967 (1947); state courts have power and jurisdiction to enforce federal law. Trial court has subject matter jurisdiction over federal due process claims not tried on the merits in the federal courts. 54 CA 178.
But a judge must be competent to enforce the Federal rules or lose jurisdiction.
4) CONSPIRACY and Title 42, U.S.C., Section 14141, 18 U.S.C 371: J. Winslow, under so many (rumored) complaints by various lawyers, was soon after REMOVED from divorce court and was transferred to criminal court into another jurisdiction. The State of Connecticut was trying to hide the bad discretions of a judge by transferring her, and then tried to cover-up the problems of the KNIZE case by laying me victim to her inappropriate rulings, by being unwilling to overturn her unlawful judgments by denying my post judgment requests to Vacate her Orders, grant me relief to her void judgments, denying me rightful premises to have a new trial, denying me the clear probable causes to Open the Judgment. Plaintiff’s Atty Christine O’Sullivan failed to provide any reasonable argument against the enforcement of Contracts in KNIZE, did not answer as to Breach of 1991 House Contract, knew the law about Limited Liability Companies but remained silent as to the fraud upon OK ART, when professional conduct dictates she must alert the court of truth.
As a result, I have lost most of my property worth about $600,000, which, under the Constitution’’s right to property clauses, I was to be guaranteed a fair trial, yet Due Process was violated at every turn. Most significant in all of this was the fact that I always pleaded that a certain Limited Liability Company I had shares in, secured my protection from being responsible for any underlying asset value it held, and that my Shareholder Agreement would upon my corporate demand be valued at a nominal value of $11,500. The contract was in evidence. Yet I was jailed (I charge post-judgment J. Tierney with wrongful imprisonment) until I had to sell public stocks I held, which Judge Winslow declared in her Memorandum in 2004 as my separate property, and give my ex-wife $400,000. Also, my ex-wife had a House Agreement Instrument with me which I Motioned for her Breach. This Agreement was unlawfully discarded by J. Winslow as she legislated from the bench with non-pleaded arguments, ruling a clause was merely a Whereas Clause and not terms of the contract. The word “Whereas” was never used. Never could she prove it was not a term of the contract, especially when Mr. Knize was the drafter and held as the ultimate interpreter testifying it was indeed a defined obligation to share in the house expenses. Was all this not fraud as defined by Kenner? "Fraud upon the court" has been defined by the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals to:
"embrace that species of fraud which does, or attempts to ..defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery can not perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication." Kenner v. C.I.R., 387 F.3d 689 (1968); 7 Moore's Federal Practice, 2d ed., p. 512, ¶¶¶¶60.23. The 7th Circuit further stated "a decision produced by fraud upon the court is not in essence a decision at all, and never becomes final."

Therefore I claim RICO and other violations because there was a conspiracy to commit fraud upon the court. There is no judge discretion to defy the rule of law, a judge loses jurisdiction when he or she does, and judgments become void as a matter of law.
"There is no crueler tyranny than that which is exercised under cover of law, and with the colors of justice ..." - U.S. v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 614 (3d Cir. 1982). "Fraud vitiates the most solemn contracts, documents and even judgments" United States v. Throckmorton, 98 US 61, 70 (1878)
All Judges interfered or obstructed legitimate Government activity by wilfully causing harm to Defendant through judicial abuse of power ; or they made wrongful use of a governmental instrumentality. under violations outlined in 18 U.S.C 371.
U.S. Supreme Court and Connecticut case on Fraud provides the best defense:
HAZEL-ATLAS GLASS CO. v. HARTFORD-EMPIRE CO., 322 U.S. 238 (1944)
“Hazel contended that the Circuit Court of Appeals' judgment had been obtained by fraud
and supported this charge with affidavits and exhibits (Last paragraph:) In the present instance, I think it would have been proper for the court to permit the filing of the bill in the District Court where the rights of the parties to summon, to examine, and to cross examine witnesses, and to have a deliberate and orderly trial of the issues according to the established standards would be preserved.
I should reverse the order of the Circuit Court of Appeals with directions to permit the filing of the bill in the District Court. Mr. Justice REED and Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER join in this opinion”.
In Knize the fraud was extrinsic because the judges formed an improper ruling, and broke the law, disregarded contracts, disregarded jurisdiction after the case was presented. Proper Appeal was made and there are no Writs of Error possible, Conn. Legislature repealed the exercise. The Defendant has a clear right to put the judges on the stand for inquiry in the District court. There is a claim of Fraud in obtaining a bill of sale to defendant’s ’s public stocks and/or the court taking fiduciary control of sale or compensation of OK Art and 1991 House agreement which had bearing upon the couple’s mutual house ownership.
U.S. Supreme Court U S v. THROCKMORTON, 98 U.S. 61 (1878) “There is no question of the general doctrine that fraud vitiates the most solemn contracts, documents, and even judgments. Page 98 U.S. 61, 65 “'Likewise, there are few exceptions to the rule that equity will not go behind the judgment to interpose in the cause itself, but only when there was some hindrance besides the negligence of the defendant, in presenting the defence in the legal action. There is an old case in South Carolina to the effect that fraud in obtaining a bill of sale would justify equitable interference as to the judgment obtained thereon. 923 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 -- Conspiracy to Defraud the United States
The general conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, creates an offense "[i]f two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose. (emphasis added). See Project, Tenth Annual Survey of White Collar Crime, 32 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 137, 379-406 (1995)(generally discussing §§ 371).
The operative language is the so-called "defraud clause," that prohibits conspiracies to defraud the United States. This clause creates a separate offense from the "offense clause" in Section 371. Both offenses require the traditional elements of Section 371 conspiracy, including an illegal agreement, criminal intent, and proof of an overt act.
Although this language is very broad, cases rely heavily on the definition of "defraud" provided by the Supreme Court in two early cases, Hass v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 462 (1910), and Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182 (1924). In Hass the Court stated: The statute is broad enough in its terms to include any conspiracy for the purpose of impairing, obstructing or defeating the lawful function of any department of government . . . (A)ny conspiracy which is calculated to obstruct or impair its efficiency and destroy the value of its operation and reports as fair, impartial and reasonably accurate, would be to defraud the United States by depriving it of its lawful right and duty of promulgating or diffusing the information so officially acquired in the way and at the time required by law or departmental regulation.
Hass, 216 U.S. at 479-480. In Hammerschmidt, Chief Justice Taft, defined "defraud" as follows To conspire to defraud the United States means primarily to cheat the Government out of property or money, but it also means to interfere with or obstruct one of its lawful governmental functions by deceit, craft or trickery, or at least by means that are dishonest. It is not necessary that the Government shall be subjected to property or pecuniary loss by the fraud, but only that its legitimate official action and purpose shall be defeated by misrepresentation, chicane or the overreaching of those charged with carrying out the governmental intention.
Hammerschmidt, 265 U.S. at 188. The general purpose of this part of the statute is to protect governmental functions from frustration and distortion through deceptive practices. Section 371 reaches "any conspiracy for the purpose of impairing, obstructing or defeating the lawful function of any department of Government." Tanner v. United ates, 483 U.S. 107, 128 (1987); see Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855 (1966). The "defraud part of section 371 criminalizes any willful impairment of a legitimate function of government, whether or not the improper acts or objective are criminal under another statute." United States v. Tuohey, 867 F.2d 534, 537 (9th Cir. 1989).
The word "defraud" in Section 371 not only reaches financial or property loss through use of a scheme or artifice to defraud but also is designed and intended to protect the integrity of the United States and its agencies, programs and policies. United States v. Burgin, 621 F.2d 1352, 1356 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1015 (1980); see United States v. Herron, 825 F.2d 50, 57-58 (5th Cir.); United States v. Winkle, 587 F.2d 705, 708 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 827 (1979). Thus, proof that the United States has been defrauded under this statute does not require any showing of monetary or proprietary loss. United States v. Conover, 772 F.2d 765 (11th Cir. 1985), aff'd, sub. nom. Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987); United States v. Del Toro, 513 F.2d 656 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 826 (1975); United States v. Jacobs, 475 F.2d 270 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
Thus, if the defendant and others have engaged in dishonest practices in connection with a program administered by an agency of the Government, it constitutes a fraud on the United States under Section 371. United States v. Gallup, 812 F.2d 1271, 1276 (10th Cir. 1987); Conover, 772 F.2d at 771. In United States v. Hopkins, 916 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1990), the defendants' actions in disguising contributions were designed to evade the Federal Election Commission's reporting requirements and constituted fraud on the agency under Section 371.
The intent required for a conspiracy to defraud the government is that the defendant possessed the intent (a) to defraud, (b) to make false statements or representations to the government or its agencies in order to obtain property of the government, or that the defendant performed acts or made statements that he/she knew to be false, fraudulent or deceitful to a government agency, which disrupted the functions of the agency or of the government. It is sufficient for the government to prove that the defendant knew the statements were false or fraudulent when made. The government is not required to prove the statements ultimately resulted in any actual loss to the government of any property or funds, only that the defendant's activities impeded or interfered with legitimate governmental functions. See United States v. Puerto, 730 F.2d 627 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 847 (1984); United States v. Tuohey, 867 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Sprecher, 783 F. Supp. 133, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)(þþit is sufficient that the defendant engaged in acts that interfered with or obstructed a lawful governmental function by deceit, craft, trickery or by means that were dishonest"), modified on other grounds, 988 F.2d 318 (2d Cir. 1993).
In United States v. Madeoy, 912 F.2d 1486 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1105 (1991), the defendants were convicted of conspiracy to defraud the government and other offenses in connection with a scheme to fraudulently obtain loan commitments from the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) or Veterans Administration (VA). The court held that the district court had properly instructed the jury that:
{a party} must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of a scheme or artifice to defraud, with the objective either of defrauding the FHA or the VA of their lawful right to conduct their business and affairs free from deceit, fraud or misrepresentation, or of obtaining money and property from the FHA by means of false and fraudulent representations and promises which the defendant knew to be false.
Madeoy, 912 F.2d at 1492. Prosecutors considering charges under the defraud prong of Section 371, and the offense prong of Section 371 should be aware of United States v. Minarik, 875 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir. 1989) holding limited, 985 F.2d 962 (1993), and related cases. See United States v. Arch Trading Company, 987 F.2d 1087 (4th Cir. 1993). In Minarik, the prosecution was found to have "used the defraud clause in a way that created great confusion about the conduct claimed to be illegal," and the conviction was reversed. 875 F.2d at 1196. After Minarik, defendants have frequently challenged indictments charging violations of both clauses, although many United States Courts of Appeals have found it permissible to invoke both clauses of Section 371. Arch Trading Company, 987 F.2d at 1092 (collecting cases); see also United States v. Licciardi, 30 F.3d 1127, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 1994) (even though the defendant may have impaired a government agency's functions, as part of a scheme to defraud another party, the government offered no evidence {but in Knize the judgments are the evidence} that the defendant intended to defraud the United States and a conspiracy to violate an agency regulatory scheme could not lie on such facts).

In summary, those activities which courts have held defraud the United States under 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 affect the government in at least two of three ways:
They interfere or obstruct legitimate Government activity;
They make wrongful use of a governmental instrumentality.

4b) ACTION NOT FULLY HEARD: Relying on the fact that the KNIZE matter as a whole had not been "fully litigated": this matter had not been fully litigated, under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure IV. Trial; Rule 52 (rendering of judgments without being fully heard) in any court; because no hearing was afforded upon Appeal and no opportunity was made available to the defendant put in his evidence. Mr. Knize therefore was never "fully heard” on his issues and there was no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable authority to find against him on the issues of Contracts not being valid. FRCP. 50(a)(1). That's a JMOL ERROR/FRAUD. FACTS AND HISTORY: Denial to the defendant's very reasonable request to extend the number of pages to his legal brief for the appellate hearing, was unfair and against the 14th Amendment with respect to a Pro Se and Gender classification. The defendant wishes to bring forth no frivolous issues, but has found 44 bona-fide legal errors that Judge Winslow may have committed in her Memorandum of Decision. Any reasonable person can see that highly complicated divorce Law issues require normally 3 pages to discuss. Legal histories for these issues are extensive, and there are many cases involved with many intricate turns of logic. Meticulous explanations are required. The defendant needed allowance of at least 100 pages to properly defend himself. .Not allowing one the opportunity to state his causes as explicitly as the law requires is simply not showing fairness and perhaps is Unconstitutionally Restrictive.

November 15, 2004; No. 03-30924 IVAN ECHEVERRIA v. CHEVRON USA INC., MCCALL CREWBOATS LLC, MCCALL MARINE SERVICES INC.; CHILES OFFSHORE INC., No. 03-31046 Appeals from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana; Page 4: " {FRCP} Rule 50(a) does not explain what ""fully heard"" means. In practice, a party has been fully heard when he rests his case."

Mr. Knize never rested his case. The state law grants a citizen 35 pages for one issue. It simply does not follow that someone with more issues should be exponentially constrained to less pages. A reasonable and honest clerk or judge would see the problem and grant the request to extend the number of pages for a legal brief and argument time. From all the reversed rulings that our national appeals courts have exercised, it is clear that trial courts have a long history of making crucial legal errors (especially concerning contract law and divorce, and legal procedure) which any appellate court must function to correct and not avert by “trick”. Relying on the fact that the KNIZE matter had not been "fully litigated": under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure IV. Trial; Rule 52 because no hearing was afforded and no opportunity was made available to the defendant put in his evidence upon appeal. Mr. Knize therefore was never fully heard on his issues; FRCP. 50(a)(1); shows a JMOL ERROR. The defendant declares his actions are 1) of no fault of his own, 2) are natural responses to the legal environment, and 3) that an appellate courts' purpose is precisely to put on trial a trial court's judgment.

CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: THE UNITED STATES AND THE STATES UNDER THE CONSTITUTION: By C. Stuart Patterson; Const. Scholar: CHAPTER X: THE JUDICIAL POWER The theory of a judicial system under the common law. 89. Many of the men who, as members of the Convention of 1787, participated in the framing of the Constitution were lawyers, who had been trained in, and had mastered, the principles of the common law. When the Convention had determined that there should be a judicial department of the government of the United States, those lawyers naturally found in the common law the principles of administration which they deemed it wise to adopt. If they had been asked to formulate those principles they would have stated them substantially as follows:
It is the duty of every civilized government to provide tribunals for... the final determination of private controversies between individuals. ...{N}or can the statement of a claim by one individual against another be received as conclusive evidence of its validity. In each case there must be an inquiry by a tribunal before whom the respective parties can appear, to whom they can submit the evidence and the arguments on which they respectively rely, and who shall authoritatively decide the controversy. There are certain requirements of justice so obviously true that they do not need to be vindicated by argument, and so essential to the liberty of the citizen that their presence or absence is, in itself, a conclusive test of the existence of free institutions. Those requirements are purity, impartiality, and intelligence of administration, with as much rapidity of operation as is consistent with the attainment of a correct result. To that end every defendant who is accused of crime, or against whom a claim is attempted to be enforced by civil process, is entitled to an examination by an independent authority to determine, upon a prima facie presentation of the case and of the evidence supporting the charge, whether there should, or should not, be a trial; to due notice of the time and place of trial; to information of the precise charge against him; to a reasonable time in which to prepare his defense; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have full opportunity of testing, by cross-examination, the testimony of those witnesses; to have compulsory process for the production of witnesses on his behalf; and to be fully heard in his defense at his option, either personally or by learned counsel of his own selection.”
Connecticut cared not for finding a correct result.
5) EQUAL PROTECTION VIOLATIONS / Duress. The Conn. Constitution Sec 8 Article 1st:“No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.”; of course Section 5: “No law shall ever be passed to curtail or restrain the liberty of speech or of the press.” But a page limitation rule can have that precise effect!
Mr. Knize’s supposed OK ART Value, paid to Mrs. Knize indirectly through Public Stock Sales (which were his own by determination of J. Winslow) were forced under duress and (wrongful) imprisonment by the Connecticut court system without due process of law.
6) Judge Incompetence and Other Jurisdiction Problems with Florida Contracts (OK ART) and Constitutional Infringements
“ It is a principle of law that, once challenged, the one asserting jurisdiction must prove that jurisdiction exists as a matter of law. The proponent of a rule carries the burden of proving its application in the instant case.” See 5 U.S.C. 556(d). For judicial support of this principle, see in particular the following cases: Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 533; Griffin v. Matthews, 310 F.Supp. 341, 423 F.2d 272; McNutt v. G.M., 56 S.Ct. 789, 80 L.Ed 1135; Basso v. U.P.L., 495 F.2d 906; Thomson v. Gaskiel, 62 S.Ct. 673, 83 L.Ed 111; Albrecht v. U.S., 273 U.S. 1; Louisville R.R. v. Motley, 211 U.S. 149, 29 S.Ct. 42. Proceeding without jurisdiction, particularly after a formal notice and demand for proof of jurisdiction have been completely ignored, is a criminal denial of due process of law, in violation of the Fifth Amendment, and 18 U.S.C. 242.”

The State did not prove anything and simply denied and dismissed motions.
Due Process/Equal Protection:: "It is a fundamental premise of due process that a court cannot adjudicate a matter until the persons directly concerned (including other members of OK ART Exhibitions, LTD) have been notified of its pendency and have been given a reasonable opportunity to be heard in sufficient time to prepare their positions on the issues involved." Costello v. Costello, 186 Conn. 773, 776-777, 443 A.2d 1282 (1982)

Proper Forum State for OK ART EXHIBITIONS was not established: J. Winslow forced Mr. Knize to either violate Florida Limited Liability Statutes, OK ART Bylaws, or create an illegal contingency to pay plaintiff by selling off his declaratorily :protected stocks.
Fla. Stat. §608.427(1-7); :Upon withdrawal, a withdrawing member is entitled to receive any distribution to which the member is entitled under the articles of organization or operating agreement, {only $11,500} and if not otherwise provided in the articles of organization or operating agreement, the withdrawing member is entitled to receive, within a reasonable time after withdrawal, the fair value of the withdrawing member’s interest in the limited liability company as of the date of resignation based upon the withdrawing member’s right to share in distributions from the company. Fla. Stat. §608.427 (2). Likewise, no shareholder of a corporation organized under the Professional Service Corporation and Limited Liability Company Act may sell or transfer his or her shares in the corporation except to another professional corporation, professional limited liability company, or individual, each of which must be eligible to be a shareholder of such corporation. Fla. Stat. §621.11(1). Similarly, no member of a limited liability company organized under the Act may sell or transfer ownership interest in the limited liability company except to another professional corporation, professional limited liability company, or individual, each of which must be eligible to be a member of the limited liability company; Fla. Stat. §621.11(2).
7) Judgements Void and Not Final: Were Trial Court, Appellate Court, Supreme Court judgments then to be considered NOT final? It seems the courts would rather hold to it’’s (pleaded) Unconstitutionally Vague 35 page limitation rule for brief size (I had motioned to exceed but was denied), and leave the issue unaddressed by Connecticut; than to obey its own laws on Limited Companies (C.G.S. 34-167 See next Paragraph)) or the Florida equivalent laws; whereby a non-controlling member is not liable for the underlying assets of a company) and other laws it had in place. The court failed to account for proof of its jurisdiction for the OK Art Exhibitions, LTD Agreement, even though the agreement on exhibit stated that the Corporation had its situs in Florida, and Florida is most probably the subject matter jurisdiction for disputes. Other members of the Corporation were not notified by the plaintiff, Mrs Knize, which was unlawful because they were indispensable parties in the dispute over OK Art Exhibitions, LTD. The Corporation and Family Members had the first right of refusal, and the forum state was Florida. Atty O’Sullivan failed to give notice and process the OK ART members and that is fatal and grounds for a mistrial. I declare a mistrial.
General Statutes § 52-484 ("whenever any person has, or is alleged to have, any money or other property in his possession which is claimed by two or more persons, either he, or any of the persons claiming the same, may bring a complaint in equity, in the nature of a bill of interpleader") (Emphasis added.) “The sole purpose of the lis pendens . is to give constructive notice to persons who may subsequently acquire an interest in the property . .." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ghent v. Meadowhaven Condominium, Inc., 77 Conn. App. 276, 284-85, 823 A.2d 355

EQUAL PROTECTION OF CONNECTICUT LAW: "Where a decision ignores a clearly applicable statute . . . it is contrary to the law and cannot stand. Hartford Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Tucker, 181 Conn. 607 609, 436 A.2d 1259, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 956,101 S.Ct. 363, 66 L.Ed.2d 221 (1980); Pelletier v. White, 33 Conn. Sup. 769, 772, 371 A.2d 1068 (1976)." DeVita v. Esposito, 13 Conn. App. 101, 111, 535 A.2d 364 (1987), cert. denied, 207 Conn. 807, 540 A.2d 375 (1988); see also State v. Preyer, 198 Conn. 190, 199, 502 A.2d 858 (1985); State v. Burke, 182 Conn. 330, 332, 438 A.2d 93 (1980).
The 35 page rules are Unconstitutionally Vague because a Practice Book Rule which acts Under Conn. Statute Sec. 51-14/15
“ ...must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties is a well- recognized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of law; and a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law. International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 221 , 34 S. Ct. 853; Collins v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 634, 638 , 34 S. Ct. 924. Connally vs. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926).” Acting under Conn. Stat. 51-14, "Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right nor the jurisdiction of any of the courts.", U.S . Const. Am 14.,
... therefore the plaintiff having sustained rights to an Automatic Presumption for Unconstitutionality of CGS Sec. 51-14/15; within the powers of a judge to administer Statute authority to enforce PB rules, or enforce CGS Sec. 51-164t. (a), in relation to and application of PB Rules 4-6 and 62-7 (35 page rules), led to a deprivation of Constitutional rights.
“The vagueness doctrine is particularly significant when a regulation or rule affects a fundamental right such as free speech. Marks v. United States”, 430 U.S. 188, 196 (1977) (Added, Judgment must use Strict Scrutiny, especially when requested, as the plaintiff did; to prove a state’s compelling interest to override a substantive right, and this failure of state judges occurred numerous times. Keogh v. Bridgeport, 187 Conn. 53, 66, 444 A.2d 225 (1982): (‘‘‘‘[w]hen a statutory classification . . . affects a fundamental personal right, the statute is subject to strict scrutiny and is justified only by a compelling state interest’’’’).

The Connecticut Court clearly broke from precedent and this is constructive fraud. The Connecticut Judiciary hides PB Rule accountability behind the cloak of CGS Sec. 51-14/15, keeping 51-14 and 51-15 so vague as to obscure enforcement of PB Rules. In KNIZE there were so many violations of court procedure and against the right to the mutual Prenuptial Agreement, and a certain House Agreement of 1991, whereby J. Winslow pleaded for the plaintiff and acted on non-pleaded requests with highly questionable legal references. She ruled WITHOUT JURISDICTION concerning the Florida contract (OK ART EXHIBITIONS, LTD), of which the forum state was Florida. Connecticut was without jurisdiction, and this shows reason for the application of KENNER fraud and the 5th and 14th Amendment. J. Winslow’’s response to my Articulations proved clearly and convincingly she ruled against RUBIN (violation of equal protection) where she also found that the Limited company was speculative, (and other public stocks held were separate property yet were deemed to pay for the OK value to wife,) and yet ruled irresponsibly that I was required to distribute the OK asset anyway.
Connecticut cannot consider an item of property for marital distribution if it is a mere expectancy or a contingency which may never occur. Knize claimed Rubin equal protection and J. Winslow, in her Articulations and Memorandum found that OK was speculative, contradicting her other judgment to distribute the OK asset anyway.
“The concept of "property" includes a presently existing, enforceable right to receive income in the future. Property does not include those interests, however, that might be speculative or which constitute a "mere expectancy." Rubin v. Rubin, 204 Conn. 224, 230-31, 527 A.2d 1184 (1987)

7b) Conspiracy (Pattern and Practice) of Void Orders: The award was preposterous and unfitting of a judge and served to defy the fair administration of justice, put the integrity of the court into disrepute, and attacked the machinery of the court. The question is posed to the U.S. District Court how far should it go to protect lower court judges? Where should the rights of contracts and citizens have precedent over judges who exercised clear unlawful discretion? Does the District Court want to create conflicts of law by protecting one of its own, over the need to exercise consistency of law, especially Federal Law? And how about Chief Justice Sullivan, as courts know around the nation was found recently guilty for fixing Connecticut’’s judicial nominations, and (implicating Pattern and Practice violations) who influenced in KNIZE the panel of State Supreme judges to Deny pleadings and to not accept a Motion to file late because they found no probable cause around the fact that one’’s mother suddenly was in critical condition due to a near-fatal car accident a few days before a motion was due? I was called by my family to go to my mother because she might not live the weekend. Yet, the court unethically and legally denied that this was a probable cause to file late, and ruled against equal protection of the laws where other’s were granted late filings for family emergencies out of their control and not a result of failing to exercise due diligence.
Connecticut’’s Judicial Review Council didn’’t want to touch the question. The higher courts, in part, dismissed my case on that filing of a reconsideration. Yet, having timely filed in Superior Court with their promise they’d send it up to the Supreme Court, I found out when I got back from Florida that instead the Clerk threw the motion away. That incident coupled with the failure for the higher courts to answer for its proof of jurisdiction under Strict Scrutiny under what authority they functioned to deny me First Amendment rights to have ALL of my grievances heard, ruined my fair chance for a fair trial on the issues alleged, and they ignored my requests that Connecticut stop from breaking its own laws or those of Floridas’ and the U.S. Constitutions’, which led the case into Post Judgment havoc I have been enormously harmed by the court’’s actions. I will not be able to recover the unfounded awards from my ex-wife as she has spent it. Important Federal Questions must be answered in the U. S. District Court as a last resort concerning the right to have grievances heard, according to U. S. Constitution's Amendments 1,5,10,14, and Equal Protection of the Laws concerning the Connecticut Constitution under Article First; Sec 5, 7,8,10, 14, Am Art. Fifth; Sec 20, Am Art. Seventeenth; 28 U.S.C. 2072 (b) and C.G.S. 51-14. There were civil rights laws broken as well: Title 42 Section 1983/1985 claims: a violation of Section 2236 Laws: U.S. Code Title 42 Section 14141 and violation of Section 2236 Laws: Title 18, U.S.C., Section 245 Federally Protected Activities. I REQUEST that I may give ORAL ARGUMENTS AND TESTIFY TO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT and have rights to a jury.
D. CAUSE OF ACTION
“A void judgment which includes judgment entered by a court which lacks jurisdiction over the parties or the subject matter, or lacks inherent power to enter the particular judgment, or an order procured by fraud, can be attacked at any time, in any court, either directly or collaterally, provided that the party is properly before the court”, Long v. Shorebank Development Corp., 182 F.3d 548 ( C.A. 7 Ill. 1999).

I allege that, under color of law, the following of my constitutional rights, privileges, or immunities or my rights under federal statutes have been violated and that the following facts form the basis of my allegations: LEGAL FACTS: When Mr. Knize requested that the various lower courts prove its burden to impede his fundamental rights (1st Am violation claim) under the STRICT SCRUTINY DOCTRINE , and produce a finding which will answer to such alleged deprivation, they simply denied and dismissed the case. Their denials therefore voids their judgment. A denial I claim is Administrative:. "Administrative decisions, even though they may be essential to the very functioning of the courts, have not . . .been regarded as judicial acts." Forrester v. White, 484 U.S.219, 228 (1988). In Forrester, the Supreme Court concluded that a judge was acting in an administrative, not a judicial, capacity ... therefore was not entitled to absolute immunity from suit in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 229-30. The Court reasoned that personnel matters, "like many others involved ...overseeing the efficient operation of a court-may have been quite important in providing the necessary conditions of a sound adjudicative system. The decisions at issue, however, were not themselves judicial or adjudicative." Id. at 229.
A federal court must prevent any “fraud on the Constitution”..Violation gives right of action sounding in tort to Mr. Knize whose federal rights were trespassed upon by mentioned officers acting under pretense of state law.
Concerning: Motion to Vacate Orders Sept 22, 05. Sept 6, 05 Demand, Oct 13, 05 Dismissal, Feb 28, 06 Demands for jurisdiction WHICH THEN RELATED TO March 31/April 5, 06 Dismissals for JURISDICTIONAL CHALLENGE, STAY, REVIEW and Motion for Reconsideration May 05, and on Oct 18th 06 AC 27692 Motion For Discretionary Stay. And Judge Winslow’s Memorandum of Decision May 2004.
Fair value as adverse from Fair Market Value. It was constructive fraud and improper for the Winslow Court find OK ART EXHIBITIONS Shareholder’s value to be based on the underlying value of the Company. This was a failure (and conspiracy ) of the Several Courts proving its Jurisdiction on the record, which is evidence that the judges involved with my Jurisdictional challenges acted outside of their jurisdiction and therefore are not subject to any immunities. as judicial officers. Their rules in my case for page limitations abridge 1st Am Rights. My property; portion of my house,(House Agreement of 1991), and various contracts (OK Art Exhibitions, LTD Agreement, and Mutual Prenuptial Agreement) were seized by the Connecticut Court system and Unconstitutional taking of them as papers and property, proceeded through illegal rulings. In violation were U. S. Constitution's Amendments 1,5,10,14, highlighting Equal Protection of the Laws concerning the Connecticut Constitution under Article First;
SEC. 5. No law shall ever be passed to curtail or restrain the liberty of speech... SEC. 7. The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable searches or seizures...;. SEC. 8. ...No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law; SEC. 10. All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay;.SEC. 12. The privileges of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended (Conn. threw Mr. Knize in jail for contempt for not passing over to ex-wife assets that were non-distributable in divorce by rule of law, voided judgments places a charge of wrongful imprisonment), SEC. 14. The citizens have a right ... to apply to those invested with the powers of government, for redress of grievances, or other proper purposes, by petition, address or remonstrance.

Other Laws violated were well settled that speculative assets were never subject to any kind of marital distribution, as my OK Art Exhibitions. LTD assets were. As well, those assets were protected by Agreement through a nominal value demand, distribution to only blood relatives, first right of refusal, and common law concerning what a willing buyer or seller would pay for it which was nothing because the conditions of the agreement made it a terrible risk for them. As well, Limited Liability law was completely violated (CGS Chapter 613; 34-167 / 33-900 or Florida equivalent), non-voting minority shareholders without control of Limited Companies own only Choses in Action, and are not responsible for the underlying assets, they own only the value of the shareholders agreement. The Conn. Legislative acknowledgment of this fact was plainly ignored by the court. Jurisdiction was never proved by the Conn. Superior, Appellate, or Supreme Courts, making their rulings on property void, and subjects them to a lawsuit after the fact they caused injury.
"There is no discretion to ignore lack of jurisdiction."Joyce v. U.S. 474 2D 215."The burden shifts to the court to prove jurisdiction."Rosemond v. Lambert, 469 F 2d 416 "Court must prove on the record, all jurisdiction facts related to the jurisdiction asserted." Latana v. Hopper, 102 F. 2d 188; Chicago v. New York 37 F Supp. 150 "The law provides that once State and Federal Jurisdiction has been challenged, it must be proven."100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980) "Where a court failed to observe safeguards, it amounts to denial of due process of law, court is deprived of juris." Merritt v. Hunter, C.A. Kansas 170 F2d 739. RUBIN
Moreover, a vague law like the 35 page rule creates additional concerns with enforcement since : the danger of censorship and of abridgment of our precious First Amendment freedoms is too great where officials have unbridled discretion over a forum's use." Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 553 (1975). ““Accordingly, the courts will not presume that the public official responsible for administering a legislative policy will act in good faith and respect a speaker's First Amendment rights; rather, the vagueness "doctrine requires that the limits the [government] claims are implicit in its law be made explicit by textual incorporation, binding judicial or administrative construction, or well-established practice.”" City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 770 (1988).
Thus, a vague Statute, Practice Book law or policy has the potential to create significant constitutional problems for adjudication well beyond the realm of procedural due process. Conclusion: Due process of law is not only constitutionally guaranteed, but its basic concept of fairness in legal proceedings is an ancient one. They must not rule above the law on Federal issues, but ensure the Federal laws stand.
“Relief under Rule 60(b)(3) may be granted when the motion is substantiated by clear and convincing evidence that the court "acted with 'an intent to deceive or defraud the court,' by means of a 'deliberately planned and carefully executed scheme.'" Yapp v. Excel Corp., 186 F.3d 1222, 1231 (10th Cir. 1999). “The burden is met by the movant to establish fraud and to show that the movant would have had a good claim or defense in the main action” See Wilkin v, Sunbeam Corp., 466 F.2d 714, 717 (10th Cir. 1972).

Mr. Knize argues constructive fraud and deliberate indifference against proper reading of contracts to defraud Mr. Knize of his property are specific in nature and show specific allegations against the court that were never answered. The Connecticut courts certainly did abuse its power by denying reasonable interpretation of Mr. Knize’s Shareholders Agreement in OK Art Exhibitions LTD, the couple’s mutual Prenuptial Agreement, and their House Agreement of 1991. See, e.g., Jennings v. Hicklin, 587 F.2d 946, 948 (8th Cir. 19). Surrounding Incident, Post Judgment: On May 19, 2006, in Waverly Knize V. Francis Knize, I, defendant, had most of my property illegally seized on two unconstitutional counts; my mother’s near fatal accident was not deemed a just cause to file late for a Motion For Reconsideration in the Supreme Court, DENIAL on 05/05/06, even though it happened at the precise time the Motion was due (Equal Protection Violation against right for family emergencies and excuse for due diligence.), and the issues raised about due process of fundamental rights, specifically, application of Strict Scrutiny upon the same rights identified in pleaded Connecticut’s Election Law Reform, were never addressed in any finding (Abuse of Discretion caused fraud through Abuse of Power, the ruling was not consistent with the allegations) by the courts it was alleged. Brief Page limitations were challenged by the defendant (unchallenged by the plaintiff) on the basis that the rules violate associational and content rights, chill the first Am. , disobey principles of FRCP VI; Trials Rule 50-52 ; The courts under the color of law violated the right to an open hearing on the matter- courts. “ It is therefore the firmly held main rule that a court may not dispose of the merits of a case on the basis of exparte, in camera submissions." Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170 (1951) Due process was clearly and convincingly violated. This first impression issue needs to be determined by this court; Denials in whole deprived the defendant of rights to the obligation of contracts. The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions holds that government may not grant a benefit on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right, Does this apply to the KNIZE Case?
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions holds that government may not grant a benefit on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right, even if the government may withhold that benefit altogether. ... The "exchange" thus has two components: the conditioned government benefit on the one hand and the affected constitutional right on the other. We must first unravel possible meanings of coercion through law in three seminal decisions that extended unconstitutional conditions doctrine to speech and religious exercise: Speiser v. Randall, Sherbert v. Verner, and Shapiro v. Thompson. While unconstitutional conditions doctrine is hardly unique in deeming some offers of benefit coercive, the concept of coercion will depend just as inescapably on independent conceptions of utility, autonomy, fairness, or desert in the unconstitutional conditions context as in other contexts, ...an unconstitutional condition can skew the distribution of constitutional rights among rightholders because it necessarily discriminates facially between those who do and those who do not comply with the condition. Basic constitutional jurisprudence dictates that courts subject most government benefit decisions to minimal scrutiny, but scrutinize government actions that directly burden preferred liberties more closely. Unconstitutional conditions problems arise at the boundary between these two directives: when government conditions a benefit on the recipient's waiver of a preferred liberty, should courts review the conditioned benefit deferentially, as a benefit, or strictly, as a burden on a preferred liberty? District Court must carefully weight the points
ISSUES CONCERNING THE COURT'S DENIALS TO BE FULLY HEARD:
How Fed RCP applies to this case:
November 15, 2004; No. 03-30924 IVAN ECHEVERRIA v. CHEVRON USA INC., MCCALL CREWBOATS LLC, MCCALL MARINE SERVICES INC.; CHILES OFFSHORE INC., No. 03-31046 Appeals from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana; Page 4: "Rule 50(a) does not explain what ""fully heard"" means. In practice, a party has been fully heard when he rests his case." "{N}o judgment allowed until a party is fully heard."

Mr. Knize was never fully heard when the Court deprived him of his 1st Amendment rights and made a challenge on the 35 page limitation rule, claiming being fully heard is a fundamental right. The courts simply tried to ignore it, thus breaking the law (Roth v. Weston).

MATERIAL and LEGAL FACTS: Federal Equal Protection of Conn..Constitution Amendments, Art. Fifth; Sec 20, Art. Seventeenth; 28 U.S.C. 2072 (b) and C.G.S. 51-14. There were civil rights laws broken as well: Title 42 Section 1983/1985 claims, in part, a violation of Section 2236 Laws: U.S. Code Title 42 Section 14141, Title 18, U.S.C., Section 245; Federally Protected Activities. Title 18, U.S.C., Section 241 Conspiracy Against Rights, This statute makes it unlawful for two or more persons to conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person of any state, territory or district in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him/her by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, (or because of his/her having exercised the same) 18 US Code Sec. 2511 (d)(20) A conspirator is responsible for the acts of other conspirators who have left the conspiracy before he joined it, or joined after he left it; statutes of limitations tolled for previous acts when each new act is done. US v. GUEST, 86 S.Ct. 1170; US V.COMPAGNA, 146 F.2d 524. KNIZE case is also Pursuant CIVIL RICO Laws brought in under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961, 1962(c).and (d)
FOR CLAIMS; IMPORTANT NOTE: Concerning all numbered claims: Judges are parties to the action because they held the power to legally transfer assets, and deny other allegations made in Mr. Knize’s 120 page Brief, AC 25532 Motion to Vacate Orders Sept 28, 05. ORDER J. Barry R. Schaller, Thomas A. Bishop, Alexandra B. Dipentima, Sept 6, 05 Demand, Oct 18 06 Motion to Stay Dismissal Order: J. Barry R. Schaller, Thomas A. Bishop, Alexandra B. Dipentima Oct 13, 05 Dismissal, Feb 28, 06 Demands for SMJ jurisdiction WHICH THEN RELATED TO March 31/April 5, 06 Dismissals for JURISDICTIONAL CHALLENGE, STAY, REVIEW; J. Barry R. Schaller, J. C Ian McLachlan, J. Lubbie Harper and Motion for Reconsideration May 05, and on Oct 18th 06 AC 27692 Motion For Discretionary Stay. Motion for Relief of Void Judgment.; J. Barry R. Schaller, Thomas A. Bishop, Alexandra B. Dipentima. APPELLATE COURT DECISION Unanswered Oct 13 2005... And Judge Winslow’s Memorandum of Decision, MOTION FOR REVIEW Denied Jul 26 2004, MOTION FOR ARTICULATION Order Jul 30 2004, MOTION FOR ARTICULATION Denied Aug 02 2004, MOTION FOR ARTICULATION 2 Orders Jul 09 2004 MOT STAY OF EXECUTION Denied Jul 26 2004, 2 MOTIONS TO REARGUE NOT SHOWING ORDERS, MOTION TO REARGUE MOTION FOR ORDER Denied May 24 2006 ....J. Tierney’s May 2004.Post Judgment : On May 26, 2006, in Waverly Knize V. Francis Knize; Mrs. Knizes’ Motion For Contempt Granted May 22 2006 Denied Sep 14 2005,LETTER Denied Nov 07 2005 J. Tierney, PET FOR CERTIFICATION Denied Dec 22 2005, MOTION TO DISMISS/ REARGUE ; 3 ORDERS TIERNEY Denied Jan 23 2006, MEMORANDUM OF DECISION, TIERNEY, Order Feb 10 2006, MOTIO N FOR REVIEW/ APPL FOR MANDAMUS/ ORDER MOTION FOR ORDER/MOTION FOR ORDER/ MOTION FOR ORDER / Feb 9-27 ALL NOT ON RECORD, MOTION FOR REVIEW Denied Feb 24 2006, MOTION TO REARGUE Denied Feb 24 2006, Mar 23 2006 THROUGH Apr 07 2006 there were 17 ORDERS Not Put On Record as required by law. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL Denied Apr 24 2006, MOTION TO DISMISS Denied Apr 24 2006, MOTION FOR ORDER Denied Apr 24 2006,MOTION FOR ORDER Denied May 19 2006, MOTION TO DISQUALIFY Denied Sep 13 2006 MITTIMUS ISSUED May 22 2006 (Wrongful Imprisonment), MOTION FOR ORDER FEE WAIVER Denied May 30 2006 (J. BLACK Never Provided a Requested Hearing),MOTION FOR ARTICULATION Denied Jun 27 2006, MOTION FOR ORDER Order Aug 14 2006, MOTION TO STRIKE, MOTION TO STRIKE, MOTION FOR STAY; Orders Never Placed on Record, MOTION TO REARGUE Order Oct 10 2006, MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL MOTION FOR ORDER , MOTION FOR ORDER, MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL Sept 13- Oct 23 Never Put on Record and probable unanswered or some issues placed in 292.10 Nov 03 2006 MEMORANDUM OF DECISION Court No 293.10 Nov 03 2006 MEMORANDUM OF DECISION , MOT TO OPEN JUDGMENT Denied Dec 22 2006, 297.00 Nov 09 2006 MOTION TO STRIKE, MOTION FOR ORDER Denied Dec 22 2006, MOTION FOR ORDER Order Jan 04 2007, MOTION FOR ARTICULATION UNANSWED SINCE Jan 04 2007, MOTION FOR ORDER P No Order Jan 04 2007, MOTION FOR ORDER Order Jan 09 2007, MOTION FOR ORDER Denied Jan 09 2007, MOTION FOR LEAVE Denied Jan 09 2007, MOTION FOR JUDGMENT Denied Jan 09 2007, MOTION FOR LEAVE/ MOTION FOR ORDER/ MOTION FOR LEAVE/MOTION FOR STAY; Apr 11 2007 ORDER NOT ON RECORD; 337.00 Apr 11 2007 PET REMOVE TO FED COURT 338.00 Apr 11 2007 MOTION TO OPEN 338.20 Apr 11 2007 MOTION TO DISMISS ; AWAIT HEARING
Count I: Mr. Knize argues that the mere ownership of stock in a corporation does not justify the exercise of personal or Subject Matter jurisdiction over the owner, and that subjecting the owner to such jurisdiction would offend notions of fair play and substantial Justice. Mr. Knize requests relief from the May 2004 Memorandum judgment and denials for proof of Subject matter Jurisdiction now invokes Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4), which provides relief from a judgment that is void. Rule 60(b)(4) "provides a mandatory remedy that is not subject to any particular time limitation." Wilmer v. Board of County Comm'rs, 69 F.3d 406, 409 (10th Cir. 1995). The court therefore cannot err by denying any motion on the basis that it was not brought within a reasonable time. Mr. Knize’s injury was foreseeable on account of usurpation OK ART agreements, Prenuptial, and 1991 House.
"Jurisdiction, once challenged, cannot be assumed and must be decided."
[Maine v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 250]
"... Federal jurisdiction cannot be assumed, but must be clearly shown."
[Brooks v. Yawkey, 200 F. 2d 633]
“A Motion to set aside a judgment as void for lack of jurisdiction is not subject to the time limitations of Rule 60(b). See Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288 (Utah 1986). There is only an immaterial procedural difference between the relief sought pursuant to Rule 60(b) and the relief sought in an independent action. Hadden v. Rumsey Prods., 196 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1952); 7 Moore's Federal Practice, § 60.38(3) (2d ed. 1971)) A judgment is void, and therefore subject to relief under Rule 60(b)(4), only if the court that rendered judgment lacked jurisdiction or in circumstances in which the court's action amounts to a plain usurpation of power constituting a violation of due process. (usurpation n : seizing and holding (an office or powers) by force)
United States v. Boch Oldsmobile, Inc., 909 F.2d 657, 661 (1st Cir. 1990) Where Rule 60(b)(4) is properly invoked on the basis that the underlying judgment is void, "'relief is not a discretionary matter; it is mandatory.'" Orner v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1307, 1310 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting V.T.A., Inc. v. Airco, Inc., 597 F.2d 220, 224 n.8 (10th Cir. 1979)). In order for a judgment to be void, there must be some jurisdictional defect in the court's authority to enter the judgment, either because the court lacks personal jurisdiction or because it lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit. Puphal v. Puphal, 105 Idaho 302, 306, 669 P.2d 191, 195 (1983); Dragotoiu, 133 Idaho at 647, 991 P.2d at 379. A void judgment is one that has been procured by extrinsic or collateral fraud or entered by a court that did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties. Rook v. Rook, 233 Va. 92, 95, 353 S.E.2d 756, 758 (1987)
A recent discussion of the Rule 60(b)(4) grounds for attack on a void judgment may be found in Fisher v. Amaraneni, 565 So. 2d 84 (Ala. 1990). The judgment was set aside for lack of personal jurisdiction based on improper service by publication. The court defined a judgment as void "only if the court rendering it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or of the parties, or if it acted in a manner inconsistent with due process." Id. at 86 (citing Wonder v. Southbound Records, Inc., 364 So. 2d 1173 (Ala. 1978)). It should be noted here that a Rule 60(b)(4) motion involves a different standard of review than the other Rule 60(b) subsections since the court held "[w]hen the grant or denial turns on the validity of the judgment, discretion has no place for operation. If the judgment is void it must be set aside ...." Fisher, 565 So. 2d at 87. "The consequences of an act beyond the court's jurisdiction in the fundamental sense differ from the consequences of an act in excess of jurisdiction. An act beyond a court's jurisdiction in the fundamental sense is void; it may be set aside at any time and no valid rights can accrue thereunder. In contrast, an act in excess of jurisdiction is valid until set aside, and parties may be precluded from setting it aside by such things as waiver, estoppel, or the passage of time." People v. Ruiz (1990) 217 Cal. App. 3d 574, 265 Cal. Rptr. 886
In a long and venerable line of cases, the Supreme Court has held that, without proper jurisdiction, a court cannot proceed at all, but can only note the jurisdictional defect and dismiss the suit. See, e.g., Capron v. Van Noorden, 2 Cranch 126; Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43. Bell v. Hood, supra; National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Assn. of Railroad Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 465, n. 13; Norton v. Mathews, 427 U.S. 524, 531; Secretary of Navy v. Avrech, 418 U.S. 676 , 678 (per curiam); United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348 ; Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 721; and Chandler v. Judicial Council of Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 86—88, distinguished. For a court to pronounce upon a law’s meaning or constitutionality when it has no jurisdiction to do so is, by very definition, an ultra vires act. Pp. 8—17.
"Doubt relative to statutory construction should be resolved in favor of the individual, not the government"Greyhound Corp. v. United States, 495 F2d 863
"Courts have no power to rewrite legislative enactments to give effect to their ideas of policy and fitness or the desirability of symmetry in statutes."
Busse v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 479 F2d 1143

COURT LACKED SMJ BECAUSE MRS. KNIZE WAS NOT A PARTY TO THE

OKART CONTRACT AND HAD NO STANDING, CONTRACT DID NOT NAME HER.
“Superior Court of Connecticut Judicial District of Waterbury, at Waterbury Jane Doe One et al. v. Shannon Oliver et al. No. CV990151679S : "Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it . . . The objection of want of jurisdiction may be made at any time . . . and the court or tribunal may act on its own motion, and should do so when the lack of jurisdiction is called to its attention." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kizis v. Morse Diesel International, Inc., 260 Conn. 46, 52, 794 A.2d 498 (2002). In the present case, the plaintiffs allege that they were the third-party beneficiaries of the contract between Lisa Oliver and AOL. The court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this claim because the plaintiffs do not have standing to state a cause of action for breach of contract. [OR IN OK ART TO CAUSE AN ACTION UPON THE SHAREHOLDERS AGREEMENT] "The absence of standing precludes the existence of a court's subject matter jurisdiction and requires dismissal of the claim . . . Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he has, in an individual or representative, capacity, some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Rapaport & Benedict, P.C. v. Stamford, 39 Conn. App. 492, 496-97, 664 A.2d 1193 (1995). The plaintiffs allege that they have standing to state a claim for breach of contract because they were the third-party beneficiaries of the contract between Lisa Oliver and AOL. "The ultimate test to be applied [in determining whether a person has a right of action as a third- party beneficiary] is whether the intent of the parties to the contract was that the promisor should assume a direct obligation to the third-party [beneficiary] and . . . that intent is to be determined from the terms of the contract read in the light of the circumstances attending its making, including the motives and purposes of the parties . . . The only way a contract could create a direct obligation between a promisor and a third-party beneficiary would have to be . . . because the parties to the contract so intended." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gazo v. Stamford, 255 Conn. 245, 261, 765 A.2d 505 (2001).

Was there a violation of Section 2236 Laws: Cases and U.S. Code Title 42 Section 1983 and Sec. 1985: Civil action for deprivation of rights? Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. Allegation: a declaratory decree was violated and/or declaratory relief was unavailable concerning the unwarranted granting of the Defendant’s stock assets to the plaintiff under J. Winslow’s Memorandum of Decision Number 27 and reinforced by Judge Winslow’s Articulations dated May 26 04 and July 30th 04 and yet the defendant was forced under wrongful imprisonment to hand over those assets against his right to property enumerated in the Constitution Am 14 and others. It was IMPOSSIBLE by obligation of contract for the plaintiff to have paid award to the spouse out of the OK Art Exhibitions, LTD because of the provisions in the Shareholder’s Agreement did not permit a $400,000 demand but only a $11,500 power of Demand, and that right of first refusal by members would only elicit $11,500. Judge Winslow ruled that the wife had no expectancy to those assets, yet granted them anyway under excuse of a mosaic. Thus, the actions of J. Tierney May 19, 2006 FA 02-0190291S Motion For Contempt and Conn. Appellate/Supreme Court, who presided after J. Winslow was removed by the Judiciary from divorce cases, constitute false imprisonment, deprivation of property rights, illegally seized property, and color of law violations.
“We have held that "[f]or a judgment to be void under Rule 60(b)(4), it must be determined that the rendering court was powerless to enter it." V.T.A., Inc. v. Airco, Inc., 597 F.2d 220, 224 (10th Cir. 1979).

This court should set aside Judgments and Orders which violated First Am Rights. Concerning the right to have grievances heard, according to U. S. Constitution's Amendments 1,5,10,14, and Equal Protection of the Laws concerning the Connecticut Constitution under Article First; Sec 5, 7,8,10, 14, Art. Fifth; Sec 20, Art. Seventeenth; 28 U.S.C. 2072 (b) and C.G.S. 51-14. A Strict test must be exercised against a challenge of Unconstitutionality which the Connecticut courts ignored. Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 110 (2d Cir.2004): Under the strict scrutiny test, Conn. courts had two burdens: 1) proving the existence of a compelling state interest and 2) showing that the restriction is narrowly tailored to advance that interest. Under the Landell test, whether the speech restriction is narrowly tailored..In Landell, the Second Circuit wrote “to explain the nature of the narrow tailoring inquiry required” in the First Amendment setting. 382 F.3d at 125. It explained that “[t]he narrow tailoring inquiry examines the ‘fit’ between means and ends.” Id. “In order to satisfy the ‘narrow tailoring’ standard, Conn. had the duty to prove that the mechanism chosen is the least restrictive means of advancing that interest.” Id. at 126 (emphasis in original) (citing United States.v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 816 (2000)). But, judges didn’t prove anything, they just dismissed, deposed, and denied. They lost jurisdiction. If I was ever granted a hearing on the issue: I claim the means of an efficiency of court do not justify the ends of the Constitution allowing the right to petition for grievances. Mr. Knize has suffered a constitutionally cognizable injury-in-fact from the deprivations
“JOHN DOE, et al., :V. :ALBERTO GONZALES, CIVIL ACT. NO.: 3:05-cv-1256 (JCH)
The subject matter of the speech at issue in the pending motion places it at the center of First Amendment protection. “[P]olitical belief and association constitute the core of those activities protected by the First Amendment.” Id.at 356; see also Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838-39 (1978). (“Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of the Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)” proposition). Page 10 However, the Second Circuit has distinguished these cases from those like the instant one, where the challenged statute or regulation imposes a direct infringement on speech. "Where a plaintiff alleges injury from a rule or regulation that directly limits speech, the irreparable nature of the harm may be presumed." Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. of New York, 331 F.3d 342, 349 (2d Cir. 2003). Therefore, in this case, where the statute directly prohibits speech, the presumption of irreparable harm arises”
All courts lacked in Jurisdiction because they were either incompetent, couldn’t rule for a company which existed in Florida (members Forum State) , or if they could had to respect the laws of that state, the company Bylaws and inclusion of indispensable parties, or they outright, with deliberate indifference broke the law, showing they were not impartial, violating due process, or the third party to contract, Mrs. Knize had no standing.. The Intent of The Constitution of the United States Article 10 as defined by Common Law: “Among these just and humane provisions, we observe, that ....that no one can be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”, these judges did not approach the question put forth that the 35 page rules were Unconstitutional. The obligation on the legislature not to pass laws inflicting unusual punishments must be considered as subject to some qualification as Conn. failed with the page limitation PB Rules, and with defrauding of assets or property.
The prohibition of unusual punishments applies alike, under the qualifications already noticed, to the legislative and to the judicial power; this restriction applies equally to the branches. The protection of the individual against all unnecessary severity in the prosecution of justice, characterizes the greatest part of the fifth, and the whole of the eighth amendment. A person accused (even in divorce) ought to have all the aid of the law to his defense. All Judges violated the premise with their denials and dismissals.
Article 10 (1791) declares: “...that the powers not delegated to congress by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people....” The State had no right to violate my right to contracts.
MR. Justice Douglas: "....that a ‘‘‘‘governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation {or for that matter to a rule formed through common law} may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.'" NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307. "We ordinarily read statutes {law} to avoid, rather than to create, constitutional questions." In re Valerie D., 223 Conn. 492, 534, 613 A.2d 748 (1992). "To satisfy strict scrutiny, the State must show that [a law] furthers a compelling state interest by the least restrictive means practically available. Bernal v. Fainter 467 U.S. 216, 227 (1984)"
Because the constitutionality of any statute cannot be determined under a 'hypothetical set of facts as yet unproven'; Lehrer v. Davis, 214 Conn. 232, 234-35, 571 A.2d 691 (1990); "and because current sociocultural definitions of "family" { or fundamental individual Rights} are so fluid as to create myriad factual circumstances to which this statute, as we have interpreted it, may apply, we are not prepared to say whether our interpretation of this statute, or a statute of any sort that may be enacted in response to our interpretation, would be constitutional in a given factual circumstance. All we decide today is that, in order to avoid the most obvious constitutional problems that arise from guarantee of equal protection, if a law "impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly secured by the Constitution [it] is presumptively unconstitutional." Harris v. McRae 448 U.S. 297, 312 (1980)"

INCONSISTENT WITH CIVIL LIBERTIES TO BUSINESS: All judges violated the above said premises above and principles and Constitutional Review Standard defined:
In Re: U.S. Supreme Court; BUTCHERS' UNION CO. v. CRESCENT CITY CO., 111 U.S. 746 (1884)111 U.S. 746 . FIELD, J., concurring: Page 110 U.S. 746, 757 “As in our intercourse with our fellow-men certain principles of morality are assumed to exist, without which society would be impossible, so certain inherent rights lie at the foundation of all action, and upon a recognition of them alone can free institutions be maintained. These inherent rights have never been more happily expressed than in the declaration of independence, that new evangel of liberty to the people: 'We hold these truths to be self-evident'-that is, so plain that their truth is recognized upon their mere statement-'that all men are endowed'-not by edicts of emperors, or deerees of parliament, or acts of congress, but 'by their Creator with certain inalienable rights.'-that is, rights which cannot be bartered away, or given away, or taken away, except in punishment of crime-'and that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; and to secure these'-not grant them, but secure them- 'governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.' Among these inalienable rights, as proclaimed in that great document, is the right of men to pursue their happiness, by which is meant the right to pursue any lawful business [OK ART ] or vocation, in any manner not inconsistent with the equal rights of others, which may increase their prosperity or develop their faculties, so as to give to them their highest enjoyment. The common business and callings of life, the ordinary trades and pursuits, which are innocuous in themselves, and have been followed in all communities from time immemorial, must therefore be free in this country to all alike upon the same conditions. The right to pursue them, without let or hinderance, except that which is applied to all persons of the same age, sex, and condition, is a distinguishing privilege of citizens of the United States, and an essential element of that freedom which they claim as their birthright. It has been well said that 'the property which every man has in his own labor, as it is the original foundation of all other property, so it is the most sacred and inviolable. The patrimony of the poor man lies in the strength and dexterity of his own hands, and to hinder his employing this strength and dexterity in what manner he thinks proper, without injury to his neighbor, is a plain violation of this most sacred property. It is a manifest encroachment upon the just liberty both of the workman and of those who might be disposed to employ him. As it hinders the one from working at what he thinks proper, so it hinders the others from employing whom they think proper.' Smith, Wealth Nat. bk. 1, c. 10. In this country it has seldom been held, and never in so odious a form as is here claimed, that an entire trade and busi- [Page 111 U.S. 746, 758] ness could be taken from citizens and vested in a single corporation. Such legislation has been regarded everywhere else as inconsistent with civil liberty. That exists only where every individual has the power to pursue his own happiness according to his own views, unrestrained except by equal, just, and impartial laws.”

Count II: Violations of due process (substantive due process doctrine) by Unconstitutional Taking of Property. The Judges are an automatic party to divorce, and can be held responsible for their color of judicial acts in a civil case. Injury was foreseeable by judges.

" Marriage is a civil contract to which there are three parties-the husband, the wife and the state." Van Koten v. Van Koten. 154 N.E. 146. "The ultimate ownership of all property is in the State: individual so-called "ownership" is only by virtue of Government, i.e. law amounting to mere user; and use must be in accordance with law and subordinate to the necessities of the State. Senate Document No. 43 73rd Congress 1st Session. (Brown v. Welch supra). [KNIZE contacts were violated] "'The proximate cause of an injury is the last negligent act contributing [Judge Winslow and other Judges] to the injury and without which the injury would not have occurred.” Syllabus Point.5, Hartley v. Crede, 140 W. Va. 133, 82 S.E.2d 672 (1954) , State v. Kopa, 173 W. Va. 43, 311 S.E.2d 412 (1983)." Syl. Pt. 1, Mays v. Chang, 213 W. Va. 220, 579 S.E.2d 561 (2003)
These cases would strengthen the proposition the Judges are a party in divorce cases by virtue of their power to distribute marital assets. However, as an Unenumerated Right as defined by Amendment 9, a court must abide to support the right to property under LLC/UCC laws, and rights to freely contract and to be free from governmental regulation, omission, and failures in due process of, in KNIZE, all the KNIZE contracts mentioned in this document: “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.” Mr. Knize claims lawful possession of over $550,000 paid to ex-wife through contract mentioned in this document.. In Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326 (1937), “ it was said that this
category of fundamental rights {5th, 9th, 14th.) includes those fundamental liberties that are "implicit n the concept of ordered liberty," such that "neither liberty nor justice would exist
if [they] were sacrificed."

The Judges took illegal possession of OK ART rights, especially through J. Winslow’s Memorandum of Decision 2004, Winslow Articulations (May 26 04 and July 30th 04) proves that she did so illegally. The 14th Amendment for Equal Protection is violated with respect to LLC Law, and Law of conditional sales. 70 C. 505; 77 C. 38; 101 C. 565,.as the OK contract was subject to bylaws which defined value. Court ruled Transfer Instruments are to be deemed void and should not stand, with transference of OK asset back to Mr. Knize and transference of value from 50 Sunset Pass House, given Mrs. Knize back to Mr. Knize upon reason J. Winslow took illegal possession through fraud upon the court by legislating from the bench to invalidate the House Agreement of 1991. OK Art Exhibitions, LTD was deemed by J. Winslow in her Articulation and 2004 Memorandum as Speculative Property and Separate Property (TRANSCRIPTS: Jan 21 04 Pg 28: COURT: ... I understand that the valuation is speculative at best.”) and yet Mr. Knize was forced under imprisonment later in Post Judgment to distribute the asset anyway. The couple’s Prenuptial Agreement has violations shown in detail in the illegally suppressed brief offered; Oct 13, 05 Dismissal This represents a Voidable Order. For OK ART it violated principles of RUBIN, STONE, Florida Limited Liability Law (below), Connecticut Limited Liability Laws in CGS Titles 33 (33-900) and 34, including Ch 613; 34-167(a) where members are not vested in ownership of limited liability company property, is completely similar to Florida limited liability law and statute. Mr. Knize did not own what J. Winslow valued and held Mr. Knize responsible for, and therefore her rulings are VOID::
34-167 (a) Property transferred to or otherwise acquired by a limited liability company is property of the limited liability company and not of the members individually. A member has no interest in specific limited liability company property. A member has no interest in specific limited liability company property.
(b) Property may be acquired, held and conveyed in the name of the limited liability company. Any interest in real property may be acquired in the name of the limited liability company and title to any interest so acquired shall vest in the limited liability company itself rather than in the members individually.
All Judges that ruled to obscure the hearing of this issue on its merits are guilty of Void, improper, INCOMPETENT, and Unconstitutionally “bad” behavior. I was harmed for such actions by. Loss of property. I implied through motions and pleadings the lack of Jurisdiction the court had due to its incompetence for breaking Connecticut’s own laws, and perhaps those of Floridas’. This court should set aside Judgments and Orders which violated the principles of Unconstitutional Taking. It wasn’t even determined what state could rule on OK ART. There was no respect for Florida’s Jurisdiction and there was no Equal Protection:
U.C.C. - ARTICLE 9 - ..PART 3. RIGHTS OF THIRD PARTIES (Mrs. Knize) ; PERFECTED AND UNPERFECTED SECURITY INTERESTS; RULES OF PRIORITY§ 9-311. Alienability of Debtor's Rights: Judicial Process.The debtor's rights in collateral may be voluntarily or involuntarily transferred (by way of sale, creation of a security interest, attachment, levy, garnishment or other judicial process) notwithstanding a provision in the security agreement prohibiting any transfer or making the transfer constitute a default.

Conn. P.A. 94-217 HISTORY: ...provided that a dissociating member's right to receive the fair value of his interest in the limited liability company also occurs if the operating agreement does not provide "the manner of payment of the distribution", effective October 1, 1994, and applicable to limited liability companies ... the provision entitling a dissociating member to the fair value of his interest in the company with provision that, unless otherwise provided, the dissociating member is not entitled to payment for his interest in the company and, beginning on the date of dissociation, has only the rights of an assignee

82000 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2987, at **21-22 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 15, 2000). In Stone, the court held that there being presented no history of oppressive or unfair dealing with the petitioner, nor any evidence that her reasonable expectations were suppressed by the corporation's conduct, it was not inequitable or unfair to give effect to the shareholders' agreement for determining the fair value of the plaintiff's stock. See id. at *37.
STONE v. R.E.A.L. HEALTH, P.C., No. CV98-41 49 72 ,2000 Ct. Sup. 14157, 29 CLR 219 No. CV98-41 49 72, Superior Court Judicial District of New Haven at New Haven.MEMORANDUM OF DECISION: “If the parties have previously entered into a shareholders agreement that defines or provides a method for determining the fair value of shares to be sold, the court should look to such definition or method unless the court decides it would be unjust or inequitable to do so in light of the facts and circumstances of the particular case.[emphasis added.]" Model Business Corporation Act Official Comment to General Statutes §§ 33-900.” See Also JOHNSON v. JOHNSON, No. X07 CV99 0060602S (Aug. 15, 2001)
“The rights of the parties are measured by the instrument as originally intended, and the effect of the reformation, as a whole, is to give all the parties all the rights to which they are equitably entitled under the instrument which they intended to execute.’’ (Emphasis added.) 66 Am. Jur. 2d, Reformation of Instruments § 11 (1973).

The STONE case had cited the legislative intent that a Shareholders Agreement stands “:the articles of incorporation, as I recall, so that you may reverse the statutory obligation” All the Judges had duty to enforce legislative intent. They don’t make laws.
“The plaintiff argues that the court's rulings must take into consideration what she describes as the oppressive conduct of the other directors. There is no developed case law in Connecticut as to the meaning of `oppression' in this context. The legislative history of the law in Connecticut demonstrates a desire to consider the Model Business Corporation Act and its commentary as expressive of the intent of the legislature in passage of the act. In proceedings on the floor of the state House discussing the passage of the Connecticut version of the Model Business Corporation Act, which includes the sections at issue in this litigation, Representative Richard D. Tulisano stated: "I also wanted to put on the record that there are in fact commentaries that have (CT Page 14166) been established which help one interpret this act, both at the Connecticut commentary and there is commentary to the model act that people should look to for reference and understanding of the intent of the drafters of the legislation. I also ought to be very honest that I have not read all of those, nor do I necessarily agree with all of those commentaries and for whatever that means for legislative purposes, certainly the proponents of the bill would like that to be looked at. It is probably the normal way (CT Model Buss. Act) of interpreting the legislation. In the future, it's the way the UCC was done and it's probably the way it should be done here." 3, 7 H.R. Proc., Pt. 18, 1994 Sess. p. 6446. “The commentary instructs the court to consider the provisions of the shareholder agreement for the determination of fair value, unless to do so would be unjust or inequitable.” In proceedings on the floor of the state House discussing the passage of the Connecticut version of the Model Business Corporation Act, which includes the sections at issue in this litigation, Representative Richard D. Tulisano stated: "I also wanted to put on the record that there are in fact commentaries that have (CT Page 14166) been established which help one interpret this act:
THE CONNECTICUT GENERAL ASSEMBLY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MAY 2, 1994: Through you, Mr. Speaker, as I understand it, the bylaws would prevail. There's another section in here that makes it clear that you might amend the bylaws, as I recall. REP. RADCLIFFE: (123rd) Through you, Mr. Speaker, I'm referring to section 109 in the change of the law. The current law allows the corporation or gives the corporation, as I understand it, the ability to indemnify officers, directors, shareholders, but does not require that. So, through you, Mr. Speaker, I would assume that if the bylaws or articles of incorporation were silent, they would now have that duty. What I'm asking is, can a corporation through its bylaws or through its articles of organization, eliminate the duty to indemnify, notwithstanding what would be section 109 of this act. Through you, Mr. Speaker. REP. TULISANO: (29th) Through you, Mr. Speaker, if it's included in the articles of incorporation, section 109 makes reference to the articles of incorporation, as I recall, so that you may reverse the statutory obligation if you put it in your certificate of incorporation. ACTING SPEAKER REP. COURTNEY: (56th) :Representative Radcliffe. REP. TULISANO: (29th) Thank you. So I understand this, for purposes of legislative intent, the mandatory provision applies only if the bylaws and the articles of incorporation are silent. Through you, Mr. Speaker. REP. TULISANO: (29th) Through you, Mr. Speaker, that's correct, but I think this points out why we gave it even a longer effective date, because those kinds of shifts are occurring throughout this legislation which we want to make sure everybody is aware of and comfortable before they go into effect. ACTING SPEAKER REP. COURTNEY: (56th) Representative Radcliffe. REP. RADCLIFFE: (123rd) Thank you, and through you, Mr. Speaker, one final question regarding the rights of shareholders and directors that I was a little bit uncomfortable with. A derivative action, are we making it easier for shareholders to institute a derivative action against a corporation than under current law? Through you, Mr. Speaker. ACTING SPEAKER REP. COURTNEY: (56th) Representative Tulisano. REP. TULISANO: (29th) Through you, Mr. Speaker, honestly, I'm not sure. REP. RADCLIFFE: (123rd) Okay, that's a very honest answer. It seems here in this section that we're giving shareholders some additional rights that they didn't have under current law in order to initiate these actions and perhaps before the effective date of this act in 1997, this is another one of the areas that people are going to take a look at. I would rise in support of the bill to the extent that this bill could be examined thoroughly. I think it has. I assume that after passage it will be examined and reexamined by those who operate in this area, and if there are changes that ought to be made or omissions, that are in the current bill, that we would have ample opportunity to correct those. I'm glad to see the amendment clarify the effective date. I think that was important for this particular bill.
1994 GENERAL ASSEMBLY SENATE WEDNESDAY May 4, 1994 The Senate Concerning Substitute for Senate Bill No. 230, AN ACT CONCERNING DISCLOSURE OF POINTS ON SECONDARY MORTGAGE LOANS. If the parties are unable to reach agreement, any or all terms of the purchase may be set by the court . . ., and the court may find it useful to consider valuation methods that would be relevant to a judicial appraisal of shares . . . If the court finds that the value of the corporation has been diminished by the wrongful conduct of controlling shareholders, it would be appropriate to include as an element of fair value the petitioner's proportional claim for any compensable corporate injury. In cases where there is dissension but no evidence of wrongful conduct, "fair value" should be determined with reference to what the petitioner would likely receive in a voluntary sale of shares to a third party, taking into account his minority status. If the parties have previously entered into a shareholders agreement that defines or provides a method for determining the fair value of shares to be sold, the court should look to such definition or method unless the court decides it would be unjust or inequitable to do so in light of the facts and circumstances of the particular case.[emphasis added.]" Model Business Corporation Act Official Comment to General Statutes §§ 33-900.
The shareholders' agreement between the parties provides a method for the determination of the fair value of the shares of the plaintiff. The agreement was signed by the plaintiff as well as the individual defendants. It provided a formula which determined the amount to be paid to a departing shareholder for her shares of stock in the corporation, in the event of, inter alia, the termination of that physician's employment with the corporation”
Precedent Of Statutes: ‘Although it is well established that trial courts have broad equitable remedial powers regarding marital dissolutions . . . it is equally well settled that [c]ourts have no inherent power to transfer property from one spouse to another; instead, that power must rest upon an enabling statute.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Smith v. Smith, supra, 249 Conn. 272.
IF CONN. STATUTES WERE BROKEN: Sec. 34-168. Transfer of property. (a) Except as provided in subsection (e) of this section, property of the limited liability company that is held in the name of the limited liability company may be transferred by an instrument of transfer executed by any member in the name of the limited liability company.
(e) If the articles of organization provide that management of the limited liability company is vested in a manager or managers: (1) Title to property of the limited liability company that is held in the name of the limited liability company may be transferred by an instrument of transfer executed by any manager in the name of the limited liability company; and (2) a member, acting solely in his capacity as a member, shall not have such authority.

OK ART HAD RESTRICTIONS AND OTHER OK ART MEMBERS HAVE STANDING IN THIS CASE: UNDER 607.0627 FLORIDA LAW where members were bound to a corporate agreement: Mrs. Knize could have no more right to it than Defendant, but really, as a spouse in divorce, Mrs. Knize held no rights as a non-member of OK ART.
607.0627 Restriction on transfer of shares and other securities.-- (1) The articles of incorporation, the bylaws, an agreement among shareholders, or an agreement between shareholders and the corporation may impose restrictions on the transfer or registration of transfer of shares of the corporation.

IF FLORIDA STATUTE WAS BROKEN; law was binding:, 607.1324 stipulated only fair value could hold as value, in this instance according to a Shareholders Agreement. SEE
607.1324 Shareholder's acceptance of corporation's offer.-- (1) If the shareholder states on the form provided in s. 607.1322(1) that the shareholder accepts the offer of the corporation to pay the corporation's estimated fair value for the shares, the corporation shall make such payment to the shareholder within 90 days after the corporation's receipt of the form from the shareholder. (2) Upon payment of the agreed value, the shareholder shall cease to have any interest in the shares.
Title 36 608.425 (1) All property originally contributed to the limited liability company or subsequently acquired by a limited liability company by purchase or otherwise is limited liability company property. (2) Unless otherwise provided in the articles of organization or the operating agreement, property acquired with limited liability company funds is limited liability company property. (3) Instruments and documents providing for the acquisition, mortgage, or disposition of property of the limited liability company shall be valid and binding upon the limited liability company, if they are executed in accordance with this chapter.

608.426 f.s. Abstract: (1) The limited liability company may make distributions to its members in accordance with the provisions contained in the operating agreement, except that no distribution may be made if after the distribution the limited liability company would be insolvent. In the case of any distribution based upon such financial statement or such a valuation, each such distribution shall be identified as a distribution based upon such financial statements or a fair valuation of assets,

608.427 Withdrawal of member and distribution upon withdrawal.-- (1) A member may withdraw from a limited liability company only at the time or upon the occurrence of an event specified in the articles of organization or operating agreement and in accordance with the articles of organization or operating agreement...
(2) Upon withdrawal, a withdrawing member is entitled to receive any distribution to which the withdrawing member is entitled under the articles of organization or operating agreement, and, if not otherwise provided in the articles of organization and operating agreement, the withdrawing member is entitled to receive, within a reasonable time after withdrawal, the fair value of the withdrawing member's interest in the limited liability company as of the date of resignation based upon the withdrawing member's right to share in distributions from the limited liability company.

J Winslow was incompetent to honor Florida Statutes which provide for the formation of limited liability companies . She broke the codification of The Florida Limited Liability Company Act where the principal organizing document is the operating agreement. Most statutory provisions are subject to the operating agreement, and the LLC members are free to a substantial extent to create their own organizational provisions. But J. Winslow had wilful plans to disregard. She loses jurisdiction. J. Winslow should know the law before she would have deliberate indifference to break it: Rev. Rul. 77-287 Section 2031. - and REV. Rul. 59-60 prevented values higher than that described in restrictive agreements:OK ARTAgreement is Intangible Property SEE:
Rev. Rul. 77-287 Section 2031. - Definition of Gross Estate 26 CFR 20.2031-2: Valuation of stocks and bonds. (Also Sections 170, 2032, 2512; 1.170A-1, 20.2032-1, 25.2512-2.) July, 1977 [*1] Valuation of securities restricted from immediate resale. Guidelines are set forth for the valuation, for Federal tax purposes, of securities that cannot be immediately resold because they are restricted from resale pursuant to Federal securities laws; Rev. Rul. 59- 60 amplified. SECTION 1. PURPOSE. The purpose of this Revenue Ruling is to amplify Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, as modified by Rev. Rul. 65-193, 1965-2 C.B. 370, and to provide information and guidance to taxpayers, Internal Revenue Service personnel, and others concerned with the valuation, for Federal tax purposes, of securities that cannot be immediately resold because they are restricted from resale pursuant to Federal securities laws. This guidance is applicable only in cases where it is not inconsistent with valuation requirements of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 or the regulations thereunder. Further, this ruling does not establish the time at which property shall be valued. SEC. 2. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM. It frequently becomes necessary to establish the fair market value of stock that has not been registered for public trading when the issuing company has stock of the same class that is actively [*2] traded in one or more securities markets. The problem is to determine the difference in fair market value between the registered shares that are actively traded and the unregistered shares. This problem is often encountered in estate and gift tax cases. However, it is sometimes encountered when unregistered shares are issued in exchange for assets or the stock of an acquired company. (OK ART is not registered)
REV. Rul. 59-60, as modified, were extended to the valuation of corporate securities for income and other tax purposes by Rev. Rul. 68-609, 1968-2 C.B. 327. .02 There are several terms currently in use in the securities industry that denote restrictions imposed on the resale and transfer of certain securities. The term frequently used to describe these securities is "restricted securities," but they are sometimes referred to as "unregistered securities," "investment letter stock," "control stock," or "private [*3] placement stock." Frequently these terms are used interchangeably. They all indicate that these particular securities cannot lawfully be distributed to the general public until a registration statement relating to the corporation underlying the securities has been filed, and has also become effective under the rules promulgated and enforced by the United States Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) pursuant to the Federal securities laws. The following represents a more refined definition of each of the following terms along with two other terms - "exempted securities" and "exempted transactions." (a) The term "restricted securities" is defined in Rule 144 adopted by the SEC as "securities acquired directly or indirectly from the issuer thereof, or from an affiliate of such issuer, in a transaction or chain of transactions not involving any public offering." (b) The term "unregistered securities" refers to those securities with respect to which a registration statement, providing full disclosure by the issuing corporation, has not been filed with the SEC pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933. The registration statement is a condition precedent to a public distribution of securities [*4] in interstate commerce and is aimed at providing the prospective investor with a factual basis for sound judgment in making investment decisions. () The terms "investment letter stock" and "letter stock" denote shares of stock that have been issued by a corporation without the benefit of filing a registration statement with the SEC. Such stock is subject to resale and transfer restrictions set forth in a letter agreement requested by the issuer and signed by the buyer of the stock when the stock is delivered. Such stock may be found in the hands of either individual investors or institutional investors. (d) The term "control stock" indicates that the shares of stock have been held or are being held by an officer, director, or other person close to the management of the corporation. These persons are subject to certain requirements pursuant to SEC rules upon resale of shares they own in such corporations. (e) The term "private placement stock" indicates that the stock has been placed with an institution or other investor who will presumably hold it for a long period and ultimately arrange to have the stock registered if it is to be offered to the general public. Such stock [*5] may or may not be subject to a letter agreement. Private placements of stock are exempted from the registration and prospectus provisions of the Securities Act of 1933.
SEC. 5. FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES MATERIAL TO VALUATION OF RESTRICTED SECURITIES. .01 Frequently, a company has a class of stock that cannot be traded publicly. The reason such stock cannot be traded may arise from the securities statutes, as in the case of an "investment letter" restriction; it may arise from a corporate charter restriction, or perhaps from a trust agreement restriction. In such cases, certain documents.

J. Winslow violated the OK Restrictions set forth by bylaws. She violated right to property.
This was NOT a Harmless Error as the outcome of the case would change when corrected.
“The "probable harm" necessary to obtain reversal on an evidentiary ruling means that the error would likely have effected the result”. State v. Butler, 36 Conn. App. 525, 532 (1995)
CITING Pelarinos v. Henderson, 34 Conn. App. 726, 731 (1994).

"The moment the idea is admitted into society that property is not as sacred as the laws of God, and there is not a force of law and public justice to protect it, anarchy and tyranny commence. Property must be sacred or liberty cannot exist." John Adams

The Winslow Court gave Mrs. Knize the equivalent power as a Creditor for OK Art. Mr. Knize became a Debtor to Mrs. Knize. Therefore Equal Protection was violated shown below.: Also, Actions must include other members of OK Art who had rights for first refusal, and yet were not summoned by Mrs. Knize or the Court. This constitutes a mistrial and a Breach of Duty Of Care ;. Jurisdiction is lost. Transfer Attachment was unlawful:
CGS Sec. 52-552. Fraudulent conveyances, judgments, contracts, when void. Section 52-552 was repealed, .yet the principles of law for cases cited in section REMAIN under Sec. 52-552k. CITED: Who may take advantage of fraudulent conveyance. It is good between the parties. 52 C. 371; 68 C. 588; 76 C. 199; 78 C. 416; see 79 C. 18. Rights of creditors where representative fails to act. 49 C. 214; 71 C. 80. Creditors can proceed only by legal process; 17 C. 492; and may be estopped by participation; 52 C. 364; and are only entitled to relief so far as necessary to protect them. 79 C. 284. Creditor must show himself entitled to relief. 67 C. 372; 68 C. 580; 81 C. 626. (OTHER OK ART MEMBERS:) If conveyance is made with intent to defraud one creditor, it is voidable as to all; 50 C. 31; 52 C. 441; 131 C. 95; but is voidable, not void. 67 C. 372. (MR. KNIZE:) Grantee can acquire no title by possession against creditors (members); 4 D. 284; but his title is good against an invalid attachment. 62 C. 24. Sale, if voidable, is so in toto; 39 C. 37; Ordinarily only existing creditor can object; 75 C. 41; 101 C. 697; but conveyance may be in fraud of future creditors; 81 C. 626; so, (JUDGES ARE A PARTY) Equity will not set aside fraudulent contract at suit of one of the fraudulent parties. 117 C. 296. Contracts Law:: Implied-in-Law Contracts MAYNARD MEHL v. JOHN H. NORTON. No. 31,338. Supreme Court of Minnesota 201 Minn. 203; 275 N.W. 843; 1937 Minn. LEXIS 851; 113A.L.R. 1055 November 5, 1937. Quasi contractual liability for unjust enrichment is based upon the ground that a person receiving a benefit, which it is unjust for him to retain, ought to make restitution or pay the value of the benefit to the party entitled thereto, in KNIZE restitution or pay the value of the benefit derived through OK ART and 1991 House Agreement.
Count Ill: Conspiracy of the court to use the machinery of the court to Defraud Mr. Knize. and impair contract obligations for OK ART EXHIBITIONS, LTD and other mentioned contracts. Enforcement actions without the authority of a state law are criminal by nature; court’s fraud upon the court for unreasonable failure to avoid an injury or damages. The state judges did nothing to discharge their constitutional duty of care.
18 US Code Sec. 2511 (d)(20) A conspirator is responsible for the acts of other conspirators who have left the conspiracy before he joined it, or joined after he left it; statutes of limitations tolled for previous acts when each new act is done. Rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states: “A person aggrieved ...by the deprivation of property may move the district court for the district in which the property was seized for the return of the property on the ground that such person is entitled to lawful possession of the property”.

Mr. Knize claims lawful possession of the property; OK ART EXHIBITIONS LTD, (indemnity for) his public stocks that he was forced to sell, any potion of the 50 Sunset Pass, Wilton house that was seized by the court under ,violation of Connecticut Constitution Article First; SEC. 5,. SEC. 7. SEC. 8.
The court shall receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary to the decision of the motion. If the motion (Rule 41(e)) is granted, the property shall be returned to the movant...If a motion for return of property is made or comes on for hearing in the district of trial after an indictment or information is filed, it shall be treated also as a motion to suppress under Rule 12.

Mr. Knize notifies this court he will file the motion. A. Standards of Review:
“Standing to bring their Rule 41(e) motion is reviewed de novo. See Utah v. Babbitt, 137 F.3d 1193, 1203 (10th Cir. 1998). The district court order dismissing the motion on the basis of laches is also reviewed de novo, cf. Hutchinson v. Pfeil, 105 F.3d 562, 564 (10th Cir. 1997), as is the question of whether a statute of limitations bars the motion. See Cisneros v. ABC Rail Corp., 217 F.3d 1299, 1304 (10th Cir. 2000). ¶13 Motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) may take one of two forms. See Holt v. United States, 46 F.3d 1000, 1002 (10th Cir. 1995). First, a party may make a facial challenge to the plaintiff's allegations concerning subject matter jurisdiction, thereby questioning the sufficiency of the complaint. See id. In addressing a facial attack, the district court must accept the allegations in the complaint as true. "Second, a party may go beyond allegations contained in the complaint and challenge the facts upon which subject matter jurisdiction depends." Id. at 1003. In addressing a factual attack, the court does not "presume the truthfulness of the complaint's factual allegations," but "has wide discretion to allow affidavits, other documents, and a limited evidentiary hearing to resolve disputed jurisdictional facts under Rule 12(b)(1)." Id. Because we construe the United States' Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of standing to be a facial attack on the complaint, rather than a factual one, we accept Appellants' allegations of material facts as true and construe the complaint in favor of Appellants. See Riggs v. City of Albuquerque, 916 F.2d 582, 584 (10th Cir. 1990). The same standard applies to the United States' Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss based upon the doctrine of laches and the statute of limitations. See Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for the Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir.1999).

NOTICE: Mr. Knize will file a Motion to Dismiss. Laches may be excused from ignorance of the party's rights; from the obscurity of the transaction; by the pendency of a suit, and; where the party labors under a legal disability, Mr. Knize was ignorant of his full rights during original trial.
Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, Mr. Knize holds he has standing to pursue a Rule 41(e) motion. He claims the Connecticut courts will err in applying the doctrine of laches without requiring Defendant to demonstrate material prejudice. Finally, Mr. Knize claims that the six-year statute of limitations set forth at 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) applies to the bringing of a Rule 41(e) motion. In cases where state government has effected an administrative forfeiture of property, a Rule 41(e) claimant's cause of action alleging unconstitutional lack of notice to other OK ART members of the forfeiture accrues when they discovered or should have discovered that the property was forfeited. In cases where there has been no forfeiture action brought against property that has been seized in conjunction with a criminal proceeding, which criminal charges are to rule upon now by this court, a Rule 41(e) claimant's cause of action does not accrue until the government no longer has the right to seized items as evidence in the criminal proceeding. Mr. Knize claims constructive and direct fraud upon the mentioned contracts.
LACK OF SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION. As a matter of law, there is no presumption of subject-matter jurisdiction in a statutory proceeding, such as in divorce. Proof of Subject-matter jurisdiction has been denied in this case. Until and unless the original Petitioner proves that subject-matter jurisdiction in all of its elements and in all situations have been met, and at the proper time, the Connecticut court remains devoid of any subject-matter jurisdiction. The court has NOT allowed a hearing or proved it when it was challenged. The court subrogated by giving Mrs. Knize rights when she had none.
All Judges acted in concert and had fraudulently transferred assets; took illegal possession. See Nature of the Case. The Winslow Court gave Mrs. the equivalent power as a Creditor for OK Art. Mr. Knize became a Debtor to Mrs. Knize. SEE Count
XXIV. Therefore Equal Protection was violated under the UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT CHAPTER 923a. Rule of Law was Violated: Judge Winslow gave an unreasonable value to the OK Art Exhibitions, LTD Shareholders Document. Under definitions of this act: (9) "Person" means an individual, partnership, corporation, limited liability company, association, organization, government or governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust or any other legal or commercial entity. Claim is pending in state court. Action is also sought under Jurisdiction of 11 USC § 549/11 USC § 548 and other sections under the Bankruptcy code (CHAPTERs 3,5.7,11 others). I reserve my right to pursue Chapter claims including pursuant 11 USC § 302. Joint cases, 11 USC § 706. Conversion (a) The debtor may convert a case under this chapter to a case under chapter 11, 12, or 13 of this title at any time, if the case has not been converted under section 1112, 1208, or 1307, 11 USC § 722. Redemption. An individual debtor may, whether or not the debtor has waived the right to redeem under this section, redeem tangible personal property intended primarily for personal, family, or household use, from a lien securing a dischargeable consumer debt 11 USC § 723. Rights of partnership trustee against general partners (a) If there is a deficiency of property of the estate to pay in full all claims which are allowed in a case under this chapter concerning a partnership 11 USC § 501. Filing of proofs of claims or interests (a) A creditor or an indenture trustee may file a proof of claim. An equity security holder may file a proof of interest.,11 USC § 725. Distribution of property of the estate , 11 USC § 506. Determination of secured status (a) (1) An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has an interest, or that is subject to setoff 11 USC § 509. Claims of codebtors
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) or (c) of this section, an entity that is liable with the debtor on, or that has secured, a claim of a creditor against the debtor, and that pays such claim, is subrogated to the rights of such creditor to the extent of such payment.(b) Such entity is not subrogated to the rights of such creditor to the extent that--(1) a claim of such entity for reimbursement or contribution on account of such payment of such creditor’s claim is--(A) allowed under section 502 of this title;(B) disallowed other than under section 502(e) of this title; or (C) subordinated under section 510 of this title; or(2) as between the debtor and such entity, such entity received the consideration for the claim held by such creditor. (c) The court shall subordinate to the claim of a creditor and for the benefit of such creditor an allowed claim, by way of subrogation under this section, or for reimbursement or contribution, of an entity that is liable with the debtor on, or that has secured, such creditor’s claim, until such creditor’s claim is paid in full, either through payments under this title or otherwise.11 USC § 524. Effect of discharge (a) A discharge in a case under this title--(1) voids any judgment at any time obtained, to the extent that such judgment is a determination of the personal liability of the debtor with respect to any debt discharged under section 727, 944, 1141, 1228, or 1328 of this title, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived;(2) operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived; and (3) operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect or recover from, or offset against, property of the debtor of the kind specified in section 541(a)(2) of this title that is acquired after the commencement of the case, on account of any allowable community claim, except a community claim that is excepted from discharge underif ( showRev ) { document.write(" section 523, 1228(a)(1), or 1328(a)(1) of this title, or that ") } section 523, 1228(a)(1), or 1328(a)(1), or that would be so excepted, determined in accordance with the provisions of sections 523(c) and 523(d) of this title, in a case concerning the debtor's spouse commenced on the date of the filing of the petition in the case concerning the debtor, whether or not discharge of the debt based on such community claim is waived.
The legal standard of Review for FAIR VALUE for a Chose in Action was NOT used.
CGS Sec. 52-552d. Value. (a) Value is given for a transfer or an obligation if, in exchange for the transfer or obligation, property is transferred or an antecedent debt is secured or satisfied, but value does not include an unperformed promise made otherwise than in the ordinary course of the promisor's business to furnish support to the debtor or another person.
(Mr. Knize’s holding of the Shareholders Agreement did not permit a value to the debtor, Mrs. Knize which could possibly exceed $11,500, if that, yet the Winslow Court improperly made a value of $1,500,000 in her 2004 Memorandum of Decision and Articulations)
(b) For the purposes of subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 52-552e and section 52-552f, a person gives a reasonably equivalent value if the person acquires an interest of the debtor in an asset pursuant to a regularly conducted, noncollusive foreclosure sale or execution of a power of sale for the acquisition or disposition of the interest of the debtor upon default under a mortgage, deed of trust or security agreement.
(c) A transfer is made for present value if the exchange between the debtor and the transferee is intended by them to be contemporaneous and is in fact substantially contemporaneous.(P.A. 91-297, S. 4.)

(Mrs. Knize NEVER could legally acquire such a value of $400.000 for said OK asset because of the conditions and bylaws of the Shareholders’ Agreement and principles of FAIR VALUE. Mr. Knize did not acquire rights to full asset value, below)
Sec. 52-552g. When transfer is made or obligation is incurred. For the purposes of sections 52-552a to 52-552l, inclusive:
(1) A transfer is made: ... (B) with respect to an asset that is not real property or that is a fixture, when the transfer is so far perfected that a creditor on a simple contract cannot acquire a judicial lien otherwise than under sections 52-552a to 52-552l, inclusive, that is superior to the interest of the transferee;
(2) If applicable law permits the transfer to be perfected as provided in subsection (1) of this section and the transfer is not so perfected before the commencement of an action for relief under sections 52-552a to 52-552l, inclusive, the transfer is deemed made immediately before the commencement of the action; (BUT)
(3) If applicable law does not permit the transfer to be perfected as provided in subsection (1) of this section, the transfer is made when it becomes effective between the debtor and the transferee;
(4) A transfer is not made until the debtor has acquired rights in the asset transferred;

((Yet, under RUBIN future transfer cannot be made, Mrs. Knize had no standing to OK ART. A challenge under a claim for relief under sections 52-552a to 52-552l, should through the fairness of proceedings mandate that a transfer be returned or indemnified until the OK ART entity realized the sale of underlying assets and with proper examination of the fraudulent claim, the rights of the debtor, Mr. Knize, be established to mean he has rights upon his Demand of OK ART for only $11,500 and not $1,500,000 and under RUBIN, the asset was “mere speculation. J. Winslow used inadmissable evidence to determine the value of OK ART EXHIBITIONS, LTD.)

(5) An obligation is incurred (B) if evidenced by a writing, when the writing executed by the obligor is delivered to or for the benefit of the obligee.

(The claim for Breach of the 1991 House Agreement Contract Mr. Knize placed and shown to exist in J. Winslow’s Memorandum of Decision 2004, is a direct claim of a violation to an obligation to share all house expenses equally, and was to offset the award to Mrs. Knize of over $300,000 for the house on 50 Sunset Pass, Wilton. Fraud upon the court occurred when J.Winslow, through intrusion on the valid contract, used flawed citation of Demoralis v. Demoralis, and is subject to relief with further litigation )

Conn. CGS Sec. 52-552i. Defenses, liability and protection of transferee. (a) A transfer or obligation is not voidable under subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of section 52-552e against a person who took in good faith and for a reasonably equivalent value.
(The defendant made a good faith attempt to properly value OK ART at less than $11,500. J. Winslow and The State of Connecticut, gaining judicial control of the OK Art, did not act in good faith, and give reasonably equivalent value to OK Art and therefore is subject to the UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT, both Federal and State. For purposes of determining whether federal jurisdiction exists in an action, state officials in parallel situations have been deemed to be acting as agents or officers of the federal government.
See e.g., Kuehner v. Schweiker, 717 F.2d 813, 826 (3d Cir 1983) (Becker, J., concurring) (state officials responsible for UFTA procedures "are essentially the alter egos of their [federal] counterparts and effectively are officers, employees, or agents of an agency of the United States"), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 469 U.S. 977 (1984) And, of course, in the converse situation. The basic structure and approach of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act are preserved in the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. There are two sections in the new Act delineating what transfers and obligations are fraudulent. Section 4(a) is an adaptation of three sections of the U.F.C.A.; § 5(a) is an adaptation of another section of the U.F.C.A.; and § 5(b) is new. One section of the U.F.C.A.
Both Acts declare a transfer made or an obligation incurred with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors, (other OK ART Corp and members), to be fraudulent. Both Acts render a transfer made or obligation incurred without adequate consideration to be constructively fraudulent - i.e., without regard to the actual intent of the parties - under one of the following conditions: (1) the debtor, (Mr. Knize), was left by the transfer or obligation with unreasonably small assets for a transaction or the business in which he was engaged; (2) the debtor intended to incur, or believed that he would incur, more debts than he would be able to pay; (OK ART could not supply the value of a non-realized asset) or (3) the debtor was insolvent at the time or as a result of the transfer or obligation, {which Mr. Knize was from his right obliged to only $11,500 and the forced Winslow judgment making him pay $400,000}. As under the original federal Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act a transfer or obligation that is constructively fraudulent because insolvency concurs with or follows failure to receive adequate consideration is voidable only by a creditor in existence at the time the transfer occurs or the obligation is incurred. Either an existing or subsequent creditor may avoid a transfer or obligation for inadequate consideration when accompanied by the financial condition specified in § 4(a)(2)(i) Federal UFCA.
Reasonably equivalent value is required in order to constitute adequate consideration under the revised Act. The revision follows the Bankruptcy Code in eliminating good faith on the part of the transferee or obligee as an issue in the determination of whether adequate consideration is given by a transferee or obligee. The new Act, like the Bankruptcy Act, allows the transferee or obligee to show good faith in defense after a creditor (other OK ART Members) establishes that a fraudulent transfer has been made or a fraudulent obligation has been incurred. Thus a showing by a defendant Judge that a reasonable equivalent has been given in good faith for a transfer or obligation is a complete defense if they have not intended to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors: {The OK ART Corporation, and its members who were not properly summoned to court.}

A good faith transferee or obligee who has given less than a reasonable equivalent is nevertheless allowed a reduction in liability to the extent of the value given. The new Act, like the Bankruptcy Code, eliminates the provision of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act that enables a creditor to attack a security transfer on the ground that the value of the property transferred is disproportionate to the debt secured. The premise of the new Act is that the value of the interest transferred for security is measured by and thus corresponds exactly to the debt secured. Foreclosure of a debtor's interest by a regularly conducted, noncollusive sale on default under a mortgage or other security agreement may not be avoided under the Act as a transfer for less than a reasonably equivalent value.

Section 7 lists the remedies available to creditors under the new Act. It eliminates as unnecessary and confusing a differentiation made in the original Act between the remedies available to holders of matured claims and those holding unmatured claims. Since promulgation of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act the U.S. Supreme Court has imposed restrictions on the availability and use of prejudgment remedies. As a result many states have amended their statutes and rules applicable to such remedies, and it is frequently unclear whether a state's procedures include a prejudgment remedy against a fraudulent transfer or obligation. A bracketed paragraph is included in Section 7 for adoption by those states that elect to make such a remedy available.
Section 8 prescribes the measure of liability of a transferee or obligee under the Act and enumerates defenses. Defenses against avoidance of a preferential transfer to an insider under § 5(b). In addition a preferential transfer may be justified when shown to be made pursuant to a good faith effort to stave off forced liquidation (shown in OK ART Shareholders Agreement provisions) and rehabilitate the debtor. Section 8 also precludes avoidance, as a constructively fraudulent transfer (executed by J. Winslow indirectly within her mosaic of distribution which ILLEGALLY averted application of UFTA), ie; of the termination of the enforcement of a security interest in compliance with Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. -The new Act includes a new section specifying when a transfer is made or an obligation is incurred. The section specifying the time when a transfer occurs is adapted from Section 548(d) of the Bankruptcy Code. Its premise is that if the law prescribes a mode for making the transfer a matter of public record or notice, it is not deemed to be made for any purpose under the Act until it has become such a matter of record or notice. Back to Connecticut’s UFTA)

52-5521:(b) Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent a transfer is voidable in an action by a creditor (OTHER OK ART MEMBERS) under subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of section 52-552h, the creditor may recover judgment for the value of the asset transferred, as adjusted under subsection (d) of this section, or the amount necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim, whichever is less. The judgment may be entered against: (1) The first transferee of the asset or the person for whose benefit the transfer was made, or (2) any subsequent transferee other than a good-faith transferee who took for value or from any subsequent transferee.
(c) If the judgment under subsection (b) of this section is based upon the value of the asset transferred, the judgment must be for an amount equal to the value of the asset at the time of the transfer, subject to adjustment as the equities may require, (as stipulated in OK ART Bylaws.)
(Mr. Knize’s equitable value to OK Art can only be $11,500 and Mrs. Knize’s award is REQUIRED, by law, to be adjusted)
(d) Notwithstanding voidability of a transfer or an obligation under sections 52-552a to 52-552l, inclusive, a good-faith transferee or obligee is entitled, to the extent of the value given the debtor for the transfer or obligation, to (1) a lien on or a right to retain any interest in the asset transferred; (2) enforcement of any obligation incurred; or (3) a reduction in the amount of the liability on the judgment.
Sec. 52-552j. Extinguishment of cause of action. A cause of action with respect to a fraudulent transfer or obligation under sections 52-552a to 52-552l, inclusive, is extinguished unless action is brought: (1) Under subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of section 52-552e, within four years after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred or, if later, within one year after the transfer or obligation was or could reasonably have been discovered by the claimant; (2) under subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 52-552e or subsection (a) of section 52-552f, within four years after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred; or (3) under subsection (b) of section 52-552f, within one year after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred.(Terms of J. Winslow’s award to Mrs. Knize started less than a year ago)

Sec. 52-552k. Supplementary provisions. Unless displaced by the provisions of sections 52-552a to 52-552l, inclusive, the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relating to principal and agent, estoppel, laches, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, insolvency or other validating or invalidating cause, supplement the provisions of said sections.

STANDARD OF REVIEW: Dietter v. Dietter, 737 A.2d 926 (Conn.App. 08/17/1999) (AC 15995) 54 Conn.App. 481, 737 A.2d 926, 1999.CT.42400 August 17, 1999 ROBERT E. DIETTER v. CATHERINE DIETTER: “After applying General Statutes §§ 52-552e *fn4 to the facts in the record before us, the trial court concluded that, acting with the actual intent to defraud the defendant, the plaintiff (or Judge Winslow) fraudulently transferred both of the assets in question from the marital estate. In cases arising under General Statutes §§ 52-552, the statutory predecessor to the Fraudulent Transfer Act, which was repealed by Public Acts 1991, No. 91- 297, §§ 13, we held that "[t]he determination of the question of fraudulent intent is clearly an issue of fact which must often be inferred from surrounding circumstances. . . . Such a fact is, then, not ordinarily proven by direct evidence, but rather, by inference from other facts proven -- the indicia or badges of fraud." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Shawmut Bank v. Brooks Development Corp., 46 Conn. App. 399, 406, 699 A.2d 283 (1997); Tyers v. Coma, 214 Conn. 8, 11, 570 A.2d 186 (1990); Cook v. Bieluch, 32 Conn. App. 537, 551-52, 629 A.2d 1175, cert. denied, 228 Conn. 910, 635 A.2d 1229 (1993). We see no reason to depart from that standard under the Fraudulent Transfer Act.
Under this statute, a person wishing to avoid an alleged fraudulent conveyance has the burden of proving either constructive fraud or actual fraud. Patrocinio v. Yalanis, 4 Conn. App. 33, 35, 492 A.2d 215 (1985). To prove constructive fraud, a plaintiff must show that the conveyance was made without substantial consideration and that the conveyance rendered the transferor unable to meet an obligation to the plaintiff. Id.; Zapolsky v. Sacks, 191 Conn. 194, 200, 464 A.2d 30 (1983).
"Constructive fraud: A contract or act, which, not originating in evil design and contrivance to perpetuate a positive fraud or injury upon other persons, yet, by its necessary tendency to deceive or mislead them, or to violate a public or private confidence, or to impair or injure public interest, is deemed equally reprehensible with positive fraud, and therefore is prohibited by law, ... " Bovier's Law Dictionary - 1856 Edition

Actual fraud requires a showing that the conveyance was made with a fraudulent intent and that the transferee of the property participated the fraud. Id. In either instance, fraud must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Patrocinio v. Yalanis (supra). Mr. Knize refers to the Exhibits List for the actual Shareholders agreement. It was signed by Family members. It places a Demand Value of $11,500. As a matter of Law is is an expected asset.; Fraud and Injury through valuation of the court for $1,500.000 is clear and convincing. Parties have been termed indispensable when their interest in the controversy is such that a final decree cannot be made without either affecting that interest or leaving the controversy in such condition that its final Disposition may be inconsistent with equity and good conscience. Sturman v. Socha, 191 Conn. 1, 6, 463 A.2d 527 (1983); Standard Mattress Co. v. Hartford, 31 Conn. Sup. 279, 288, 329 A.2d 613 (1974). Mr. Knize contends that OK ART family members are indispensable parties When, however, a suit cannot be disposed of properly on its merits in the absence of an indispensable party, the objection is not waived by failure to assert it in a motion to strike and may be raised on appeal. 59 Am. Jur.2d, Parties 264; see Foote v. Branford, 109 Conn. 358, 361, 146 A. 723 (1929) (court cannot grant remedy sought in the absence of a necessary party) Because Mr. Knize claims that the absent parties were indispensable to a full and fair adjudication of the fraudulent conveyance count, a higher court must review the claim or its merits. "Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right, they must first be notified." Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223, 233. See Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274; Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409; Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385.. Review of the record is convincing that the defendant’s contacts with Florida were insufficient to satisfy due process requirements to hold the issue of transferring assets in OK ART in Conn. Mr. Knize argues that the mere ownership of stock in a corporation does not justify the exercise of Conn.’s personal jurisdiction over the owner, and that subjecting the owner to such jurisdiction would offend notions of fair play and substantial Justice.Next consider whether these facts satisfy the minimum contacts requirement of the due process clause, and fraud.claims:

"The United States constitution allows state courts [FLORIDA} to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants only when minimum contacts exist between the defendant and the forum state. The nature of these contacts must be such that requiring the defendant to defend in the forum state does not offend `traditional notions of fair play and substantial Justice.' World-Wide Volkswagen Corporation v. Woodson, [444 U.S. 286 292, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980)]; International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 1326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed.2d 95 (1945)]; Milliken v. Meyer 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S.Ct. 339, 85 L.Ed.2d 278 (1940)." Frazer v. McGowan (supra) 252. SEE Gaudio v. Gaudio, 580 A.2d 1212 (Conn.App. 09/18/1990)

FIRST AM. RIGHTS: In KNIZE: FA 02-0190291 S, The Higher Courts defrauded the judicial machinery by not honoring 1st Amendment rights for a brief which would have argued that J. Winslow, in her 2004 Memorandum, broke from precedent and Statute (Conn.Title 33/34 and Fla. Stat.) to deprive Mr. Knize of his property rights:
" a judgment improperly rendered, as a matter of law, must be set aside.” Conn. Light and Power v. St. John, 80 Conn App 767, 774, 837 A.2d 841 (2004). “Our Supreme Court has expressed a policy "to bring about a trial on the merits of a dispute whenever possible and to secure for the litigant his day in court." Coppola v. Coppola, 243 Conn. 657, 665, 707 A.2d 281 (1998). Equal protection violation.
CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY v. ROBERT ST. JOHN ET AL.(AC 23279). As a preliminary matter, we address the appropriate standard of review. Because a determination regarding a court's subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, our review is plenary. Giulietti v. Giulietti, 65 Conn. App. 813, 846, 784 A.2d 905, cert. denied, 258 Conn. 946, 947, 788 A.2d 95, 96, 97 (2001). "Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of a court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it. . . . A court does not truly lack subject matter jurisdiction if it has competence to entertain the action before it. . . . Once it is determined that a tribunal has authority or competence to decide the class of cases to which the action belongs, the issue of subject matter jurisdiction is resolved in favor of entertaining the action. . . . [I]n determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged." (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Connor v.Statewide Grievance Committee, 260 Conn. 435, 442-43, 797 A.2d 1081 (2002).

Mr. Knize through implication that the courts were violating the law certainly has always contested the court's competence to entertain the type of action before it; the courts were
negligent, had deliberate indifference within the scope of their judicial employment, are guilty of important omissions and unwarranted government action.. Citing 44 errors at the appeals court clearly implies the Judges were not competent ie; J. Winslow .This could not have been known to Mr. Knize until AFTER J. Winslow’s rulings. Also, having cited that the Appeals Court, and the Supreme Court implicates that those judges were not competent in Constitutional and Contract law and that they would lose Jurisdiction. Model Canon 300 (C) (1) of the ABA.s Model Code Of Judicial Conduct provides: “a judge shall diligently discharge the judge's administrative responsibilities without bias or prejudice, maintain professional competence in judicial administration...” where LLC law was ignored.
Mr. Knize found some 44 plain errors from the original trial court judge, and he needed at least 3 pages for each issue. He believes the Constitution guarantees a right to have ALL of one’s grievances heard BEFORE any court can seek to use administrative rules to suppress any particular grievance. The original trial court judge (Winslow) failed so many legal precedents (violation of the equal protection) of divorce court rulings, mostly concerning the VERY PUBLIC INTEREST of a citizen’’s rights to contract (violation of Art 1st, Sec 10, U.S. Const. No State shall.. pass any law.. impairing the obligation of Contracts), that the defendant (I, Mr. Knize) felt compelled to address them all to settle the controversies and conflicts that the court itself created. His over-limitation brief was denied in several proceedings even though the court was motioned for an extension of pages with an attached Motion for Proof of Subject Matter Jurisdiction. "Administrative decisions, even though they may be essential to the very functioning of the courts, have not ...been regarded as judicial acts." Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 228 (1988). In Forrester, the Supreme Court concluded that a judge was acting in an administrative, not a judicial, capacity when he demoted and discharged a probation officer and therefore was not entitled to absolute immunity from suit in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Administrative law encompasses laws and legal principles governing the administration and regulation of government agencies (both Federal and state). Such agencies are delegated power by Congress (or in the case of a state agency, the state legislature) to act as agents for the executive. Generally, administrative agencies are created to protect a public interest rather than to vindicate private rights. Governmental agencies must act within Constitutional parameters. These and other limits have been codified into statutes such as the Federal Administrative Procedure Act (FAPA) and state analogs. In other words, The
Judges in KNIZE had an administrative duty to enforce Fraudulent Transfer Act rules, and Constitutional law, Limited Liability Laws, and other codified laws, and they acted in an administrative capacity. They are therefore not subject to any immunities. State agencies' (Judicial Branch) administration and regulation are governed by state Acts: TITLE 5 > PART I > CHAPTER 5 > SUBCHAPTER II > § 552. SEE ABA Model Canon 300 (C) (1).
Count IV: Judge Winslow legislated from the bench for a) OK Art b) Prenuptial Agreement c) Couple’s Mutual House Agreement of 1991, and the Prenuptial Agreement. This makes her judgments void and ruling must be set aside.
Ertel v. Demmon 93 Conn App 115 2006 and AC 26104 " a judgment improperly rendered, as a matter of law, must be set aside.” Conn. Light and Power v. St. John, 80 Conn App 767, 774, 837 A.2d 841 (2004).

CLAIM: Look at Winslow articulations, and definition for mosaic, (May 26 04 and July 30th 04 Articulations ) to hide a contingency payment to the wife which was illegal. Also, J. Winslow’s refusal to articulate my questions about Fair Value, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Company Discounts, and other issues, some dealing with the Prenuptial Agreement, and the House Contract of 1991, confirms her guilt to illegally transfer assets. Under her duty to another to speak or failure to speak is inconsistent with honest dealings and is acting in bad faith and stopped the defendant from proving her error. “Silence, to work "estoppel", must amount to bad faith” Wise v. United States, D.C.Ky., 38 F.Supp. 130, 134; and, elements or essentials of such estoppel include: change of position to prejudice of person claiming estoppel, Sherlock v. Greaves, 106 Mont. 206, 76 P.2d 87, 91; damages if the estoppel is denied, James v. Nelson, C.C.A.Alaska, 90 F.2d 910, 917; duty and opportunity to speak, Merry. V. Garibaldi, 48 Cal.App.2d 397, 119 P{.2d 768; 771; ignorance of the facts by person claiming estoppel to alter his position; knowledge of facts and of rights by person estopped, Consolidated Freight Lines v. Groenen, 10 Wash2d 672, 117 P.2d 966, 968; misleading of party claiming estoppel, Lincoln v. Bennett, Tex.Civ.App., 135 S.W.2d 632, 636; reliance upon silence of party sought to be estopped, New York Life Ins. Co. v. Talley, C.C.A. Iowa, 72 F.2d 715, 718.""Estoppel by Acquiescence" See: "Acquiescence is a species of estoppel. An estoppel arises where party aware of his rights sees other party acting upon mistaken notion of his rights. Injury accruing form one's acquiescence in another's action to his prejudice creates "estoppel". Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., C.C.A.Ill., 125 F.2d 369, 375. Passive conduct on the part of one who has knowledge of the facts may be basis of estoppel Winslow v. Burns, 47 N.M. 29, 132 P.2d 1048, 1050. It must appear that party to be estopped was bound in equity and good conscience to speak and that party claiming estoppel relied upon acquiescence and was misled thereby to change his position to his prejudice. Sherlock v. Greaves, 105 Mont. 206, 76 P.2d 87, 91. "Silence is a species of conduct, and constitutes an implied representation of the existence of facts in question. When silence is of such character and under such circumstances that it would become a fraud, it will operate as an Estoppel." Carmine v. Bowen, 64 A. 932
Count V: Appellate court panel did not prove its Jurisdiction as required by law.
“Quite apart from the guarantee of equal protection, if a law impinges on a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly secured by the Constitution it is presumptively unconstitutional.
If a law has no other purpose that to chill assertion of constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to exercise them, it is patently unconstitutional.” HARRIS V. McRAE, 100 S.Ct. 2671, 448 U.S. 297, 65 L.Ed.2d 784,rehearing denied 101 S.Ct. 39, 448 U.S. 917, 65 L.Ed.2d 1180 (1980) “In pursuing substantial state interest, state cannot choose means which unnecessarily burden or restrict constitutionally protected activity”. DUNN V. BLUMSTEIN, 92 S.Ct. 995, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) “Only where state action impinges on exercise of fundamental constitutional right or liberties must it be found to have chosen the least restrictive alternative”. SAN ANTONIO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DIST. V. RODRIGUEZ, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)
BASIS::All judges deprived the defendant of his constitutional rights by suppressing the acknowledgment of the laws for Limited Liability companies. The color of law statutes do not require them to have believed they had Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Deliberately depriving a defendant of his constitutional rights is a crime. Alleging that the judges had Obstructed Justice does not require that they had suppressed evidence, only that they tried to. Federal civil rights law is similar. The U.S. Supreme Court held that:

"No ...judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it." Cooper v Armstrong, 358, US 1, 78 Ct 1401 1958. It also held repeatedly that "Whenever a judge acts where he/she does not have jurisdiction to act, the judge is engaged in an act or acts of treason" U.S. v. Will, 449 US 200, 216, 1091 S. Ct 471, 66 L.Ed 392, 406 (1980); Cohen v. Virginia, 19 US (6 Wheat) 264. 404, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821)

“Since Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), it has been settled that the Eleventh Amendment provides no shield for a state official confronted by a claim that he had deprived another of a federal right under the color of state law. Ex parte Young teaches that when a state officer acts under a state law in a manner violative of the Federal Constitution, he "comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States." Id., at 159-160. (Emphasis supplied.) “There is a general rule that a ministerial officer who acts wrongfully, although in good faith, is nevertheless liable in a civil action and cannot claim the immunity of the sovereign. Cooper v. O'Conner, 99 F.2d 133: When a judicial officer acts entirely without jurisdiction or without compliance with jurisdiction requisites CONDITIONS he may be held civilly liable for abuse of process even though his act involved a decision made in good faith, that he had juris”
Count VI: In Post J. J. Tieney obfusticated and subverted any attempt to rehear the case, caused wrongful imprisonment, and is guilty of fraudulent transfer of assets under KENNER and Hazel Glass to benefit the other party. The Tierney Court
denied Mr. Knize his right to a meaningful ability to set in motion the governmental machinery because the court stopped the machinery unlawfully, not in a proper way, as for example, upon a valid determination of lack of probable cause. Attorney O’Sullivan/Tierney are liable for actions (silence) in requesting Contempt without an affidavit determining Liability of the Defendant according to the valid instruments in evidence Title 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1746 requires that liability be sworn thus the court and Plaintiff failed to state a claim because without a swearing to liability there is no claim. The claim must include reference to the OK ART instruments and show that the restrictions enforced rights to the plaintiff. OK Shareholders Agreement makes
Plaintiff’s liability claims completely VOID; a breach of professional duty of care.
Count Vll: Constitutional Law violations of the Connecticut courts: Observing that is the duty of the District Court to do its duty to prevent any “fraud on the Constitution”. In violation were U. S. Constitution's Amendments 1,4,5,10,14, highlighting Federal Equal Protection of the Laws concerning the Connecticut Constitution under Article First; SEC. 5. No law shall ever be passed to curtail or restrain the liberty of speech... SEC. 7. The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable searches or seizures...;. SEC. 8. ...No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law; SEC. 10. All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay;.SEC. 12. The privileges of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended (Conn. threw Mr. Knize in jail for contempt for not passing over to ex-wife assets that were non-distributable in divorce by rule of law, voided judgments places a charge of wrongful imprisonment), SEC. 14. The citizens have a right ... to apply to those invested with the powers of government, for redress of grievances, or other proper purposes, by petition, address or remonstrance. All Judges must be held responsible to an injured party for the deprivation of Constitutional Rights.
"The Supreme Court initially discussed judicial immunity in Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 19 L.Ed. 285 (1869). In Randall, the Court wrote that judges of superior or general jurisdiction courts were not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts, where the acts, in excess of jurisdiction, are done maliciously or corruptly." In more recent cases: Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) and Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 it was found that judges were really not acting in a malicious and corrupt manner and the proofs also showed that. Congress by its words and meaning enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and that meaning included judges to be held responsible to an injured plaintiff for the deprivation of Constitutional Rights. Any judge made case finding to the contrary is hereby challenged as unconstitutional and unlawful. No Court has ever challenged the Constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, and therefore said Congressionally enacted legislation stands as law. The only way to change an act of Congress is by an act of Congress. No judge can change it and any such findings and changes are not to be upheld in Federal Courts as lawful. No changes in the wording have ever been made to Title 42 U.S.C.A. 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986 and 1988 and therefore these Congressionally enacted laws are enforceable in the Federal Courts. The only change made to Title 42 U.S.C.A. 1983 took place in 1979. At this time the words "or the District of Columbia" were inserted following "Territory". If any judges or persons representing judges had wanted to make a change this would have been an opportune time to do so. No action was ever taken to change the wording of the law and it remains as such today. See RANDALL V. BRIGHAM, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 19 L.Ed. 285 (1869).

"The resolution of immunity questions inherently requires a balance between the evils inevitable in any available alternative. In situations of abuse of office, an action for damages may offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional guarantees."
BUTZ V. ECONOMOU, 438 U.S. 506, 98 S.Ct. 2910 (1978)
“Federal lawsuits can be brought under both Title 42 U.S.C.A. 1983, 1985, 1986, 1988 and/or brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials. Butz at 504:
"Referring both to the objective and subjective elements, we have held that qualified immunity (Note: or "good faith") would be defeated if an official "knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff], or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury. . ." HARLOW V. FITZGERALD, 102 S.Ct. 2727 at 2737, 457 U.S. 800 (1982)

"I agree with the substantive standard announced by the Court today, imposing liability when a public-official defendant "knew or should have known" of the constitutionally violative effect of his actions. This standard would not allow the official who actually knows that he was violating the law to escape liability for his actions, even if he could not "reasonably have been expected" to know what he actually did know. Thus the clever and unusually well-informed violator of constitutional rights will not evade just punishment for his crimes. I, also agree that this standard applies "across the board," to all "government officials performing discretionary functions.," Harlow at 2739, Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, and Justice Blackmum concurring. In Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting: "I do not think that all judges, under all circumstances, no matter how outrageous their conduct are immune from suit under 17 Stat. 13, 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The Court's ruling is not justified by the admitted need for a vigorous and independent judiciary, is not commanded by the common -law doctrine of judicial immunity, and does not follow inexorably from our prior decisions." at 558-559 "The position that Congress did not intend to change the common-law rule of judicial immunity ignores the fact that every member of Congress who spoke to the issue assumed that the words of the statute meant what they said and that judges would be liable." at 561 "Yet despite the repeated fears of its opponents, and the explicit recognition that the section would subject judges to suit, the section remained as it was proposed; it applied to "any person". There was no exception for members of the judiciary. In light of the sharply contested nature of the issue of judicial immunity it would be reasonable to assume that the judiciary would have been expressly exempted from the wide sweep of the section, if Congress had intended such a result." at 563 "We should, of course, not protect a member of the judiciary "who is in fact guilty of using his powers to vent his spleen upon others, or for any other personal motive not connected with the public good." at 564 ". . .the judge who knowingly turns a trial into a "Kcngaroo" court? Or one who intentionally flouts the Constitution in order to obtain conviction? Congress, I think, concluded that the evils of allowing intentional, knowing deprivations of civil rights to go unredressed far out weighed the speculative inhibiting effects which might attend an inquiry into a judicial deprivation of civil rights." at 567.

Since Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), it has been settled that the Eleventh Amendment provides no shield for a state official confronted by a claim that he had deprived another of a federal right under the color of state law. Ex parte Young teaches that when a state officer acts under a state law in a manner violative of the Federal Constitution, he "comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States." Id., at 159-160. (Emphasis supplied.) ...There is a general rule that a ministerial officer who acts wrongfully, although in good faith, is nevertheless liable in a civil action and cannot claim the immunity of the sovereign. Cooper v. O'Conner, 99 F.2d 133 .When a judicial officer acts entirely without jurisdiction or without compliance with jurisdiction requisites CONDITIONS he may be held civilly liable for abuse of process even though his act involved a decision made in good faith, that he had jurisdiction. State use of Little v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 217 Miss. 576, 64 So. 2d 697.
Count VllI: 1991 House Contract is to be deemed enforceable, used a flawed citation of Demoralis v. Demoralis, Whereas clause distinction was improperly rendered by legislating on the bench and by Fraud upon the court.. Clause in question was clearly a term of contract. The word “Whereas” was never used in the contract. The Defendant’s Motion for Breach of that contract, for not sharing all expenses equally, must stand. Defendant claims lawful possession of 50 Sunset Pass residence without indemnifying ex-wife for any portion of it. J’s Orders are Void, see other counts. In Demoralis showed used of the word “whereas”.
Count IX: Equal protection; :Late filings at the Appellate Court are to be forgiven when there are clear grounds that Due Diligence was not violated by Mr. Knize, but events beyond his control; his mother having succumbed to a near fatal car accident, were rightful grounds to file a Motion for Reconsideration Late. Case should not be dismissed on that factor.
Count X: All Judges alleged, and as a party in divorce court, in a special relationship

“in their personal capacity, had trespassed upon the law, and thus are engaged in treason concerning claimed offenses. They have no immunity, and it is a Question of Law which cannot be summarily denied and dismissed under an opposing pleading that this complaint fails to state a claim because the judges have immunity. The People v. Brewer, 128 Ill. 472, 483 (1928). The judges listed had no legal authority or discretion (jurisdiction) to hear or rule on certain matters before them, they could only act ministerially or ministerially to obey codified law.. They acted without any jurisdiction when they ignore statute and laws. (LLC and contract laws). When judges act when they do not have jurisdiction to act, or they enforce a void order, they become trespassers of the law, and are engaged in treason The Court in Yates v. Village of Hoffman Estates, Illinois, 209 F.Supp. 757 (N.D. Ill. 1962) held that "not every action by a judge is in exercise of his judicial function. ... it is not a judicial function for a judge to commit an intentional tort even though the tort occurs in the courthouse." When a judge acts as a trespasser of the law, when a judge does not follow the law, the judge loses subject-matter jurisdiction and the judges orders are void, of no legal force or effect. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 (1974) stated that "when a state officer acts under a state law in a manner violative of the Federal Constitution, he "comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States." [Emphasis supplied in original]. By law, a judge is a state officer. The judge then acts not as a judge, but as a private individual (in his person).

Dereliction of duty, negligence, deliberate indifference, violation of public confidence and trust, to support the Constitution by oath of office were conducted by all Judges accused.
The negligent acts of public employees are not shielded by sovereign immunity when the employees are acting in a merely ministerial (acts or omissions and silence), rather than discretionary capacity. Connecticut Statutes are claimed to be unconstitutional so far as they extended sovereign immunity to state employees performing ministerial functions. Discretionary acts are defined as:
... "those acts wherein there is no hard and fast rule as to course of conduct that one must or must not take and, if there is [a] clearly defined rule, such would eliminate discretion." Black's Law Dictionary 467 (1990). The Restatement Second of Torts §§895D provides that discretionary functions involve the process of administering government, which requires that officers and employees determine a course of action to carry out the purpose for which they are charged. "The basis of the immunity [for discretionary functions] has been not so much a desire to protect an erring officer as it has been a recognition of the need of preserving independence of action without deterrence or intimidation by the fear of personal liability and vexatious suits." Id.

Ministerial acts, on the other hand, are defined as "that which involves obedience to instructions, but demands no special discretion, judgment, or skill." Black's Law Dictionary 996 (1990). In discussing ministerial functions, the Restatement Second provides: "If an act of the official involves less in the way of personal decision or judgment or the matter for which judgment is required has little bearing of importance upon the validity of the act ... Ministerial acts are those done by officers and employees who are required to carry out the orders of others or to administer the law with little choice as to when, where, how or under what circumstances their acts are to be done." Id. Violation of the statute "alone may not be sufficient to render Judges liable to the defendant Before they may be held to respond in damages it must further appear that [his] violation of the duty placed on [him] by this rule was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. “The burden of establishing this is on the (accuser)." Blakey v. Boos, 83 SD 1, 8, 153 NW2d 305, 309 (1967) (citation omitted); accord Musch v. H-D Coop., Inc., 487 NW2d 623, 625-26 (SD 1992):” With regard to the proximate cause issue, this court has recognized that the mere violation of a statute is insufficient to support an action for damages. Rather, a plaintiff must show that the violation of a statutory duty was the proximate cause of his injury to support a recovery in negligence. Serles v. Braun, 79 SD 456, 113 NW2d 216 (1962); Zeller v. Pikovsky, 66 SD 71, 278 NW 174 (1938). In Leslie v. City of Bonesteel, 303 NW2d 117, 119 (SD 1981), we stated: "For proximate cause to exist, 'the harm suffered must be found to be a foreseeable consequence of the act complained of ... . The negligent act must be a substantial factor in bringing about the harm.” Williams v. United States, 450 FSupp 1040, 1046 (DSD 1978).

Mr. Knize was indisputedly harmed by illegal court appointed awards to plaintiff of over $3,130,000. Judge knew that his/her rulings have financial foreseeable consequences when diverting from established, codified law: Mr. Knize holds that ministerial acts are those which involve obedience to instructions, but demand no special discretion, judgment or skill. In KNIZE, it is clear of the existence of Titles and 33 and 34, Florida LLC law and common contract law that any judge is expected to perform knowledge of the law. "Ignorance of the law does not excuse misconduct in anyone, least of all in a sworn officer of the law." In re McCowan (1917), 177 C. 93, 170 P. 1100. None of the courts would acknowledge defects of Judgment for Limited Liability law The courts sought to not acknowledge the mistakes done by other judges as a matter of law, and had a duty to report Judge fraud. I was aggrieved by this. Since Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), it has been settled that the Eleventh Amendment provides no shield for a state official confronted by a claim that he had deprived another of a federal right under the color of state law. [A judge does not have any discretion, but a duty, to know the law and to comply with the law, when the law has been ruled upon by a higher court.] People v. Gersch, 135 Ill.2d 384, 553 N.E.2d 281 (1990); Agricultural Transp. Ass'n. v. Carpentier, 2 Ill.2d 19, 116 N.E.2d 863 (1963). [Any act contrary to the above would be an action without lawful authority, a violation of the Constitution and of the judge's oath. A judge has no discretion to engage in a war against the Constitution.] Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S.Ct. 1401 (1958). The judge would be acting without subject-matter jurisdiction, and as stated below, would be engaged in an act of treason. Ex parte Young teaches that when a state officer acts under a state law in a manner violative of the Federal Constitution, he:
"comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States." Id., at 159-160. (Emphasis supplied.)
“There is a general rule that a ministerial officer who acts wrongfully, although in good faith, is nevertheless liable in a civil action and cannot claim the immunity of the sovereign. Cooper v. O'Conner, 99 F.2d 133. When a judicial officer acts entirely without jurisdiction or without compliance with jurisdiction requisites CONDITIONS he may be held civilly liable for abuse of process even though his act involved a decision made in good faith, that he had jurisdiction. Little v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 217 Miss. 576, 64 So. 2d 697.
Judges have given themselves judicial immunity for their judicial functions. Judges in KNIZE have no judicial immunity for criminal acts, aiding, assisting, or conniving with others who perform a criminal act, or for their administrative/ ministerial duties. When a judge has a duty to act on proofs of Jurisdiction, and UCC/LLC law, he does not have discretion - he is then not performing a judicial act, he is performing a ministerial act. Judicial immunity does not exist for judges who engage in criminal activity, for judges who connive with, aid and abet the criminal activity of another judge, or to a judge for damages sustained by a person who has been harmed by the judge's connivance with, aiding and abeting, another judge's criminal activity.
EX PARTE VIRGINIA, 100 U.S. 339: MR. JUSTICE STRONG delivered the opinion of the court: .”It was insisted during the argument on behalf of the petitioner that Congress cannot punish a State judge for his official acts; and it was assumed that Judge Cole, in selecting the jury as he did, was performing a judicial act. This assumption cannot be admitted. Whether the act done by him was judicial or not is to be determined by its character, and not by the character of the agent.
South Dakota Supreme Court; Hansen v. State Dept. of Transportation, 1998 SD 109, 1998; Appeal from the First Judicial Circuit, Union County, SD #20326– “A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(5) tests the law of a plaintiff's claim, not the facts which support it." Thompson v. Summers, 1997 SD 103, ¶¶5, 567 NW2d 387, 390 (citing Stumes v. Bloomberg, 1996 SD 93, ¶¶6, 551 NW2d 590, 592; Schlosser v. Norwest Bank South Dakota, 506 NW2d 416, 418 (SD 1993)). Schlosser directs the trial court to consider
the complaint's allegations and any exhibits which are attached. The court accepts the pleader's description of what happened along with any conclusions reasonably drawn therefrom. The motion may be directed to the whole complaint or only specified counts contained in it ... . In appraising the sufficiency of the complaint we follow, of course, the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. The question is whether in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and with doubt resolved in his or her behalf, the complaint states any valid claim of relief. The court must go beyond the allegations for relief and examine the complaint to determine if the allegations provide for relief on any possible theory.
506 NW2d at 418 (citations & internal quotations omitted).
[¶¶7] Whether the defendants are protected by sovereign immunity is a question of law, reviewed de novo, with no deference given to the trial court's legal conclusions. Wilson v. Hogan, 473 NW2d 492, 493 (SD 1991) (citations omitted).
[¶¶8] Whether The Doctrine Of Sovereign Immunity Bars Hansen's Claims.

Personal-capacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a government official for actions he takes under color of state law. ...The only immunities that can be claimed in an official-capacity action are forms of sovereign immunity that the entity, [as an] entity, may possess, such as the Eleventh Amendment.
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 US 159, 165-67, 105 SCt 3099, 3105-06, 87 LEd2d 114, 121-22 (1985) (citations & internal quotations omitted).
[¶¶16] The PEPL, Memorandum of Liability Coverage to the Employees of the State of South Dakota, Endorsement No. 2 (Issue Date May 1, 1996, Effective Date July 1, 1993), provides for damages resulting from negligently performed ministerial acts or tasks.
Ministerial act or task means an act or task that involves obedience to instructions, but demands no special discretion, judgment or skill.Id. (italics in original)
[¶¶17] This endorsement is a departure from the exclusion it replaced, which did not make an exception for damages resulting from ministerial acts or tasks. The amendment may have resulted from this court's holding in Kyllo v. Panzer, 535 NW2d 896 (SD 1995), that SDCL 21-32-17 and 21-32A-2 were unconstitutional so far as they extended sovereign immunity to state employees performing ministerial functions.(fn3) "This rule of law that a public employee is liable for negligently performed ministerial acts was first recognized by this court in State v. Ruth, 9 SD 84, 90, 68 NW 189, 190 (1896), seven years after the adoption of the South Dakota Constitution." Kyllo, 535 NW2d at 899 (tracing the common law history of sovereign immunity); see also Wilson, 473 NW2d at 494 ("[T]he negligent acts of public employees are not shielded by sovereign immunity when the employees are acting in a merely ministerial, rather than discretionary capacity.") (collecting cases).
[¶¶18] Hansen states that her allegations of breach of statutory and common-law duties pertain to ministerial acts or omissions by Howard and Commission and thus are not barred by sovereign immunity.(fn4) Therefore, we must examine her claims to determine if she is correct, and if so, whether they survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(5). Whether a particular function is discretionary or ministerial is a question of law. Gasper, 450 NW2d at 231-32; Bego, 407 NW2d at 810.
[¶¶33] In Kyllo, 535 NW2d at 901-902 n9, we held that ministerial acts are those "which [involve] obedience to instructions, but [demand] no special discretion, judgment or skill." Under present circumstances, we hold Howard's role in Hansen's accident does not qualify as ministerial and therefore the motion to dismiss was properly granted in his favor.”

QUESTIONS PRESENTED.
Is a state court judge, who has been individually divested of all jurisdiction over a case by virtue of being affirmatively disqualified, who refuses to acknowledge his own divestment, and thereafter commits unconstitutional torts solely under color of the case in which he knows, or should know, that he has lost all jurisdiction, subject to 42 U.S.C. §§1981-88 liability? Is a state court presiding judge, who commits unconstitutional torts solely in his administrative capacity, furthering the misconduct of another non-immune judge and both a judgment and an arrest for contempt entered without jurisdiction by that other judge, subject to 42 U.S.C. §§1981-88 liability? Did J. Tierney wrongfully imprison Mr. Knize?
Count Xl: 28 U.S.C.Section 2072(b) clearly prohibits the Connecticut Court from promulgating any rules which might abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right: 2072. Rules of procedure and evidence; power to prescribe (b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. [28 U.S.C. 2072(b)], which aligns with the Connecticut Statute 51-14 "Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right nor the jurisdiction of any of the courts.” Mr. Knize’s rights to bring forth to higher courts over 40 plain errors of the Trial court Judge Winslow is guaranteed and Conn. courts had the burden shifted to them to use the Strict Test to show their compelling interest, yet they illegally denied that right. Picking v. Pennsylvania R. Co. made it clear.
This federal Civil Rights case was brought under 42 U.S.C. §§§§ 1981-88. None of the statutory language is at issue; rather the judge-made policy of judicial immunity is sought to be shown inapplicable to circumstances where a judge is affirmatively divested of all jurisdiction in a state case, and thereafter without authority commits 42 U.S.C. §§§§ 1981-88 cognizable acts. All Judges committed crimes and can be sued for damages: : Under Title 10 U.S.C. Section 502 the judge had subscribed to a lifetime oath, in pertinent part, "I, __________, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign or domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; ...".

The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that "No state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it.". Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S.Ct. 1401 (1958). Any judge who does not comply with his oath to the Constitution of the United States wars against that Constitution and engages in acts in violation of the Supreme Law of the Land. The judge is engaged in acts of treason. Having taken at least two, if not three, oaths of office to support the Constitution of the United States, and the Constitution of the State of Illinois, any judge who has acted in violation of the Constitution is engaged in an act or acts of treason (see below). If a judge does not fully comply with the Constitution, then his orders are void, In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (1888), he/she is without jurisdiction, and he/she has engaged in an act or acts of treason. TREASON; whenever a judge acts where he/she does not have jurisdiction to act, the judge is engaged in an act or acts of treason. U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed.2d 392, 406 (1980); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed 257 (1821)

J. Winslow had no jurisdiction for Florida contract changes against OK ART Bylaws, and did not support the Constitution and equal protection of Uniform Commercial Code when she legislated from the bench for the Prenuptial Agreement and House Agreement of 1991. Higher court Judges lost jurisdiction by not proving under strict scrutiny the state’s compelling interest for a fundamental right, particularly the First Amendment concerning the presumption of repugnance to First Amendment rights by page limitation rules. Unconstitutionality of CGS Sec. 51 -14/15; within the powers of a judge to administer Statute authority to enforce PB rules, or enforce CGS Sec. 51-164t. (a), in relation to and application of PB Rules 4-6 and 62-7 .
THE RIGHT TO PRO SE DEFENSE AND THAT DEFENSE BEING LESS STRINGENT.
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 520 (1971) [Plaintiff-inmate filed pro se complaint against prison seeking compensation for damages sustained while placed in solitary confinement. In finding plaintiff's complaint legally sufficient, Supreme Court found that pro se pleadings should be held to "less stringent standards" than those drafted by attorneys.] Elmore v. McCammon (1986) 640 F. Supp. 905: "... the right to file a lawsuit pro se is one of the most important rights under the constitution and laws." Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1959); Picking v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 151 Fed 2nd 240; Pucket v. Cox, 456 2nd 233 Pro se pleadings are to be considered without regard to technicality; pro se litigants' pleadings are not to be held to the same high standards of perfection as lawyers.
Maty v. Grasselli Chemical Co., 303 U.S. 197 (1938) "Pleadings are intended to serve as a means of arriving at fair and just settlements of controversies between litigants. They should not raise barriers which prevent the achievement of that end. Proper pleading is important, but its importance consists in its effectiveness as a means to accomplish the end of a just judgment." Puckett v. Cox, 456 F. 2d 233 (1972) (6th Cir. USCA)[ It was held that a pro se complaint requires a less stringent reading than one drafted by a lawyer per Justice Black in Conley v. Gibson] GHADIALI v. DELAWARE STATE MEDICAL SOCIETY, (1943). 48 F. Supp. 789 GHADIALI v. DELAWARE STATE MEDICAL SOCIETY et al. No. 1022. United States District Court, D. Delaware. “The plaintiff has appeared pro se in this proceeding and is the author of the amended complaint. In view of these facts the court
will endeavor to construe the pleading and the plaintiff's contentions without regard for technicalities. ALLEN v. CORSANO, (1944) 56 F. Supp. 169 ALLEN v. CORSANO. Civil Action No. 388. Plaintiff appears pro se and is the author of his own pleadings. As stated by Judge Biggs, in a similar situation,[fn1] "In view of these facts the court will endeavor to construe the pleading and plaintiff's contentions without regard for technicalities."

Picking v. Pennsylvania Railway, 151 F.2d. 240, Third Circuit Court of Appeals. [The plaintiff's civil rights pleading was 150 paragraphs constituting over 100 pages, and described by a federal judge as "inept". Nevertheless, it was held] "Where a plaintiff pleads pro se in a suit for protection of civil rights, the Court should endeavor to construe Plaintiff's Pleadings without regard to technicalities."

The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits State action the effect of which would be to abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States or to deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process or to deny any person the equal protection of the law, The statute were intended to provide for redress against State action and primarily that which deprived within the jurisdiction of the United States. Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 509-514, 59 S.Ct. 954, 83 L.Ed. 1423; Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 14-20, 27 S.Ct. 6, 51 L.Ed. 65; Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 290, 291, 12 S.Ct. 617, 36 L.Ed. 429. PICKING protects Francis out of common law..

Mr. Knize lost his Appeal because Sept 28, 05. ORDER, Sept 6, 05 Demand, Oct 18 06 Motion to Stay Dismissal Order: Oct 13, 05 Dismissal, Feb 28, 06 ignored Demands for SMJ jurisdiction; March 31/April 5, 06 Dismissals for JURISDICTIONAL CHALLENGE, STAY, REVIEW; Motion for Reconsideration May 05, and on Oct 18th 06 AC 27692 Dismissals. It was in essence the same argument in Pickering that absolutely protects Pro Se.. Mr. Knize continues to plead the federal civil rights protections applied in state courts FOR THE PAGES HE NEEDS FOR A BRIEF AND HAD AND WILL CONTINUE TO DEMAND ANY COURT UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF Picking v. Pennsylvania Railway, SUPPORT EQUAL PROTECTION OF THIS IMPORTANT HIGHER COURT RULING. It has never been challenged and thus stands. State Interference with Federal Jurisdiction.—It appears settled that state courts have no power to enjoin proceedings; Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408 (1964), or effectuation of judgments McKim v. Voorhies, 7 Cr. (11 U.S.) 279 (1812); Riggs v. Johnson County, 6 Wall. (73 U.S.) 166 (1868). of the federal courts. Comity of a state court to be left to its rules and rulings fails when Constitutional rights are claimed. In the U.S. Supreme Court, TESTA v. KATT, 330 U.S. 386 (1947) 330 U.S. 386 : tested all the various legal arguments and concluded when Federal Acts were involved, NO STATE COURT CAN OVERRIDE THEM IN THEIR COURTS, UNDER U.S.Const. Art. VI, 2. A judge does not have discretion on whether to follow Supreme Court Rules ("SCR"); a judge has a duty to follow SCR. People v. Gersh, 135 Ill.2d 384 (1990). Apparently Judges who deprived rights which the Supreme Court ruled on in other cases have no respect for judges of higher courts; J. Winslow and others prefered to rule by the rule of man/woman, rather than the rule of law. See also Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 37 , 392-394. The Connecticut Supreme Court had the instrumental citing in the TESTA case, so please READ CAREFULLY and understand that our state is supporting that federal law is applicable in our state courts:

“The first Congress that convened after the Constitution was adopted conferred jurisdiction upon the [330 U.S. 386, 390] state courts to enforce important federal civil laws, (Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 77) and succeeding Congresses conferred on the states jurisdiction over federal crimes and actions for penalties and forfeitures. 5 Enforcement of federal laws by state courts did not go unchallenged. Violent public controversies existed throughout the first part of the Nineteenth Century until the 1860's concerning the extent of the constitutional supremacy of the Federal Government. During that period there were instances in which this Court and state courts broadly questioned the power and duty of state courts to exercise their jurisdiction to enforce United States civil and penal statutes or the power of the Federal Government to require them to do so.6 But after the fundamental issues over the extent of federal supremacy had been resolved by war, this Court took occasion in 1876 to review the phase of the controversy concerning the relationship of state courts to the Federal Government. Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130 . The opinion of a unanimous court in that case was strongly buttressed by historic references and persuasive reasoning. It repudiated [330 U.S. 386, 391] the assumption that federal laws can be considered by the states as though they were laws emanating from a foreign sovereign. Its teaching is that the Constitution and the laws passed pursuant to it are the supreme laws of the land, binding alike upon states, courts, and the people, 'any- thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.' U.S.Const. Art. VI, 2. See also Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 37 , 392-394. It asserted that the obligation of states to enforce these federal laws is not lessened by reason of the form in which they are cast or the remedy which they provide. And the Court stated that 'If an act of Congress gives a penalty to a party aggrieved, without specifying a remedy for its enforcement, there is no reason why it should not be enforced, if not provided otherwise by some act of Congress, by a proper action in a state court.' Id. 93 U.S. at page 137. And see United States v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 296 U.S. 463, 479 , 56 S.Ct. 343, 348.

The Claflin opinion thus answered most of the arguments [against] theretofore advanced against the power and duty of state courts to enforce federal penal laws. And since that decision, the remaining areas of doubt have been steadily narrowed. SEE State of Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257 ; Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1 , 32 S.Ct. 169, 38 L.R. A., N.S., 44; Minneapolis & St. L.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 , 36 S. Ct. 595, L.R.A.1917A, 86, Ann.Cas. 1916E, 505; McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F.R. Co., 292 U.S. 230 , 54 S.Ct. 690; Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44 , 62 S.Ct. 6, 136 A.L.R. 1222; Miles v. Illinois C.R. Co., 315 U.S. 698 , 62 S.Ct. 827, 146 A.L.R. 1104; Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 , 121-123, 65 S.Ct. 459, 461, 462; 325 U.S. 77 , 65 S.Ct. 954. There have been statements in cases concerned with the obligation of states to give full faith and credit to the proceedings of sister states which suggested a theory contrary to that pronounced in the Claflin opinion. 9 But when in Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., supra, this Court was presented with a case [330 U.S. 386, 392] testing the power and duty of states to enforce federal laws, it found the solution in the broad principles announced in the Claflin opinion

The precise question in the Mondou case was, in the courts of the states when their jurisdiction, as prescribed by local laws, is adequate to the occasion. ...' Id. 223 U.S. at page 46, 32 S.Ct. at page 177, 38 L.R.A.,N.S., 44. The Supreme Court of Connecticut had decided that they could not. Except for the penalty feature, the factors it considered and its reasoning were strikingly similar to that on which the Rhode Island Supreme Court declined to enforce the federal law here involved. But this Court held that the Connecticut court could not decline to entertain the action. The contention that enforcement of the congressionally created right was contrary to Connecticut policy was answered as follows:
'The suggestion that the act of Congress is not in harmony with the policy of the State, and therefore that the courts of the state are free to decline jurisdiction, is quite inadmissible, because it presupposes what in legal contemplation does not exist. When Congress, in the exertion of the power confided to it by the Constitution, adopted that act, it spoke for all the people and all the states, and thereby established a policy for all. That policy is as much the policy of Connecticut as if the act had emanated from its own legislature, and should be respected accordingly in the courts of the state.' Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., supra, 223 U.S. at page 57, 32 S.Ct. at page 178, 38 L. R.A.,N.S., 44.

For whatever consideration they may be entitled in the field in which they are relevant, those decisions did not bring before us our instant problem of the effect of the supremacy clause on the relation of federal laws to state courts. Our question concerns only the right of a state to deny enforcement to claims growing out of a valid federal law. It is conceded that this same type of claim arising under Rhode Island law would be enforced by that State's courts. Its courts have enforced claims for double damages growing out of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. 201 et seq. 12 Thus the Rhode Island courts have jurisdiction adequate and appropriate under established local law to adjudicate this action. 13 Under these circumstances the State courts are not free to refuse enforcement of petitioners' claim. See McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F.R. Co., 292 U.S. 230 , 54 S.Ct. 690; and compare Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 , 65 S.Ct. 459; Id., 325 U.S. 77 , 65 S.Ct. 954. The case is reversed and the cause is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed.

Mr. Knize found some 44 plain errors from the original trial court judge, and he needed at least 3 pages for each issue. Am 1 violated:" US Constitution, The Bill of Rights 12/15/1791"; 1st Am 'Congress shall make no law ...prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, ..., and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.” The United States signed on to the 1966 United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) states that: Article 19 of Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression,
Art 19, 3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes: (a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity; (b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy.

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