Articles VI and VII are the last in the Constitution. Article VI obligates the government It makes the Constitution, federal laws, and treaties (U.N. Gen. Assem. Res. 2200 A(XXI) of 16 Dec. 1966) the supreme law of the land, superior to state laws. It also mandates that all elected and appointed officials in the United States will "be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution..."
‘Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.’ Marbury v. Madison (1803).
Count Xll: Guilt Defined Pertinent To KNIZE, Judgement-transferred Assets: Concerning Mr. Knize’s proofs of the Limit Liability nature of OK ART EXHIBITIONS. LTD and ignoring the evidence of the Breach for the couple’s mutual House Agreement of 1991. Gratuity fraud: because of an official act that has been taken. Extortion; propery obtained under color of official office through the use of actual or threatened force or fear .Conspiracy claimed: specific intent that a crime be performed; agreement with another person to engage in or cause that crime to be performed, and one of the conspirators committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. Mr. Knize alleges, a breach of fiduciary duty the Judiciary Branch owed a duty to uphold integrity of the system, acted out of the judiciary’s best financial interest and it is is a civil matter; the elements of proof required for conviction work under a standard that it is not necessary to prove wrongful intent. The judges and Atty O’Sullivan failed to Report a Federal RICO Felony to Appropriate U.S. Law Enforcement Authorities and actively engaged in concealing the fraudulent act and evidence of the fraudulent act; suppressing of evidence. They directly or indirectly (acts of omission) caused others to withhold or suppress information pertaining to the fraudulent act; making false statements to investigators regarding the fraudulent act (as did Atty O’Sullivan and J. Winslow) ; The Judges and Atty O’Sullivan (an officer of the court) committed color of law fraud against the United States under Civil RICO. The Conn. State Judiciary, an agency by definition must, as assignee of rights in divorce concerning contracts, follow federally-mandated procedures to determine the least liability of third parties, other OK ART members and seek effect upon any third parties who may be indispensable to the action. All of the charges also represent RICO 18 USC 1961, 1962 (c) and (d) claims among others cited. Including section 1951 (relating to interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion), section 1952 (relating to racketeering), section 1503 (relating to obstruction of justice), any offense involving fraud connected with a case under title 11 and a case under section 157 of this title), fraud in the sale of securities.
Count Xlll: Statements in written Memorandum, May 2004 and following Articulations by J. Winslow were knowingly or recklessly false. The Defendant can prove the 9 elements of fraud as they apply to Judicial fraud 1) A representation of law by the judge 2) Its falsity of law application; 3) Its materiality as to the legal effect forcing a party to act; 4) The judge’s knowledge of the representation's falsity or ignorance of its truth; a higher standard is put upon judges to know the law 5) Intent that the representation of law be acted on in a manner reasonably contemplated; 6) The hearer's ignorance and helplessness to challenge a ruling containing a falsity of law representation, becoming victim of law and rulings; 7) The hearer's reliance on its truth as portrayed by an authority; through ruling is in clear violation of the law 8) The hearer's right to rely on the representation, judge’s proclamation of law; and 9) Damage caused by the representation. Loss of property and livelihood. See Musgrave v. Lucas, 193 Or 401, 410, 238 P2d 780 (1951); Webb v Clark, 274 Or 387, 391, 546 P2d 1078 (1976).In summary, those activities which courts have held defraud the United States under 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 affect the government in Knize at least two of three ways:
They interfere or obstruct legitimate Government activity; or
They make wrongful use of a governmental instrumentality.
Counts Two through Nineteen charge individual defendants in violation. The relevant part of Section 1001 reads as follows:
The defendant alleges the Judges violated TITLE 18 > PART I > CHAPTER 47 > § 1001 when they made false statements regarding the nature of Mr. Knize’s assets in their decisions, articulations, and denials; § 1001. Statements or entries generally
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and willfully- (1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact;
(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation;
(3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry..”
Count XlV Post Judgment: On May 19, 2006, in Waverly Knize V. Francis Knize, I, then defendant, had most of my property Unconstitutionally seized by J. Tierney through devise of Mrs. Knize’s Motion for Contempt and was wrongfully imprisoned. .Connecticut Constitution SEC. 9. No person shall be arrested, detained or punished, except in cases clearly warranted by law. I claim that if void laws are found which reflected upon Mr. Knize’s punishment therefore Equal Protection of the laws were violated on Sec 9.
Count XV: Mr. Knize has rights to sue the State of Connecticut (District Court has the duty to pass state suit to the original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court) , the Judges personally, Mrs. Knize’s Attorney, as persons under The UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT and other laws contained in this document. Judges acted as private persons because they lost Jurisdiction by not ruling according to law. An action may be brought against a governmental entity under a theory of "respondeat superior" liability.
In the absence of sovereign immunity from tort liability or suit in tort, and with appropriate reservations depending on the effect that the nature of a particular act or function may have on the issue of immunity [i.e., whether the function is discretionary or ministerial], a state government or its agencies or instrumentalities is subject to liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the torts of its agents, officers, and employees while acting in the course and scope of their employment or authority[.]
Count XVl: State Judges (not subject to 28 U.S.C. §§§§ 351-364 because they are not Federal Judges), under the color of law violated laws cited in this document wilfully, and are guilty of an offense against the United States. .They acted "corporately" as an officer of the court through the corporation known as the Corporate State of Connecticut See: Brink's Inc. v. City of New York, 717 F.2d 700, 708-10 (2d Cir.1983. ) A person is guilty of an offense if his liability is based on conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act of which he is physically capable. No man is above the law, not even judges. I am alleging that all judges mentioned have engaged in conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts, and other conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute.. Their actions were NOT effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts, The phrase, ““effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts,”” is intended to include willful misconduct in office, willful and persistent failure to perform duties of the office, habitual intemperance. Chief Justice Sullivan was already found guilty of ethics by Connecticut’s Judicial Review Council .
“No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All the officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it. It is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man who by accepting office participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives. United States v. Lee 106 U.S. 196, 220"
“The sole function of the court is to enforce the law according to the statute.” Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485, 37 S.Ct. 192, 194 (1917).
All Judges involved are guilty of violating CIVIL RICO 1963 (c) (d). Charge is against individual defendants CASES Showing Wilful Disregard:
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 106 (1945) ("[t]he fact that the defendants may not have been thinking in constitutional terms is not material where their aim was not to enforce local law but to deprive a citizen of a right and that right was protected by the Constitution. When they so act they at least act in reckless disregard of constitutional prohibitions or guarantees.").
United States v. Ragsdale, 438 F.2d 21, 23-26 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 919 (1971)(an instruction regarding ordinary consequences of voluntary acts is appropriate).
United States v. Stokes, 506 F.2d 771, 776-77 (5th Cir. 1975)(to act willfully is to act with the intent to deprive another of his constitutional rights).
United States v. Love, 767 F.2d 1052, 1059-60 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1081 (1986)(upheld instruction regarding inference that one normally intends the consequences of voluntary acts). Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979)(an inference that a person normally intends the consequences of his voluntary acts is permissible).
United States v. O'Dell, 462 F.2d 224, 232 n. 10 (6th Cir. 1972)(the defendants need not have known specifically that they were violating constitutional rights).
United States v. Gwaltney, 790 F.2d 1378, 1386 (9th Cir. 1986) ("it is not necessary for the Government to prove that the defendant was thinking in constitutional terms at the time of the incident, for a reckless disregard for a person's constitutional rights is evidence of specific intent to deprive that person of those rights.")
Count XVll: Atty O’Sullivan is guilty of acts of omission, in service of the Conn. professional code of conduct, as an officer of the court, thus disregarding the protections of a proper argument against the viability of Limited Liability Law, contract law, and she is just as guilty for all claims suitable against fraud upon the machinery of the court as the judges are under Civil RICO 1962 (c) (d) and 18 U.S.C § 1001 and other laws in this document.
Count XVlll: By filing a complaint under authority of a federal statute, known as federal question jurisdiction, the complainant is stating a claim upon which relief can be granted. In spite of the clear face of the federal question, (statutory authority), implicit within which is the statement of the claim, judges cannot deny complaints for breach of F.R.C..P. 12(b)(6), a legal and logical impossibility. Any judge who has dismissed a complaint for breach under 12(b)(6) where the complainant has cited a federal statute, has violated 18 U.S.C. § 1961 -- obtaining money by artifice, 18 U.S.C. § 241 -- conspiracy against rights and 18 U.S.C § 1001 -- false statement, Original Jurisdiction; Judges with Lawful oath to "said, State" of Connecticut; "Due Course" of Law Article 1, Sec. 10, as ratified "In all Cases....and those in which a State shall be a Party, the Supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction." Art.III, Sec. 2 United States Constitution. Congress proclaimed "every person" who acts under color of state law to deprive another of a constitutional right answerable to that person in a suit for damages; that Section 1983 created a new "species of tort liability which on its face admits of no immunities," and which permits no erosion by judge-made rules, the suggestion that Congress intended to preserve the Bradley version of judicial immunity is not credible because Bradley was decided in 1872, only a year after the enactment of the Civil Rights Act. The common law immunity that the Court recognized at the time of the Act's passage did not exonerate judges from liability for acts "done maliciously or corruptly" outside their jurisdiction. Deprivation of the rights and immunities secured by the United States Constitution by the members of the judiciary acted as "instruments of suppression of civil rights" and became a target of the new legislation. Congress had no reason to suspect that the then prevailing immunity rule would protect judges from liability. Moreover, as Justice Douglas stated in a dissent, the common law immunity rule could at best be a defense . My claim under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply to any count herein because liberally construed, they bring a general constitutional challenge, especially to CGS Sec. 51-14/15; in relation to and application of PB Rules 4-6 and 62-7.
("The openness of judicial proceedings serves to preserve both the appearance and the reality of fairness in the adjudications of United States {and other} courts. It is therefore the firmly held main rule that a court may not dispose of the merits of a case on the basis of ex parte, in camera submissions.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). For good reason, our system of justice relies on the adversarial process to bring to the attention of the finder of fact the strengths and deficiencies in parties’ litigation postures. “[F]airness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided determination of facts decisive of rights.” Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). (Arguing that § 2709(c)’s ban on speech prohibits them from engaging in constitutionally protected speech that is relevant and perhaps crucial to an ongoing and time-sensitive national policy debate.)
Mr. Knize will move for preliminary relief to enjoin enforcement of CGS Sec. 51-14/15 as to Mr. Knize’s identity speech, and as to protect against intrusion of 35 page rules.
"The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury." Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)(plurality opinion). The subject matter of the speech at issue in the pending motion places it at the center of First Amendment protection. “[Political belief and association constitute the core of those activities protected by the First Amendment.” Id.at 356; see also Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838-39 (1978). (“Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of the Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).Section 2709(c) is subject to strict scrutiny not only because it is a prior restraint, but also because it is a content-based restriction. See Kamasinski v. Judicial Research Council, 44 F.3d 106, 109 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that confidentiality rules imposed on complainants and witnesses before the Connecticut Judicial Review Council were content-based restrictions and thus subject to strict scrutiny).
CGS Sec. 51-14/15 and whatever Statute which acts to impose 35 page limitation rules:
"has the potential for becoming a means of suppressing a particular point of view,” that is, the view that certain federal investigative powers impose profoundly on individual civil liberties to the point that they violate our constitution. Forsyth County, 505 U.S. 123, 130-31 (1992) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The statute has the practical effect of silencing those who have the most intimate knowledge of the statute’s effect and a strong interest in advocating against infringements of Constitutional rights those who are actually subjected to the governmental authority by imposition of the provision. The government may intend the 35 page provision to serve some purpose other than the suppression of speech. Nevertheless, it has the practical impact of silencing individuals with a constitutionally protected interest in speech and whose voices are particularly important to an ongoing, national debate about the intrusion of governmental authority into individual lives. Mr. Knize alleges 35 page limitations has the potential to both be a prior restraint and a content-based restriction on free speech in the courtroom for one’s defense.
Count XlX: A Court’s 35 page rule is not narrowly tailored and so Judges deprived rights: Please certify this Question: Is CGS Sec. 51-14/15; in relation to and application of PB Rules 4-6 and 62-7 Narrowly Tailored to Serve a Compelling State Interest?
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS FOR A BRIEF: I have rights to at least three pages for each issue, and perhaps a 20 minutes cap on oral argument time in the court for each one. We must consider that a reasonable request for pleading rights while allowing the state efficiency of administration. It falls within the protections of associational and content rights out of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. These are within the same breed of challenges that came before Connecticuts’ Election Reform cases as I have pleaded in motions. {T}he application of the strict scrutiny test is required to any {Constitutional} infringement it may suffer. Roth v. Weston 789 A.2d 431, 441 (Conn.2002). J. Tierney remained numb to the claim as he sat in the courtroom. Strict Scrutiny is what the courts in my case fought to NOT HAVE HEARD. It was COLLUSION, in part against the 13th Amendment against Mr. Knize’s personal beliefs in the natural rights of man which is God given; they constitute discrimination against my religion and sex against men’s rights. Judge Tierney said in the open courtroom that my constitutional defenses “were merely “Buzz words.” I responded by saying our Constitution construction is certainly not buzz words. We see from this the demeanor of the court of Connecticut to ridicule and resist the premise of our fundamental and natural rights. This represents a conspiracy, with judges protecting themselves from error claims in lieu of protecting the citizen first. IT WAS CONSPIRACY. The Courts were Co-Conspirators of KNIZE. Injury was foreseeable by judges, by not protecting against prior restraints and a content-based restrictions on free speech in the courtroom under the 1st Am. Civil Rights were violated.
STANDARD OF REVIEW:“ {Laws}...so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926). Although we first look to the language of the statute, if the application of the statute to a particular situation reveals a latent ambiguity or inconsistency, we will go beyond the text to determine the statute's meaning. Moreover, we will not limit ourselves to a literal application of the statute if to do so would render other legislation meaningless or superfluous. State v. Szymkiewicz, 237 Conn. 613, 621, 678 A.2d 473 (1996). In addition, if a literal reading would place the statute in constitutional jeopardy, this court will go beyond the face of the statute to determine whether it may be construed so as to "achieve its purpose in a manner which is both effective and constitutional." Moscone v. Manson, 185 Conn. 124, 128, 440 A.2d 848 (1981). We ordinarily read statutes "to avoid, rather than to create, constitutional questions." In re Valerie D., 223 Conn. 492, 534, 613 A.2d 748 (1992). Moreover, courts "are bound to assume that the legislature intended, in enacting a particular law, to achieve its purpose in a manner which is both effective and constitutional." Moscone v. Manson, supra, 185 Conn. 128. "[T]his presumption of constitutionality imposes upon the trial court, as well as this court, the duty to construe statutes, whenever possible, in a manner that comports with constitutional safeguards of liberty." State v. Floyd, 217 Conn. 73, 88, 584 A.2d 1157 (1991).
Count XX: The Supreme Court denial for the defendant’s Reconsideration, on the basis I filed late appears on its face an unethical act concerning my mother’s accident, and their denial of Equal Protection was improper. Events were out of my control. CR violated.
Count XXl: Judges who disposed some of my motions of on technical grounds are “not judgments on the merits" for res judicata purposes, therefore my right for new trials, vacation of orders, and to Open the Judgment were illegally denied and the case was illegally dismissed. I then have the right to damages, because I now cannot retrieve the illegally transferred funds back from my ex-wife. The Superior Court’s denial that to hear my Motions for a New Trial and to Open because it deemed such action as frivolous and repetitious; was improper, because J. Tierney instructed that I had my day in court and we could only hear Post Judgment issues. But the case below explains that denials on technical grounds do NOT prevent a rehearing of the issues. Equal Protection is called.
No. 158 In the Matter of Felicita Luna,Appellant, v. Dennis Dobson, Respondent. 2001 NY Int. 137 December 13, 2001:WESLEY, J.: “The Connecticut Supreme Court has indicated that "[c]ases disposed of on technical grounds are not judgments on the merits" for res judicata purposes (Cain v Moore, 182 Conn 470, 474 cert denied 454 US 844), and that res judicata does not apply when "the trial court's dismissal was based on untimeliness and not on the merits of the claim" (Linden Condominium Assn., Inc. v McKenna, 247 Conn 575, 595). That court has also expressly held that a disciplinary dismissal of a plaintiff's action for failure to prosecute with reasonable diligence in the Superior Court (equivalent to our Supreme Court) does not constitute a judgment on the merits for the purposes of res judicata (see, Milgrim v DeLuca, 195 Conn 191, 194-195).
Mindful of these competing interests, Connecticut's highest court has repeatedly held that "[t]he doctrines of preclusion * * * should be flexible and must give way when their mechanical application would frustrate other social policies based on values equally or more important than the convenience afforded by finality in legal controversies" (In re Juvenile Appeal, 190 Conn, at 318, supra [emphasis added]; see also, Isaac, 253 Conn, at 423, supra; Ellis, 197 Conn, at 466, supra). Moreover, "the scope of matters precluded necessarily depends on what has occurred in the former adjudication" (Ellis, 197 Conn, at 466, supra ). Thus it appears that, in determining whether Connecticut would have applied claim preclusion, we must look to the factual circumstances of the dismissal of the first proceeding while also considering the competing concerns of finality of judgments and other social policies.”
PROBABLE CAUSE: AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY: Judicially restrained judges don’t address substantive public policy questions, but only narrower constitutional ones. Their role is only to determine if the Constitution permits a state or locality to make the public policy choice that it did. The policy most abused by power in KNIZE was the right to bring forth questions about Conn. Laws that abridge. ABA Mandates. In reference to limiting a brief: “CT Const. Art 1st SEC. 5. No law shall ever be passed to curtail or restrain the liberty of speech or of the press”
Connecticut Constitution .: ARTICLE FIRST. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
That the great and essential principles of liberty and free government may be recognized and established, WE DECLARE:
SEC. 1. All men (INCLUDING JUDGES) when they form a social compact, are equal in rights; and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community.
Count XXll: The Orders to dismiss the Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration and the Motion for Jurisdictional Challenges was improper, non-sequitur, non-judicial, and constitutes further court machinery fraud and conspiracy. Federal Question was not answered pursuant Supreme Court Duties: whether in an original proceeding or upon an appeal, if any federal question shall be presented by the pleadings, it shall be the duty of the Connecticut Supreme Court to determine in its opinion whether or not the petitioner has been denied a right guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States and yet the Conn supreme Court failed .to even have a hearing on the matters.
"The standard of review of a motion to dismiss is equally well established. In ruling upon whether a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader. Mahoney v. Lensink, 213 Conn. 548, 567, 569 A.2d 518 (1990) . . . ." Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 308, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998). Furthermore, "it is the law in our courts, as it is in the federal courts, that [a] court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 309. With these legal principles in mind, we now address the merits of the plaintiff's claim.[fn3].”
The KNIZE Courts wilfully and with deliberate indifference to law precedent found there was no relief to be granted from the claim that Connecticut must follow its own laws (Titles 33 and 34, LLC Law) and precedent cases about contracts as pleaded post-Judgment.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 03-30924 IVAN ECHEVERRIA,Plaintiff - Appellant,versusCHEVRON USA INC., MCCALL CREWBOATS LLC, MCCALL MARINE SERVICES INC.; CHILES OFFSHORE INC., Defendants - Appellees. No. 03-31046 “Rule 50(a) does not explain what "fully heard" means. In practice, a party has been fully heard when he rests his case. This court has never addressed whether a district court may enter JMOL in favor of the defendant before the plaintiff rests his case. 5 Saipan v. CNG Fin. Corp., No. 03-11053, 2004 WL 1759152 (5th Cir. Aug. 6, 2004), at *2"
U.S. Supreme Court ESCOE v. ZERBST, 295 U.S. 490 (1935) 295 U.S. 490: " But the power of the lawmakers to dispense with notice or a hearing as part of the procedure of probation does not mean that a like dispensing power, in opposition to the will of Congress, has been confided to the courts. The privilege is no less real because its source is in the statute rather than in the Fifth [or any] Amendment. It does mean that there shall be an inquiry so fitted in its range to the needs of the occasion as to justify the conclusion that discretion has not been abused by the failure of the inquisitor to carry the probe deeper. Burns v. United States, supra. That much is necessary, or so the Congress must have thought, to protect the individual against malice or op- [295 U.S. 490, 494] pression ...When an opportunity to be heard is denied altogether, the ensuing mandate of the court is void, .... It is beside the point to argue, as the government does, that in this case a hearing, if given, is likely to be futile because the judge has made it plain how his discretion will be exercised in that already he has canceled the suspension on the strength of an ex parte showing. The non sequitur is obvious. The judge is without the light whereby his discretion must be guided until a hearing, however summary, has been given the supposed offender. Cf. Snyder v. Com. of Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 116 , 54 S.Ct. 330, 90 A.L.R. 575. Judgment ceases to be judicial if there is condemnation in advance of trial. We hold that the attempted revocation is invalid for defect of power...” See also Goldberg v. Kelly 397 u.s. 254 (1970) Fuentes v. Shevin 407 u.s. 67 (1972) Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth 408 u.s. 564 (1972) Perry v. Sindermann 408 u.s. 593 (1972) Goss v. Lopez 419 u.s. 565 (1975) Mathews v. Eldridge 424 u.s. 319 (1976) Parham v. J.R. 442 u.s. 584 (1979) Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale 443 u.s. 368 (1979) Santosky v. Kramer 455 u.s. 745 (1982) Blum v. Yaretsky 457 u.s. 991 (1982) Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court 478 u.s. 1 (1986)
Connecticut Appellate and Supreme Court Judges are accused of Non-Judicial and Non Sequitur Acts ( conclusion that does not follow from the premises or evidence.) by denying and dismissing Defendant’s Motions to hear issues of Constitutionality and Voidness.
Under TITLE 18 > PART I > CHAPTER 63 > § 1346 "scheme or artifice to defraud" among other titles mentioned in this document.
Count XXlll: VIOLATIONS OF 42 U.S.C. 1986:REFUSING OR NEGLECTING TO PROTECT AND PREVENT THE WRONGS CONSPIRED TO BE DONE by unlawfully and maliciously harassing a citizen who was acting in accordance with his constitutional and statutory rights, privileges, and immunities, and conspiring to violate the rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed to Plaintiff by the Constitution , laws of the United States and the laws of Conn. begs this action of CIVIL RICO; (including but not limited to 18 U.S.C. 1511 (obstructing enforcement of state law; 18 U.S.C. 1661 through 1668) See 55 Cf.Di Giambattisa v. McGovern et al, 974 F.2d 1329, No. 92-1168 (1st Cir. 1992)., 1985(3), Common Law Conspiracy, INVIDIOUS DISCRIMINATORY ANIMUS: THE DISPARATE IMPACT; It is not the proper province of any court to rewrite a statute under the guise of interpretation. J. Winslow rewrote Limited Liability and UCC Statute previously explained.
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS. Judges intentionally and deliberately inflicted emotional distress on Mr. Knize by violating through interfering with his civil rights, and by conspiring against him, thereby destroying his trust in the judicial system., conduct was extreme and outrageous, beyond all possible bounds of decency and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. The Judges were taking advantage, respectively, of their sovereign and absolute judicial immunity, the latter being upheld even when judges are known to be malicious and corrupt, under the guise that their judicial independence should be safeguarded and that they not feel "intimidated.” See Count XXlX. The logic of that reasoning confounds: Can it be reasonable to assume that judicial independence must be maintained so that judges can be malicious and corrupt again. Such logic results in a violation of the Connecticut Code of Judicial Conduct, to wit, Judicial Court Canons 2(A) (avoiding impropriety and the appearance of it) and 3(A)(1) (fidelity to the law and maintaining professional competence in it). Law is not designed to suspend the law and usurp a legislative function in violation of the separation of powers guaranteed in Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Mr. Knize has grounds for this court to De Novo rule in his favor: for Constitutional Error of the Conn. courts.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JAMES ROCCO (AC 19344) Argued January 21—officially released July 4, 2000 “Although the defendant’s claim was not raised at trial, we will review it pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989). In Golding, our Supreme Court held that ‘‘a defendant can prevail on a claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation clearly exists and clearly deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt.’’ (Emphasis orig.) Id.
DECLARING THE FOLLOWING CONN. LAWS AS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE; On the basis of Articles 3 and 6 of the U.S. Constitution and Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Supreme Court in 1796 (Ware v. Hylton) requires the District Court to exercise its power of judicial review to strike down a law of the state government:
Giaccio v. State of Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399; 86 S.Ct. 518 (1966): "Law fails to meet requirements of due process clause if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves public uncertain as to conduct it prohibits or leaves judges and jurors free to decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is not in each particular case." [Giaccio v. State of Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399; 86 S.Ct. 518 (1966)]
(a) MARITAL DISTRIBUTION: Construction Vague in that UCC and LLC Statutory and Common laws must apply: “In making the allocation, the factors the Court will consider are: the length of the marriage, the causes of the dissolution or separation, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities, special needs, future earning capacity and prospect for future acquisition of capital assets and income”. Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 46b-81.
Under RUBIN a wife should never receive a contingency award:
“Property does not include those interests, however, that might be speculative or which constitute a "mere expectancy." Rubin v. Rubin, 204 Conn. 224, 230-31, 527 A.2d 1184 (1987) (husband's status as a possible residuary beneficiary under revocable trust and will of his mother was a "mere expectancy" and his possible future inheritance should not have been the subject of a contingent order of the court, nor was evidence of the estate plan admissible at trial).
J. Winslow made a contingent order (Memorandum 04) whereby the defendant’s stocks, where she ruled as the defendant’s non-distributable assets, had to be sold anyway to pay for OK ART valuation which couldn’t be sold for $400,000 and there was a mere expectancy (speculative) for realization under RUBIN. A mosaic of distribution cannot include Mr. Knize’s public stocks or OK Art assets as they were deemed separate property.
(b) CONN. PB RULES FOR PAGE LIMITATIONS PB Rules 4-6 and 62-7 under CGS 51-14 (a) were NOT Narrowly Tailored to protect a citizen against fundamental infringements.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW: “To demonstrate that the statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him, the defendant ‘‘must . . . demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] had inadequate notice of what was prohibited or that [he was] the [victim] of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sweetman v. State Elections Enforcement Commission, 249 Conn. 296, 322, 732 A.2d 144 (1999). ‘‘As a matter of the due process of law required by our federal and state constitutions, a penal statute must be sufficiently definite to enable a person to know what conduct he [or she] must avoid.” Precedent Of Statutes: ‘Although it is well established that trial courts have broad equitable remedial powers regarding marital dissolutions . . . it is equally well settled that [c]ourts have no inherent power to transfer property from one spouse to another; instead, that power must rest upon an enabling statute.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Smith v. Smith, supra, 249 Conn. 272.
“A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it; or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed A factual finding must be reversed as clearly erroneous if it was based on an incorrect rule of law” Dunnigan v. First Bank, 217 Conn. 205, 215 (1991).[V]ague laws do not limit the exercise of discretion by law enforcement officials; thus they engender the possibility of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. at 108-09 & n. 4; Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. at 168-70. Third, vague laws defeat the intrinsic promise of, and frustrate the essence of, a constitutional regime. We remain `a government of laws, and not of men,' Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137, 163, only so long as our laws remain clear." 630 F.2d, at 1037 (citations abbreviated)."
It was clear PB 4-6 and 62-7, and §§ 46b-81. are “so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application
”Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926): “We think this case demonstrably falls within the compass of those decisions of the Court which hold that ". . . a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law." Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391."No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal {or any} statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids." Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 . "Words which are vague and fluid . . . may be as much of a trap for the innocent as the ancient laws of Caligula." United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174, 176 . "In the light of our decisions, it appears upon a mere inspection that these general words and phrases are so vague and indefinite that any penalty {In KNIZE; Denials for filing late, and denial of Briefs, and the effect of J. Winslow’s “mosaic” causing unwarranted economic loss} prescribed for their violation constitutes a denial of due process of law. It is not the penalty itself that is invalid but the exaction of obedience to a rule or standard that is so vague and indefinite as to be really no rule or standard at all." Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission of Oklahoma, 286 U.S. 210, 243. The vice of unconstitutional vagueness is further aggravated where, as here, the statute in question operates to inhibit the exercise of individual freedoms affirmatively protected by the Constitution. As we said in Smith v. California, ". . . stricter standards of permissible statutory vagueness may be applied to a statute having a potentially inhibiting effect on speech; a man may the less be required to act at his peril here, because the free dissemination of ideas may be the loser." 361 U.S. 147 , at 151. "The maintenance of the opportunity for free [368 U.S. 278, 288] political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system. A statute which upon its face, and as authoritatively construed, is so vague and indefinite as to permit the punishment of the fair use of this opportunity is repugnant to the guaranty of liberty contained in the Fourteenth Amendment." Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 . See also Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 ; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 ; Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 .”The test for determining whether a statute is vague is whether it forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” State v. Sprague, 213 Neb. 581, 330 N.W.2d 739 (1983).
More Conspiracy: The laws to limit pages and argument time are too vague for a Pro Se or any Citizen to accept., As an United States citizen, I have an absolute right to be part of the process in the American legal system (Public Trust and Confidence Initiatives; ABA). The preamble of the Declaration gives me this right, as it guarantees this right to any citizen, expressing that “We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice.” The Judges resisted my role to help establish justice, by conspiring to silence advocacy input into the system, targeting reformists and conducting gender and religious discrimination (belief in natural rights of man) and resisting public policy: to protect the so called “integrity of the court”, violating ”Judicial Independence” over the need for scrutinizing judges {Winslow}. Assuming arguendo that Judge Winslow’s acts were merely in excess of her jurisdiction.
To be fair a court must always acknowledge;
“{T}he right to be secure in our persons, dwellings, papers, and property from unwarranted, ... seizures – (4th Amendment). ”
Amendment XIV: Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws
“ it is equally well settled that [c]ourts have no inherent power to transfer property from one spouse to another; instead, that power must rest upon an enabling statute.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Smith v. Smith, supra, 249 Conn. 272.
“JOHN DOE, et al., :V. :ALBERTO GONZALES, CIVIL ACTION NO.: 3:05-cv-1256 (JCH)
Page 8: The subject matter of the speech at issue in the pending motion places it at the center of First Amendment protection. “[P]olitical belief and association constitute the core of those activities protected by the First Amendment.” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 356; see also Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838-39 (1978).
Count XXlV The irreparable Injury was foreseeable by judges. If Laws are applied differently to different groups or people then those laws are to be found presumed void as a fact of law. Equal Protection under XlV for A Court’s proof of Jurisdiction VIOLATION OF;
"Once challenged, jurisdiction cannot be `assumed' it must be proved to exist". Stuck v Medical Eaminers, 94 Ca.2d 751, 211 P. 2s 389 "Jurisdiction once challenged cannot be assumed and must be decided". "A court cannot confer jurisdiction where none existed and cannot make a void proceeding valid. It is clear and well established law that a void order can be challenged in any court", OLD WAYNE MUT. L. ASSOC. v. McDONOUGH, 204 U. S. 8, 27 S. Ct. 236 (1907)."There is no discretion to ignore lack of jurisdiction." Joyce v. U.S. 474 2D 215."The burden shifts to the court to prove jurisdiction." Rosemond v. Lambert, 469 F 2d 416 "Court must prove on the record, all jurisdiction facts related to the jurisdiction asserted." Latana v. Hopper, 102 F. 2d 188; Chicago v. New York 37 F Supp. 150 "The law provides that once State and Federal Jurisdiction has been challenged, it must be proven." 100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980).Other cases also such as McNutt v. G.M., 56 S. Ct. 789,80 L. Ed. 1135, Griffin v. Mathews, 310 Supp. 341, 423 F. 2d 272, Basso v. U.P.L., 495 F 2d. 906, Thomson v. Gaskiel, 62 S. Ct. 673, 83 L. Ed. 111, and Albrecht v U.S., 273 U.S. 1, also all confirm, that, “when challenged, jurisdiction must be documented, shown, and proven, to .lawfully exist before a cause may lawfully proceed in the courts. Nestor v Hersey, 425 F. 2d 504 acts void absent proof of jurisdiction on record.
FIRST AMENDMENT: “When a vague law reaches activity protected by the first amendment, in addition to the due process concerns discussed below, there is a concern that the law will unnecessarily "chill" first amendment rights. See Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law 12-31, at 1033-35 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing the distinction where a case must be heard on the constitutional merits ).“ ..
Defendant was aggrieved by violation that the court must construct a finding based on the constitutionality allegations I have placed, that because that count, liberally construed, brings a general constitutional challenge to Connecticut's 35 page rules as abridging fundamental rights.
Count XXV: Joinders,:Fraud and the Economic Loss Rule applies to KNIZE. Fraud-scienter or intentional misrepresentation-is an economic tort primarily invoked in bargaining transactions, See 2 DOBBS ON TORTS, supra note 2, § 469. and has been recognized for centuries as a ground for recovery. To the extent that the economic loss rule
forecloses a tort claim for scienter fraud, it seems to radically change the law as it has been traditionally applied for a very long time. And perhaps not only the law of fraud but also the law of mistake, because innocent mutual and basic mistakes, whether generated by misrepresentation or not, would have traditionally warranted rescission and in contemporary law would warrant damages that are more or less equivalent to the costs of rescission. . 2 DOBBS ON TORTS, supra note 2, § 483. Conversion of or trespass to intangibles, not possible in earlier law, are now accepted as torts. Negligent interference with intangibles that causes economic harm can easily be imagined in KNIZE: See Fifield Manor v. Finston, 354 P.2d 1073 (Cal. 1960) (holding that subrogation, the act of substituting of one creditor for another, for a transferee's loss would in effect permit assignment of a personal injury claim in violation of law). The other side of the coin can be seen in Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc., v. Dana Corp.68 This also involved a misrepresentation in performance rather than in inducement of the contract, but the misrepresentation caused a type of harm that was almost certainly a type not guaranteed by the contract provisions. The defendant had a Shareholders Agreement which had restrictions which prevented Mrs. Knize’s accxess to funds, and guarenteed access by other OK ART members if a court was to transfer interest to Mrs. Knize . Without notifying the other members the court and the plaintiff changed the provisions. In fact, the court and plaintiff gave false representation of the provisions and had no jurisdiction to do so.. Had Mr. Knize discovered the judge would intentionally or by mistake or misrepresentation, rule against the provisions, while the original court case was ongoing he would have sued the special relationship parties (Judges) for economic loss, because the contract terms would almost certainly control. But that is not what happened. Instead, in the after-made judgment the court knowing misrepresented the OK ART shares. The(defendant reserves his right to sue to recover on an intentional fraud theory, adding a claim for punitive damages declaring that the court and Atty O’Sullivan’s conduct was separate and independent from the breach of their dudy.
Compelling Parties to Contract: The rule of law approach, which abandons any effort to determine the OK ART contract's meaning and the expectations it reasonably generates, suggests that courts may not in fact be moved by a desire to honor the contract. The contractual economic loss rule does not bar negligence claims for physical damage to persons or to other property, Mr. Knize’s publically held Stocks.. Recovery is appropriate as it is with any other property damage.
PARTIES IN CONTRACTUAL OR OTHER RELATIONSHIPS:MISREPRESENTATION AND THE INDEPENDENT TORT CONCEPT. Misrepresentation to induce a contract involves parties in a special relationship, as I Claim judges become when acting in trust of divorce instruments, Cases have taken the view that the economic loss rule bars tort claims for innocent misrepresentation, but does not bar claims for intentional or negligent misrepresentation.Keller v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods., Inc., 819 P.2d 69 (Colo. 1991) (relying upon cases of actual fraud); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Nat'l Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443,(Ill. 1982); see also BRW, Inc., 99 P.3d 66. But a Judge’s ignorance of the law is no excuse. Mrs. Knize never had a subrogation right, as per the OK ART Bylaws.
“If the insurer has no subrogation right, the owner recovers under ordinary negligence law. The case will be governed by the collateral source rule (where it has not been statutorily modified) and the owner will keep his insurance payment and also recover
in tort for the damage done. See 2 DOBBS ON TORTS, supra note 2, § 380; 2 DOBBS ON
REMEDIES, supra note 13, § 8.6(3)
To prevent unjust enrichment the Court must hear the charge not ruled upon in the original case. One in a special or contractual relationship owes a duty of care to protect against stand-alone economic harm; and again subject to qualifications, those in a special relationship arising out of contract or undertaking may not owe a duty of care to each other; rather, each party is limited to the contract claim, with all its limitations, unless the court finds fraud. If the contract is valid, it prevails. But it is not so clear that courts are really examining the contract; it looks rather as if they have made a rule of law irrespective of the parties' expressed intent, and that is troublesome. In fact, some judicial statements, like those of J. Winslow improperly emphasize a desire to force inadherence to contract negating the extent of liability, and are entirely separate from the contract.
Mrs. Knize remains a STRANGER to OK ART bylaws. The first of the economic loss rules (the stranger rule), often associated with Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927).is that, subject to some qualifications, a defendant owes no duty to exercise reasonable care for the pure stand-alone economic interests of strangers-that is to persons with whom the defendant has no relationship by contract, Mrs Knize is to considered a stranger to OK ART EXHIBITIONS. LTD.
1. The rule enforces the requirements of other tort law. In certain classes of cases, the rules of particular torts like libel or interference with contract are in place to deal with those specific cases.
2. KNIZE Transferred Loss. Transferred losses occurred when the court and Mrs. Knize harmed a protected interest of Mr. Knize, because of contract violation, violation of the rule of law, or perhaps fraud/mistake,15 the loss unlawfully fell on The salient characteristic of transferred loss is that there is a single loss. This category, quite diverse in the facts, is important because in KNIZE, the defendant can recover for economic losses that have been unlawfully transferred to Mrs. Knize.
JOINDER IN KNIZE IS MANDATORY AND PERMISSIVE. Although there is no Conn. statute or case which expressly addresses joinder in the domestic tort/divorce setting without having to start a separate tort, it appears a joinder should be considered mandatory. A new trial is demanded on this basis. The all-encompassing scope of the dissolution of marriage statute, coupled with the legal rationales stated in the cases which favor joinder, both procedurally and substantively, appear to require joinder for the following reasons :1. Collateral Estoppel. The bar of collateral estoppel is one reason to consider mandatory joinder. the dissolution decree might be admissible in the subsequent tort action subject to usual constraints of relevance, competence and with a careful eye to questions of causation and speculativeness of damages. The same may hold true for the dissolution proceeding if that action follows trial of the tort claim. S.A.V. V. K.G.V., 708 S.W. 2d 651, 653 (Mo. banc 1986), emphasis added. rule against splitting a cause of action. The civil rules on joinder of causes of action apply to divorce cases. Sturgis v. Sturgis, 663 S.W. 2d 375 (Mo. App. 1983). The joinder rules appear by their plain language to be permissive when one reads them. Rule 55.06(a) says "... a party asserting a claim to relief as an original claim...may join, either as independent or as alternate claims, as many claims, legal or equitable, as he has against an opposing party." However, Rule 55.32(a) states a "...pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which ... the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties..." The rule mandates that the respondent must plead the tort claim at the time of the divorce, if the claim exists. It makes little sense to require only the respondent to assert the tort claim during the divorce case or risk the bar of collateral estoppel. The same rule should apply to the party who files first. In fact, the Missouri Supreme Court lends guidance about the "permissive" nature of the joinder rule: With respect to the joinder of claims, or causes of action,...the civil code of Missouri is permissive...Despite the permissive character of the statute, however, a cause of action which is in fact single, as distinguished from a several cause of action, may not be split and filed or tried piecemeal, the penalty for which is that an adjudication of the suit first filed is a bar to a second suit. The rule against splitting a single cause of action is one of policy, the prevention of a vexatious multiplicity of suits. At least one court of another state has considered the rule against splitting a cause of action in the specific context considered herein, and has determined the tort action must be brought at the time of the divorce or be barred.See Tevis v. Tevis, 400 A. 2d 1189 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1979).
Count XXVl: Defendant was aggrieved by violation; that The court must exercise Equal Protection concerning just causes for denials to file late at the Supreme Court. My mother was almost killed in a car accident which transpired about a week before the Motion for Reconsideration was due. The court denied, and dismissed my case and all my pleadings, and forced post-judgment havoc where I was then jailed for contempt, and ruled against to meet post-J stipulations: because the higher court did not think it was a just cause, that there was a family emergency, and that my mother might not live the week. I was completely emotionally distressed, and had to make travel arrangements, and was unable to comply with the deadline when the days passed and the urgency of injury of my mother grew. PB 60– 3 should have protected me, but the Supreme Court is seemingly without any kind of ethics, and seemed to have moved by prejudice and bias to stop constitutional challenges over fairness. They took it too far this time. It was not a failure of my due diligence. They used indirect means which violated fundamental principles to fairness. My financial security for the rest of my life depended on the ability of the court to be fair. It was Chief Justice Sullivan who presided over the panel which was unanimous in this decision. I state for the record I have little confidence in any ruling to come out of Chief Justice Sullivan. I am sure he influenced the Panel who judged my case with more unethical standards as he did being found guilty of fixing with judicial nominations; found guilty by Conn.’s JRC. On this fact alone I should get a reconsideration of the facts and a favorable ruling to collect damages.
Count XXVll: Overall claim of Obstruction of Justice on all points mentioned. Procedural defects of J. Tierney, and The Supreme/Appellate Courts. This is also a statutory compliance claim for certain Limited Liability Laws as previously mentioned. Injury was foreseeable by judges, by denying probable cause fraud claims it was clear damages would ensue upon the defendant..
Count XXVlll The Rooker-Feldman doctrine DOES NOT apply to this case . The doctrine holds that lower United States federal courts may not sit in direct review of state court decisions, however REMOVAL IS ALLOWED by a defendant. Removal jurisdiction is governed by statute, 28 U.S.C. §1441 et seq. Generally, a case may be removed if the original case could have been filed in federal court, but was not. Thus, removal requires an independent ground for jurisdiction such as diversity jurisdiction, federal question jurisdiction, or any other grant of federal jurisdiction. The U.S. Congress has granted the district courts original jurisdiction to hear cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, meaning that they can only hear claims that were initially brought in or removed to the district court. However, new claims against Public Officials are put forth to this court that were NOT heard at the Connecticut State courts, and I am REMOVING my case to the District Court. I claim a Supplemental jurisdiction, as it is the authority of United States federal courts to hear additional claims substantially related to the original claim even though the court would lack the jurisdiction to hear the additional claims independently. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 is a codification of the Supreme Court's rulings on ancillary jurisdiction (Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978)) and pendent jurisdiction (United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966)) and a superseding of the Court's treatment of pendent party jurisdiction (Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989)). By default, courts have supplemental jurisdiction over "all other claims that are so related...that they form part of the same case or controversy" (§ 1367(a)). This means a federal court hearing a federal claim can also hear substantially related state law claims, thereby encouraging efficiency by only having one trial at the federal level rather than one trial in federal court and another in state court. The current understanding that the decisions of state courts can not be challenged in federal courts (other than the Supreme Court) unless Congress has enacted legislation that specifically authorized such relief. UNDER UFTA SECTION 8. DEFENSES, LIABILITY, AND PROTECTION OF TRANSFEREE .(b) Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent a transfer is voidable in an action by a creditor under Section 7(a)(1), the creditor may recover judgment for the value of the asset transferred, as adjusted under subsection (c), or the amount necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim, whichever is less. The judgment may be entered against: (1) the first transferee of the asset or the person for whose benefit the transfer was made; or (2) any subsequent transferee other than a good-faith transferee or obligee who took for value or from any subsequent transferee or obligee.- (Attorney O’sullivan and Mrs. Knize’s transference to purchase the home she presently resides, the previous owners.) (c) If the judgment under subsection (b) is based upon the value of the asset transferred, the judgment must be for an amount equal to the value of the asset at the time of the transfer, subject to adjustment as the equities may require. END
Also under UFCA limited liiability UCC Code IRS Codes, .Civil Rights Codes among them are: 18 U.S.C. § 1961 -- obtaining money by artifice, -- conspiracy against rights and 18 U.S.C § 1001 False Statement
An example of legislation that has been interpreted to this effect is 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254, which authorizes federal courts to grant writs of habeas corpus. Another example of an explicit legislative exception to this doctrine was the statute passed by Congress to permit federal courts to review the decisions of Florida courts in the Terri Schiavo case.
Count XXlX: Any law or case which grants or forms a basis for Judicial Immunity is Unconstitutional, Vague, and against International treaties. Judicial Immunity evinces a design to reduce the people under absolute Despotism and creates an illegal Oligarchy/Nobility, and limitation on the power of the people of the United States. Ordering transfer of the underlying assets of a Limited Liability Company, for which members (Mr. Knize) have no ownership, or overriding a contract by legislating from the bench, or creating a mosaic distribution scheme which transfers non-transferable assets; is NOT a function normally performed by a judge. Courts have repeatedly ruled that judges have no immunity for their criminal acts, and though there are no criminal penaltys in Civil RICO, that proceeding should yield civil damages found from criminal acts.. Since both treason and the interference with interstate commerce are criminal acts, no judge has immunity to engage in such acts. Defendant gives notice he will place a challenge to Subject Matter Jurisdiction in event of dismissal from the court on grounds of immunity. A Motion to Dismiss on that claim invariably violates the Separation of Powers; judges may NOT legislate from the bench, Congress’ will to provide relief for injury cannot be ruled away by the Judiciary, as it would be an act of Law making, not interpretation. In a non-criminal proceeding, there are still grounds to abolish immunity; and grant damages; the Constitution never granted Judges the power to give themselves the privilege, but indeed granted the people the right to say no to it, and Am. 9 guarantees priority to citizens the right to sue government officials under common law Tort. I demand Strict Scrutiny be employed on the Question in a proper hearing. Further, we can assume arguendo that the Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 104 S.Ct. 1970, 80 L.Ed.2d 565 (1984) decision applies equally in Bivens actions against judges in civil and criminal cases. In 1996, Congress enacted the Federal Courts Improvement Act ("FCIA"), Pub.L. No. 104-317, 110 Stat. 3847 (1996), in which it amended §§ 1983 to provide that "injunctive relief shall not be granted" in an action brought against "a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity ... unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable." The ACT is Unconstitutional and I challenge it through strict scrutiny.
"Woe unto them that call evil good (Judicial Independence), and good evil (accountability); that put darkness for light, and light for darkness; that put bitter for sweet, and sweet for bitter! Woe unto them that are wise in their own eyes, and prudent in their own sight!...who acquit the guilty for a bribe, but deny justice to the innocent" Isaiah 5:20, 21, 23
"Experience hath shewn, that even under the best forms [of government] those entrusted with power have, in time, and by slow operations, perverted it into tyranny."” It [is] inconsistent with the principles of civil liberty, and contrary to the natural rights of the other members of the society, that any body of men therein should have authority to enlarge their own powers, prerogatives or emoluments without restraint." --Thomas Jefferson: Virginia Allowance Bill, 1778. Papers 2:231
This Court must, and has a duty to address the Questions of Law through Strict Scrutiny Test surrounding this claim at a proper hearing. Marbury v. Madison (1803) states:
” The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection. [The] government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right. . .”
If the government is a government of men, the review standard is found in the common
community, and not by judges who wish to protect their own nobility of black robes:
“Governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed." --Thomas Jefferson: Declaration of Independence, 1776. ME 1:29, Papers 1:4 “The will of the nation is the only thing essential to be regarded." -- Thomas Jefferson to Governor Morris, 1792. ME 9:36
If we are a government of Laws, all the laws must stem first from the Constitution:
"[The purpose of a written constitution is] to bind up the several branches of government by certain laws, which, when they transgress, their acts shall become nullities; to render unnecessary an appeal to the people, or in other words a rebellion, on every infraction of their rights, on the peril that their acquiescence shall be construed into an intention to surrender those rights." - Jefferson: Notes on Virginia Q.XIII, 1782. ME 2:178
Judges who we trust with preserving the rights of freedom and liberty guaranteed by our Constitution to protect our people from tyranny and government oppression by prescribing limits upon the Constitution show bias to our government, rule against the people and the Constitution, destroy of our prosperity and happiness, and make us victim to their abuses and tyranny through their obvious abuses of power. Nothing in the Const. grants immunity. Treason; applies to self-granted immunity without the people’s consent as a crime of betraying one's country, especially by attempting to overthrow the sovereign people of our nation and Am. 9 contract rights or by being a subverting government action by undermining the power and authority of the Judiciary rather than to protect the people against unwarranted deprivation of property. The legislature is just as guilty when it bypasses the same requirement of consent, by being influenced by the Judiciary, over the people, to pass laws which put Judges in an untouchable class. I challenge any law so made by them as being Constitutionally repugnant. This court case will allow some voice in the proper judicial branch forum to make the test of consent, as it should correctly be done.
See U.S. Constitution Article VI, Paragraph 2 and 3: “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in the pursuance thereof; …under the authority of the United States, (the fifty states individually) shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.”
"The true principles of our Constitution... are wisely opposed to all perpetuations of power, and to every practice which may lead to hereditary establishments." --Thomas Jefferson to Messrs. Bloodgood and Hammond, 1809. ME 12:318 "A court has no affections; but those of the people whom they govern influence their decisions, even in the most arbitrary
governments." --Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, 1785. ME 5:12, Papers 8:228 "The original error [was in] establishing a judiciary independent of the nation, and which, from the citadel of the law, can turn its guns on those they were meant to defend, and control and fashion their proceedings to its own will." --Thomas Jefferson to John Wayles Eppes, 1807. FE 9:68 “The rights of citizens are not limited to those specifically enumerated in the Constitution. The Ninth Amendment protects all other rights that are retained by the people, and that are not specifically named."It is an essential attribute of the jurisdiction of every country to preserve peace, to punish acts in breach of it, and to restore property taken by force within its limits." -- Jefferson to Governor Morris, 1793.
The balance of Title 42, section 1981 of the Civil Rights Code states, "citizens shall be
subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind"
as long as they remain citizens, judges would be unconstitutional to allocate privileged rights to their own immunity, by their own vote and vote by Lawyer-Politians. Only a handful of judges have granted Judicial immunities for a whole nation. In doing so they undermined the Congress by surpassing interpretation of the Constitution to actually making laws, an unlawful act. They didn’t even refer to the Constitution to do it, there was never any interpretation of the Constitution. I allege Judicial Immunity is inconsistent with the principles of civil liberty, and contrary to the natural rights of the other members of the society, that any body of men therein should have authority to enlarge their own powers, prerogatives or emoluments without restraint. So, this challenge under Strict Test is necessary. Immunity deprives me, and other citizens of their First and Fourteenth Am. Rights. It is not narrowly tailored for judges to say they are free to commit crimes or even be malicious without due recourse. The excuse of Judicial Independence DOES NOT FLY. You cannot fool the people about this. Do a poll and you will see.
OFFICIAL TAKE: “requires that the judiciary, as a system of courts, function and be perceived to function according to law. This in turn requires that individual judges yield some intra institutional independence The judiciary is not exempt from the requirement of accountability to the people it serves for the proper performance of its duties .“ Institute for Court Management; Court Executive Development Program Phase III Project, May 2006
Also abiding by Treaties follows a necessity: The United States is bound by Treaties, entered in good faith with the United Nations, requiring that it provide effective remedies and redress for violations of Constitutional Rights, "notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity" and to "develop the possibilities of judicial remedy." See The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; U.N. Gen. Assem. Res. 2200 A(XXI) of 16 Dec. 1966; Ratified by the U.S. Senate in June 1992. See Article 2. See also the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. Gen. Assem. Res. 217-A(III) of 10 Dec 48; Art. 8. It states: "Everyone has the right to an EFFECTIVE REMEDY by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law." [emphasis added]. It is time to look at the full breadth of law. It is long overdue for the Federal Court (District Court must address the treaties violations before it should rule a failure to state a claim because they think JI exist) to revisit cases which granted judges immunity in light of the impact of Constitutions on the evolution of "well ordered systems of jurisprudence." Bradley was eighty years out-of-date when it was written to create JI. Its teachings are now two centuries past their prime and cannot survive in a world of limited government and constitutional rights. The Treaties mentioned are the "handwriting on the wall" before the entire world: "Judicial Immunity" is an embarrassing, and dying institution.
"Single acts of tyranny may be ascribed to the accidental opinion of a day; but a series of oppressions, begun at a distinguished period and pursued unalterably through every change of ministers, too plainly prove a deliberate, systematic plan of reducing [a people]
to slavery." Thomas Jefferson: Rights of British America, 1774. ME 1:193, Papers 1:125
Placing the judges above the People, turns the principle that the People are sovereign and destroys a government by the consent of the people. In Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), an 8/1 decision written by Chief Justice Warren, that affirmed immunity for judges is clearly voidable under section 1983 civil rights statute, rights which held explicitly imposed liability [on] Every person who, under color of [law] …… subjects or causes …… any citizen of the United States .. to the deprivation of any rights ...secured by the constitution and laws..[,].
is a decision that is absent of any Constitutional basis/authority for absolute judicial immunity. To his credit and to wit, Justice Douglas wrote in his lone dissent at 559:
““…… The court’’s ruling is not justified by the admitted need for a vigorous and independent judiciary, is not commanded by the common-law doctrine of judicial immunity, and does not follow from inexorably from our prior decisions. …… [P] To most, ‘‘every person’’ would mean every person, not every person except judges.”” [Continuing at 562:] The position that Congress did not intend to change the common-law rule of judicial immunity ignores the fact that every member of Congress who spoke on the issue assumed that the words of the statute meant what they said and judges would be liable. …… [P] The section’’s purpose was to provide redress for the deprivation of civil rights. It was recognized that certain members of the judiciary were instruments of oppression and were partially responsible for the wrongs to be remedied. The parade of cases coming to this Court shows that a similar condition now obtains in some of the States. Some states courts have been instruments of suppression of civil rights.”” Continuing at 565:] ““The argument that the actions of officials must not be subjected to judicial scrutiny because to do so would have an inhibiting effect on their work, is but a more sophisticated manner of saying ‘‘The King can do no wrong.’’ (ftnt. 5 omitted.) Chief Justice Cockburn long ago disposed of the argument that liability would deter judges: ‘‘I can not believe that judges ... would fail to discharge their duty faithfully and fearlessly according to their oaths and consciences …… from any fear of exposing themselves to actions at law. I am persuaded that the number of such actions would be infinitely small and would be easily disposed of. While, on the other hand, I can easily conceive cases in which judicial opportunity might be so perverted and abused for the purpose of injustice as that, on sound principles, the authors of such wrong ought to be responsible to the parties wronged.’’ Dawkins v Lord Parulet, LR 5 QB 94, 110 (C.J. Cockburn, dissenting).””
“Congress by its words and meaning enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and that meaning included judges to be held responsible to an injured plaintiff for the deprivation of Constitutional Rights. Any judge made case (BRADLEY) finding to the contrary is hereby challenged as unconstitutional and unlawful. No Court has ever challenged the Constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, and therefore said Congressionally enacted legislation stands as law. The only way to change an act of Congress is by an act of Congress. No judge can change it and any such findings and changes are not to be upheld in Federal Courts as lawful. No changes in the wording have ever been made to Title 42 U.S.C.A. 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986 and 1988 and therefore these Congressionally enacted laws are enforceable in the Federal Courts” See RANDALL V. BRIGHAM, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 19 L.Ed. 285 (1869). BUTZ V. ECONOMOU, 438 U.S. 506, 98 S.Ct. 2910 (1978)
A look at what some legal commentaries have said on the issue is helpful here. In...
““Liability of Judicial Officers Under Section 1983”” 79 Yale L.J. 322 (1969), it is written at p.322: ““…… This Note contends that the congressional intent of Section 1983 and the policies underlying this exemption do not support a grant of judicial immunity, but rather argue for judicial liability under an actual malice standard. (ftnt. 3 omitted.) [Continuing at 337:] [P] But whatever the long term results of imposing liability, there is no adequate rationale——in history or policy——for altogether exempting judicial officers from liability under section 1983 …””
In ““Suing Judges: History and Theory”” 31 South Carolina L.Rev. 201 (1980) Jay M.
Feinman and Roy S. Cohen wrote at p.203:
““We conclude that statements such as that in Bradley are inadequate history at two levels, reflecting judicial misunderstanding of both what the law was and how and why it developed. Actually, English law began with a position of general judicial liability and developed only limited exceptions on ground irrelevant to a discussion of judicial liability today. When the English law was received in the United States, this limited immunity was expanded significantly, notably by James Kent, to limit liability, and throughout the nineteenth century a mixed pattern of judicial liability and immunity existed in America. In Bradley, Justice Field provided a confused reformation of the law, which led to a further limitation of liability. At no point, however, were the advantages and disadvantages of judicial immunity fairly examined. Because the case for immunity is inconclusive and unpersuasive on historical grounds, we also examine the issue on policy grounds; our analysis proceeds from a thorough review of the case law and literature. We conclude that immunity is indefensible on policy grounds as well ……”” [Continuing at 205:] ““Most of the major judicial liability cases use the common-law origins of judicial immunity as a justification for the doctrine. For example, as noted above, Bradley v. Fisher, { U.S. 13 Wall. 335 (1871)} the case principally relied on by the Court in Stump, used extensive discussion of English case law to show the authority of the rule and to support its continued application. [P] In this section, we demonstrate that these conclusions about English law simply are incorrect. A careful analysis of English law shows that the basic rule was one of liability, that no simple rule of immunity ever existed, and that applications to American law of those instances in which immunity was granted have been inappropriate. In sum, the English law provides little support for a rule of absolute judicial immunity.”” Continuing at 279:] ““…… It is our belief that the decision in Stump should be rejected as too protective of judicial prerogative because it violates a basic tenet of the legal process –– the right of review –– when there would be little cost to the legal system from imposing liability. In ““FEDERAL JURISDICTION”” (3rd Ed) Aspen Law & Business, Aspen Publishers, Professor Erwin Chemerinsky wrote at p.495:
““In numerous specific cases –– ranging from the scope of judicial immunity (ftnt.6 omitted) to the availability of punitive damages (ftnt.7 omitted) –– the Court has focused extensively on the common law of immunities as it existed when section 1983 was adopted. This historical approach is subject to substantial criticism. First, it assumes that the common law was clear about the nature of the immunity to be accorded to particular government officers. Yet usually there was great divergence among the states and there was no firmly established rules. For instance, the Court has emphasized the common law immunity to suits for damages under section 1983. (ftnt.8 omitted.) However, in 1871 only thirteen of thirty-seven states accorded judges such immunities for suits. (ftnt.9 omitted.) In fact, in adopting section 1983, many members of Congress were particularly concerned about unconstitutional conduct by judges. (ftnt.10 omitted.)
[Continuing at 496:] ““Additionally, even if common law principle were clear and discoverable, their relevance to modern doctrines is questionable. The fundamental premises of tort law have changed dramatically over the past 130 years, as have views about the Constitution and individual rights. Undoubtedly many officers occupy far different positions that they did in 1871. Furthermore, there is strong argument that common law tort immunities have little relevance in determining the scope of responsibility for constitutional violations. Some suggest that the Court should abandon the immunity inquiry and leave the entire matter of immunities to the legislature. (ftnt.14 omitted.) Others would prefer a more functional approach to determining the nature of immunities. (ftnt.15 omitted.) Nonetheless, for now, the starting point in the Court’’s analysis of immunity remains the common law of 1871.”” [13 of 37 states accorded judges imunities for suits.]
Note, absent from some cited sources are the questions of whether the Court ever had the constitutional authority/power to give itself immunity and whether that would violate the doctrine of separation of powers. The Courts used Common law rationale:
“There is no federal general common law. Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a state whether they be local in their nature or 'general,' be they commercial law or a part of the law of torts. And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts.
- Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)
"The sentiment that ex post facto laws are against natural right is so strong in the United States that few, if any, of the State constitutions have failed to proscribe them. The Federal Constitution indeed interdicts them in criminal cases only; but they are equally unjust in civil as in criminal cases, and the omission of a caution which would have been right, does not justify the doing what is wrong." --Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, 1813. ME 13:327
The effect of the 4th Amendment is to put the courts [232 U.S. 383, 392] of the United States and Federal officials, in the exercise of their power and authority, under limitations and restraints as to the exercise of such power and authority, and to forever secure the people, their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against all unreasonable searches and seizures under the guise of law. This protection reaches all alike, whether accused of crime or not, and the duty of giving to it force and effect is obligatory upon all intrusted under our Federal system with the enforcement of the laws. The tendency of those who execute the laws of the country to obtain property by means of unlawful seizures should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts, which are charged at all times with the support of the Constitution, and to which people of all conditions have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental rights. Article 6 -
“This Constitution……. shall be the Supreme Law of the land…Judges in every state shall be bound thereby , any laws……to the Contrary notwithstanding ……judicial officers… shall be bound by Oath Affirmation, to support this Constitution.”
Cases (Bradley, Pierson) and Congressional Acts (JCDA) that concluded JI without consultation to our Constitution are hereby declared VOID by this citizen. The United States Supreme Court has stated that "No State legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating his Undertaking to support it". Cooper Vs. Aaron. 358 U.S. 1 78 S.Ct. 1401 (1958). If a judge does not fully comply with the Constitution, then his orders are void, in re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (1888), he/she is without jurisdiction, and he/she has engaged in an act or acts TREASON.
Judicial Immunity was developed by means of an unlawful ex post facto law in relation to the Constitution.. Generally speaking, ex post facto laws are seen as a violation of the rule of law as it applies in a free and democratic society. Most common law jurisdictions do not permit retroactive legislation. Furthermore, it is improper to exclude the U. S. Const. and furthermore improper to not refer to it as a primary source for instruction. The starting point then, now, and always - is that Constitution- Article III does not grant the judiciary immunity, especially for acts of operating above the law, Am. 9 gives the people right to say no, not judges to say yes. Maybe that is why Justice Field did not mention the Constitution in Bradley. The Supreme Court has thereafter ignored that there is no Constitutional authority/basis for absolute judicial immunity. But, in fact, Judges giving judges absolute immunity over and above the rights of the People violates the sovereignty of the People, the Constitution, and separation of powers.Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “on its face does not provide for any immunities.” Heck v.Humphrey,114 S.Ct.2364,2375-76 n 1 (1994).
"If once the people become inattentive to the public affairs, you and I, and Congress and Assemblies, Judges and Governors, shall all become wolves. It seems to be the law of our general nature, in spite of individual exceptions." Thomas Jefferson
Absolute immunity sets a dangerous precedent, laying the ground-work for further trampling of the rights of citizens, and further acts elevating government over the People.
Wrongfully Premised Ruling in Bradley: “[Judicial Immunity] has been the settled doctrine of the English Courts for many centuries and has never been denied, that we are aware of, [Fields didn’t open the books] in the courts of this country. "It has, as Chancellor Kent observes, 'a deep root in the common law.'" Bradley v Fisher, 80 US at 649. It is not true. What was, in fact, happening was that the Commonwealth was developing a more civilized law as they came to recognize the "Unalienable Rights" of man that gave birth to the United States. The major premise of Bradley was factually incorrect when made. English common law had grown to permit judicial liability claims. In Kendillon v Maltby, 174 Eng. Rep. 562, 566 (N.P. 1842) (see the Excerpts), Chief Justice Lord Denman stated the law in l842::
"I have no doubt on my mind, that a magistrate, be he the highest judge in the land, is answerable in damages for slanderous language, either not relevant to the cause before him or uttered after the cause is at an end; but for words uttered in the course of his duty, no magistrate is answerable, either civilly or criminally, unless express malice and the absence of reasonable or probable cause be established."
AMERICAN LAW ON ENGLISH COMMON LAW: "Under the common law of England, where individual rights were preserved by a fundamental document such as the Magna Carta, violations of those rights generally could be remedied by a traditional action for damages; violation of constitutional right was viewed as a trespass, giving rise to a trespass action. WIDGEON V. EASTERN SHORE HOSP. CENTER, 479 a.2d. 921 "
What BRADLEY Got Right: “Judicial immunity is no defense to a judge acting in the clear absence of jurisdiction." BRADLEY V. FISHER, U.S. 13 Wall. 335 (1871) The Judges acted outside of their jurisdiction in KNIZE and can be sued for damages involving questions arising under the Connecticut or United States Constitutions. (Eleventh Amendment) Title 18 U.S.C., Section 241, 242, 18 US Code Sec. 2511 (d)(20), 18 U.S.C 371, 42 U.S.C 126 SUBCHAPTER IV > § 12202, Title 42,CHAPTER 136 , SUBCHAPTER IX,PART B, Sec. 14141, 18 US Code Sec. 2511 (d)(20) and under violations outlined in 18 U.S.C 371, 42 USC 1983 and 1985, Title 28, U.S.C., § 1655,U.S.C § 1001, 42 USC 1987, RICO 18 USC 1961/1962 (c) (d), section 1344 , section 1503, section 1957 and other laws cited in this Complaint.
Judicial Immunity is an abuse and usurpation - against the American Philosophy:
“...and accordingly all experience hath shewn, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security.-- Declaration of Independence
I demand that the Federal Court form a ruling in such a way, and on behalf of the public interest, which protects with new Guards for future security for the people of the United States “to throw off” judicial Immunity, lest, by failure to do so will incite rightful public recourse against a government become “foreign” to our Constitution, and will prove the Judiciary in disrepute of the administration of justice and to hold no integrity whatsoever.
“Today, the American Bar Association, along with our Judges have craftily constructed our so called Justice system to deny us the protection of our Rights. There can be no limitation on the power of the people of the United States. By their authority the State Constitutions were made, and by their authority the Constitution of the United States was established” - U. S. Supreme Court - Hauenstein vs Lynham (100 US 483)
"I would rather be exposed to the inconveniences attending too much liberty than to those attending too small a degree of it.” Thomas Jefferson
“We hold these truths to be self-evident: That all men [which includes judges] are created equal; that they are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights; that, among these, are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; that, to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; and, whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it....Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shewn that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed.”
These words from the Declaration of Independence are instructive that judges are to be placed equally among men for their injustices; because not only whenever any form of government, but whenever any government official becomes destructive of the founding purposes, that official or those officials must be held accountable. Judges argue that America cannot endure a judiciary that is subject to political pressures. Their constant refrain is “Independence” and “Freedom from retaliation” What they really want is, “Independence from accountability” and “Freedom to retaliate.” We cannot allow the judiciary to spin accountability as “political pressure.” Ultimately, it is the people who need protection from bad judges, not the other way around. Read sections 1 and 2 of Article III of the U.S. Constitution very carefully. Congress is authorized to make rules for the Supreme Court and create (and by implication, dissolve) the lower courts.
Section 1: The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behaviour ...
Section 2, Clause 2: In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make.
In 1996 Congress added a phrase to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” [Judge Winslow in KNIZE violated her own decree]
If Congress can make rules for the Supreme Court, then the Supreme Court is not “independent” of Congress. Congress is the master of the courts. The Supreme Court cannot “rule” away the power of Congress and it cannot “rule” away its duty to put the people’s interests ahead of its own. Judges are supposed to be our public servants. If they disobey Congress, Congress has the right and the power to make them answer for it. We the People want our power and relief re-secured and restored. We don’t accept that our public servants “decided” to take it away from us. Congress has formed civil rights laws and they are to be obeyed and enforced by the judiciary. Who dares to argue about that? In Knize declaratory decrees were violated by her and higher courts, yet, declaratory relief was unavailable.
Deriving Their Just Powers From the Consent of the Governed. I allege the judiciary’s self-granted immunities is conduct that has been destructive to the founding purposes of our nation. The second question addressed by the Declaration's third self-evident truth is, how should government operate? The answer: by the consent of the governed. Consent means agreement or choice. Judges and Congress never asked the people. Lawyer-Politicians and influence of Judges forced certain judge-protections through Congress. That places parts of the Judicial Conduct and Discipline Act of 1980, FCIA, and The Judicial Discipline and Removal Reform Act of 1990 as unconstitutional. Conduct that is prejudicial to the expeditious administration of the business of the courts would be most assuredly voted by the people as offenses which can be sued upon for damages if injury was sustained.
The government must, in some way, have our agreement, or else it has no "just powers" over us. Consent has two forms: consent in establishing government and consent in operating government. The first-also called the "social compact "-was well defined in the Massachusetts state constitution of 1780 as an association "by which the whole people covenants with each citizen, and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common good." There is no common good in judges giving themselves the right to not have to abide by laws that they themselves have been authorized to enforce upon the nation. They have then created an illegal Nobility. They have then created more immunity than the United States President. They have become evil tyrants, having perversely bended the law in their own favor in the name of justice. After the people join together to form a government, they must give their consent, upon a regular basis, to its operations. KNIZE will allow the necessary input from amicus citizens. The second form of consent arises from the fact that the right to liberty is unalienable. One cannot rightly consent to a government that rules without going back to the people for their ongoing consent. Due Process in court and freedom of speech are means necessary to ensure this second form of consent. Our government must not tread on citizens with its false claim of judicial immunity without going to the people; judges should not change the government that we the people created, for their own “light and transient causes”; to say they are not bound to the same laws applicable to all of us. In re Cudahy, 294 F.3d 947 (7th Cir. 2002): "nonjudicial conduct by a judge can be `prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts' and thus fall within the purview of [28 USC 351 (a) if a Federal Judge is involved]" at 950 (citing In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 39 F.3d at 378) .This mandate must also apply to lower Judges and all courts of the land.
“[with consistency to] the public’s expectations with the desire for the courts to be responsible to changes in public views of what is competent administration. Institute for Court Management; Court Executive Development Program Phase III Project, May 2006.
If Judges act with BIAS as in the KNIZE CASE when law of the land, particularly Statutes, was clearly ignored to prejudice a law-protected party, he/she is plainly guilty of a mental or physical disability resulting in inability to discharge the duties of office and therefore it must be reviewable.. The JC admits the last two paragraphs in rule 1(e), dealing with complaints alleging bias and those alleging undue delay, are in accord with judicial council decisions. It must follow the same in the District Court. Judges of all courts cannot claim Judicial Independence as a cure-all for all misconduct, lack of jurisdiction, and crimes. The Judicial Council and various Appellate (Appeals) courts have also stated the law provides that a complaint against a Judge or a case may be dismissed if it is directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling and they will not provide relief from a ruling or judgment of a court. By the nature of Void Judgments and breaking the law, judge actions as such should always be reviewable in any proceeding. ANY court must proceed to consider the question at length, about the limits of discretionary power, when to set aside judgments and determine impropriety, obtained at a previous term, AND MUST ALWAYS HOLD that when a court acts without jurisdiction, its judgment was void and reviewable on error, misconduct, and crime. This defendant and fellow amicus citizens claim that the 1(e) mandate or any such interpretations, are
Constitutionally repugnant, and we challenge it by whatever authority allowed the rule, whether it was the Legislature or the Judiciary for all the reasons stated in this count. A proper hearing on the debate is by right of the power of the people through our founding documents to revisit what its government has ruled upon in the people’s absence. We demand oversight and our consent presented by this case. If the charges of the defendant are not addressed because JC dismissal concept Under 28 U.S.C. § 351(a), then it will become a much worse affair for the guilty Judges, I will press for Criminal charges under RICO and other laws. So this court WILL hear the allegations. The power to hear a complaint proceeding on the basis that corrective action has not been taken implies some court power to determine whether the facts alleged are true. See Report of the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal (1993). The boundary of that power--the point at which a chief judge invades the territory reserved for special committees--is unclear. Rule 4(b) addresses that issue by stating that the chief judge may conduct a limited inquiry to determine whether the facts of the complaint are “plainly untrue.” For the necessity of Uniform Law the same must hold true for any higher court. Accountability with overlap into the Legislative and with people’s consent is best OFFICIALLY described in:
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, INTERDEPENDENCE, AND JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY:
Management Of The Courts From The Judges. Perspective; Institute for Court Management; Court Executive Development Program Phase III Project, May 2006
Pg 11: A review of the separation of powers doctrine and the interbranch conflicts created will enhance the understanding of judicial independence. Separation of powers does not specifically mean creation of a barrier that positively prevents any connection or contact between the branches. Preferably, it finds expression mainly in the existence of a balance among the branches. powers, in theory and in practice that makes possible independence in the context of specific reciprocal supervision.17 Although the judiciary is an independent coequal branch of government, the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers allows some overlap in the exercise of governmental functions.18 This overlap is sometimes referred to as the doctrine of overlapping functions...*
Pg 12: There is always a struggle to maintain a balance between the protections of judges from the pressures generated from the public’s expectations with the desire for the courts to be responsible to changes in public views of what is competent administration.
Pg 13: Judicial independence and accountability are considered two different sides of the same coin, just as the independence of an individual judge and the independence of the court from which the judge presides, and is best described as follows: “The capacity of the judiciary to function independently of control by the executive and legislative branches requires the capacity of individual judges to enjoy a measure of extra institutional independence. It also requires that the judiciary, as a system of courts, function and be perceived to function according to law. This in turn requires that individual judges yield some intra institutional independence The judiciary is not exempt from the requirement of accountability to the people it serves for the proper performance of its duties.” Stephen Burbank, Judicial Independence at the Crossroads p. 16 (Sage 2002).
Pg 14: To guide their actions while performing adjudicative and administrative duties, judges rely upon the American Bar Association.s Model Code Of Judicial Conduct. Each state adopts its own version of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct and these specified rules that provide guidance to judges in the performance of their administrative and adjudicatory responsibilities. For example, Model Canon 300 (C) (1) of the ABA.s Model Code Of Judicial Conduct provides: a judge shall diligently discharge the judge's administrative responsibilities without bias or prejudice, maintain professional competence in judicial administration... END EXCERPTS
Judicial Immunity illegally bypasses the requirement that the judiciary, as a system of courts, function and be perceived to function according to law. It illegally bypasses the requirement that individual judges yield some intra institutional independence, as Judicial immunity must be authorized by the legislative branch of government after it consults with the people in some measure. I present with the pertinent question: "What happens when the constitutional remedy to reform government by the People is blocked by the very government sought to be reformed?" Please refer to the writings of John Locke in his Second Treatise on Government. Government ceases when it ceases to protect the People's rights. People's rights being routinely violated by the power in control is, by definition, not of government, but of a foreign power-- a power foreign to our Constitution that has reduced the People under absolute despotism. Anarchy happens when "there is no longer the administration of justice for the securing of men's rights, nor any remaining power within the community to direct the force, [i.e., no provision by which the People can enforce the Constitution] or provide for the necessities of the public" resulting in the absence of government and the people becoming "a confused multitude, without order or connexion." Anarchy results from the effectual dissolution of government by its failure and refusal to protect the People's rights. The Second Treatise of Civil Government (1690) by John Locke, at Chapter XIX "Of the Dissolution of Government" Sec. 218. John Locke, known as the "Philosopher of Freedom" had the greatest influence on our Declaration of Independence.
" Government, according to John Locke, will lose its right to exercise its power, however, when government abuses its people worse than any imaginable group of marauders that might be operating in the absence of a government.” ” In Lockean theory, if government abuses the exercise of the power given it by the people, the people have a natural right to rebel, as did the people of New England in 1776." The Theory of Government, By Peter Landry
When the Constitution was enacted in 1787, it brought into existence the national government. But there was one stipulation: the national government's powers were limited to those enumerated in the Constitution. If a power was not specifically listed, government officials were not permitted to exercise it. Judicial Immunity was never enumerated.
Count XXX. Based on the actions of the government taken at the Supreme Court, Walker v. Members of Congress, filed in September, 2004, that the lawsuit established that the contained assertions are accepted by the government "as fact and law." In KNIZE, the denials and dismissals and refusal to obey the Constitution is now a matter of public record. The fact is they may have committed criminal acts is a matter of public record. The
Judgments and Orders in KNIZE can be used as facts of laws for proof that fraud, improper rulings, and other claims against them. Judges and Atty O’Sullivan committed civil fraud to use one’s office, de facto or otherwise, in the capacity of a “Debt Collector” to collect a debt without the requisite evidentiary proof of the debt giving rise to the obligation and the resulting liability
The Judges and Att’y O’Sullivan committed Civil Racketeering; Under “ CIVIL RICO,” 18 U.S.C. '' 1951-1968; particularly ' 1961(3). Without showing liability on the face of the instrument, they have failed to state a claim. Under the FDCPA, 28 U.S.C. 3001 et seq., without verification of the debt, upon timely demand therefore, SCIENTER (The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995) and CIVIL FRAUD ensues. A claim is really the affidavit swearing to the liability of the defendant. A "warrant" or MITTIMUS (May 22 2006), through Contempt proceedings against Mr. Knize, issued without an affidavit of liability is not a warrant at all. Mr. Knize’s previous imprisonment was not conditioned by an affidavit of liability and thus was illegal. The best that can be said of such arrests is that it is an order to kidnap. To be a real warrant it must be issued upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation (affidavit of liability sworn to by a competent witness). This is what gives the court subject matter and personal jurisdiction. Without the swearing to liability by a competent witness, never done in KNIZE, no court or tribunal can have jurisdiction. It is only the swearing to the liability, whether it is contractual, statutory or anything else that can support a charge of a violation of any kind. Since Mr. Knize had no contractual liability (OK ART), then he did not violate or breach any contract. It is only sufficient if there was a failure to meet an obligation by a fiduciary. There was a Breach of 3 Restatement (Second), Torts § 533 (1977). A breach of trust arose when the trustee, the court, failed to carry out obligations under the terms of the agreements of OK ART. Piece of paper vessel/corporation existing in name only, means all Accounts are held in trust, as Bankrupts cannot hold asset accounts, claiming same to be its property. Any act other than the act as prescribed to a fiduciary causes a condition of embezzlement, fraud, breach of trust, criminal breach of trust. The expressed intent would be clear, that that party, the court, is attempting to use the value of property, the Shareholders Agreement against Mr. Knize, when that party should be acting only as guided by the contract and the true owner. Violation includes any fraudulent act or omission of a public officer that occasions loss in money or property through civil violations in the interest of our government, ...
“Persons, ...when such money or property was in the Custody of the public officer in the course of his public duties -All that government does and provides legitimately is in pursuit of its duty to provide protection for private rights (Wynhammer v. People, 13 NY 378), which duty is a debt owed to its creator, WE THE PEOPLE (Mr. Knize) and the private unenfranchised individual; which debt and duty is never extinguished nor discharged, and is perpetual. No matter what the de facto government/state provides for us in manner of convenience and safety, the unenfranchised individual owes nothing to the government." Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43.
"We the people have discharged any debt which may be said to exist or owed to the state/government. The governments are, presumably, indebted continually to the people, because the people (the sovereigns) presumably assented to the 1878 creation of the government corporation and because we suffer its continued existence. The continued debt owed to the people is discharged only as it continues not to violate our private rights, and when government fails in its duty to provide protection-discharge its debt to the people, it is an abandonment [delictual fault] of any and all power, authority or vestige of sovereignty which it may have otherwise possessed, and the laws remain the same, the sovereignty reverting to the people whence it came." Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
Quagmire for the government to avoid: All judges are sworn to the trust of upholding the ‘‘Supremacy of our Constitutional rule of law’’. When Judges ignored Demands to recognize my rule of law defenses, and then ruled to obey the unsubstantiated Memorandum Orders from Judge Winslow, it was direct and express proof that they converted their trust, in order to defraud my person of life liberty and security of person, thus, in so doing, abandoned the principles of fundamental Justice, by quashing my inalienable and unenumerated rights in contract in a Democratic society. Ignorance is no excuse in law, especially when judges are sworn to an Oath of allegiance to uphold the Supremacy of our Constitutional rule of law, and that nonfeasance to uphold a person’s fiduciary trust of upholding our Constitutional rule of law, by ruling on Private Informations to rule on a Civil Rights violation, will constitutionally mean citizens would be expressly surrendering their Sovereignty to a general “mosiac” of marital distribution; which cared not to look at the underlying facts of rights to contract. By mere virtue of the State imposing its will upon the defendant to transfer funds that were by law non-transferrable, the State of Connecticut created a special relationship to the parties involved: their affirmative duty to protect arises ... from the limitations which it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf. Mr. Knize was imprisoned by J. Tierney in Post Judgment: On May 22, 2006 because he refused to be limited by wrongful acts of judges to not protect him from unfounded liabilities for which no instrument said he had one. Under Duress and protest Mr. Knize signed the settlement, and now claims that signing as VOID and adds now without prejudice he signed under UCC 1-207. Mr. Knize’s copy adds the UCC 1-207 clause.
While certain "special relationships" created or assumed by the State with respect to particular individuals may give rise to an affirmative duty, enforceable through the Due Process [489 U.S. 189, 190] Clause, to provide adequate protection, see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97; Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, the affirmative duty to protect arises not from the State's knowledge of the individual's predicament or from its expressions of intent to help him, but from the limitations which it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf, through imprisonment, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty.)
CLOSING STATEMENT/PROPERTY RIGHTS AND OVERALL LEGAL PHILOSOPHY: Due process of law is not only constitutionally guaranteed, but its basic concept of fairness in legal proceedings is an ancient one. The ancient Egyptians required judges to hear both sides of a case and answer to all the relevant issues raised. The Greeks and Romans used juries and professional orators.Due process of law is also the cornerstone of the American experience brought to this continent at the beginning of European settlement. It is a fundamental part of the compact between the American government, at all levels, and every American. Thus, procedural due process is one of the most important legal concepts and duties for local government officials.
“A State cannot, per the Fourteenth Amendment, abridge the privileges of a United States citizen, even when a person is a resident of a State which tries to do so. Colgate v. Harvey, supra, 296 U.S. at 428. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits any State from abridging the privileges or immunities of United States citizens. Id. The Fourteenth Amendment demands that each state honor each United States citizen's full privileges and immunities per the Federal United States Constitution.” Id.
The governments of the United States and of the several states that comprise the United States are distinct from one another. Colgate v. Harvey, supra, 296 U.S. at 429. The rights of a citizen under one government may be materially different from those which he has under the other. Id. To each he owes an allegiance, and, in turn, he is entitled to the protection of each in respect of such rights as fall within its jurisdiction. Id. If a person claims a right that falls within his rights by virtue of his status as a United States citizen, per the Fourteenth Amendment, no State can abridge that right.” Id., 429-430.
I MOST CERTAINLY DID CLAIM THIS TO BE THE FACT IN ALL COURTS!
FROM GET-GO: Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance 2 U.S. Dall. 304, 310--13 1795:
"No man would become a member of a community in which he could not enjoy the fruits of his honest labor and industry. The preservation of property, then, is a primary object of the social compact . . . The legislature, therefore, had no authority to make an act divesting one citizen of his freehold and vesting it in another, without a just compensation . It is inconsistent with the principles of reason, justice and moral rectitude; it is incompatible with the comfort, peace and happiness of mankind, it is contrary to the principles of social alliance in every free government, and lastly, it is contrary to the letter and spirit of the Constitution."
I HAVE LOST ACCESS TO MY LIVELIHOOD AS PER THE JUDGMENT AND LOST CAREER OPPORTUNITIES DEFENDING THIS CASE FULL TIME!
OF THE LATEST CONNECTICUT CASES ON SUBSTANTIVE INFRINGEMENTS:
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
JOHN DOE, et al., : Plaintiffs :: v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. : 3:05-cv-1256 (JCH ALBERTO GONZALES, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the : United States, et al., Defendants. :SEPTEMBER 9, 2005: ("The openness of judicial proceedings serves to preserve both the appearance and the reality of fairness in the adjudications of United States {and other} courts. It is therefore the firmly held main rule that a court may not dispose of the merits of a case on the basis of ex parte, in camera submissions.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). For good reason, our system of justice relies on the adversarial process to bring to the attention of the finder of fact the strengths and deficiencies in parties’ litigation postures. “[F]airness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided determination of facts decisive of rights.” Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Arguing that § 2709(c)’s ban on speech prohibits them from engaging in constitutionally protected speech that is relevant and perhaps crucial to an ongoing and time-sensitive national policy debate, the plaintiffs moved for preliminary relief to enjoin enforcement of § 2709(c) as to Doe’s identity. speech. "The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury." Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)(plurality opinion). The subject matter of the speech at issue in the pending motion places it at the center of First Amendment protection. “[P]olitical belief and association constitute the core of those activities protected by the First Amendment.” Id.at 356; see also Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838-39 (1978). (“Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment,there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of the Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).Section 2709(c) is subject to strict scrutiny not only because it is a prior restraint, but also because it is a content-based restriction. See Kamasinski v. Judicial Research Council, 44 F.3d 106, 109 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that confidentiality rules imposed on complainants and witnesses before the Connecticut Judicial Review Council were content-based restrictions and thus subject to strict scrutiny). Section 2709(c) "has the potential for becoming a means of suppressing a particular point of view,” that is, the view that certain federal investigative powers impose profoundly on individual civil liberties to the point that they violate our constitution. Forsyth County, 505 U.S. 123, 130-31 (1992) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The statute has the practical effect of silencing those who have the most intimate knowledge of the statute’s effect and a strong interest in advocating against the federal government’s broad investigative powers pursuant to § 2709: those who are actually subjected to the governmental authority by imposition of the non-disclosure provision. The government may intend the non-disclosure provision to serve some purpose other than the suppression of speech. Nevertheless, it has the practical impact of silencing individuals 14 with a constitutionally protected interest in speech and whose voices are particularly important to an ongoing, national debate about the intrusion of governmental authority into individual lives. The court, therefore, concludes that § 2709(c) is both a prior restraint and a content-based restriction on free speech.”
Ethics Violation pointed out in many motions:
Sec. 1-84 of the 2006 supplement to the general statutes. (l) No public official or state employee, or any person acting on behalf of a public official or state employee, shall wilfully and knowingly interfere with, influence, direct or solicit existing or new lobbying contracts, agreements or business relationships for or on behalf of any person.
I contend J. Winslow is most guilty of the violation with partiality to destroy valid KNIZE contracts on behalf of my ex-wife. Conn. Const. mandated: Art. First, SEC. 10. “All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay. Sale of defendants’ assets violated the due process clause”. The court was NOT open, and Connecticut State forced sale of my assets, through denial, without due process of the law.
To the Appellate Court, Supreme Court, J. Tiernery, Judge Winslow, Clerk: Norm Roberts: You have clearly and irreparably acted to silence me against my rights as a U. S. Citizen,
And against the natural rights of man. William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Law were the chief influence upon the legal philosophy of America's founders. Those commentaries formed the most authoritative manual of law for over 100 years following the War for Independence.Blackstone wrote to include judges as men:
"Man, considered as a creature, must necessarily be subject to the laws of his Creator, for he is entirely a dependent being . . .. And consequently, as man depends absolutely upon his Maker for everything, it is necessary that he should in all points conform to his
Maker's will. This will of his Maker is called the law of nature."
For the first time in the history of the world, a nation inculcated the Creator's will for the
government of mankind in its founding documents. Judge’s have been retrogressively imposing their own will upon government disregarding that they must act according the natural rights. This case is about being progressive about the law....Congress has the authority to overrule wrongly decided cases. Wesson v. United States, 48 F.3d 894, 901 (5th Cir. 1995). If this court what to see this case go to Congress, so be it.
I Certify that all alleged facts are true, that there is no baselessness to my claims, and that I proceed with good faith and to honor the Constitution of the United States, and the integrity of the law. I reserve the right to further pursue financial damages in this court, if granted I act in my capacity as Sui Juris as my property has been taken without due process of law.
E. REQUEST FOR RELIEF
5. WHEREFORE, plaintiff demands:
The U.S. District court to grant me Relief by Ordering that the various judgements explained be set aside and the case be Remanded , and for New Trial if deemed by the court, for the reasons stated in this document, and that actual damages of $50,000 legal fees, $530,000 property loss, $350.000 loss of work (5 years), $60,000 in overpayments of alimony and other awards, and punitive damages $5,000,000 (or for treble damages), pain and suffering $100,000, Compensatory Damages taking into account other damages claimed $100,000, General Damages $10,000; amount needed to restore the fair market value of the property, Future Damages loss of future income from stocks/interest/dividends (30 years-$1,260,000), Incidental Damages $10,000, Special Damages:$100,000 in loss of up-to date stock earnings, $30,000 in damages for loss of up-to-date interest and dividends income, $50,000 in tax payments I had to make to the IRS on account of court forced sales of stocks. Also, damages for Emotional Distress are claimed at $1,000,000. I want set aside Judgments and Orders that are found void. I will not be able to recover the unfounded awards from my ex-wife as she has spent it so, the judges, Atty O’Sullivan. and Conn. State and its officials, who caused the problems must pay the damages. I request my Court Fees and costs reimbursed by those parties. Also, I request that Connecticut Courts cease and desist from judgments which prevent Constitutionality. I request that the Connecticut Judiciary, its members acting in their private capacity, be shown leniency in terms of felonious imprisonment as I wish only that Connecticut REFORM its policies to undermine Constitutional deprivations which constitute RICO 1962 (c) and (d) or other fraud upon the court, and that injunctive relief will put them on notice to take seriously the valid claims, whether from Pro Se or not, to goose-step upon our sacred substantive rights. They must do better not to impede citizens with dubious rules. They must provide new laws to oversee obvious deprivations. The District Court must pass the issue to the Supreme Court before it should rule on failure to state a claim before Judicial Immunity is said to exist, The District Court must determine who has Original Jurisdiction on U.S. Treaties and ultimate say on interpreting the Constitution.
F. JURY DEMAND
6. Do you wish to have a jury trial? Yes X__ No______
_____________________________ ______________________________
Original signature of attorney (if any) Plaintiff's Original Signature
______________________________
Printed Name Printed Name
Attorney’s full address and telephone Plaintiff’s full address and telephone
Email address if available Email address if available
DECLARATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY
The undersigned declares under penalty of perjury that he/she is the plaintiff in
the above action, that he/she has read the above complaint and that the information
contained in the complaint is true and correct. 28 U.S.C. § 1746; 18 U.S.C. § 1621.
Executed at _________________________ on ________________________.
(location) (date)
Defendant’s Original Signature
Without Prejudice UCC 1-207
Francis C. P. Knize;
Defendant Pro Se / Sui Juris
50 Sunset Pass
Wilton, Ct 06897
203 544 9603
Members of OK ART EXHIBTIONS, LTD on behalf of claims against the company.
Mr. Peter A. Knize as President of the Corporation and as member
Mrs. Lili Knize, Christine Knize, Fred M. Knize, Fred Knize, Jr. Chris Knize, Daniel Knize
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
CERTIFICATION
TO: U. S. SUPREME COURT; WASHINGTON
FRANCIS C. P. KNIZE PLAINTIFF PRO SE; SUI JURIS V.
WAVERLY M. KNIZE DEFENDANT
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
Nov 18 06
NOTICE TO CLERK ***IMPORTANT**** and Judges
!) Concise Statement of the case follows the Certified Questions and Jurisdiction Sections and are not Voluminous. The Motions at the Appendix show proof when the issues were raised and speak for themselves as a matter of record. The record shows the pleadings were timely
2) To add to all the copies your request concerning 14 g by letter is time and expense prohibitive by a Pro Se plaintiff
3) Your request for 14 i need not be addressed because I am formally requesting the Supreme Court to request the entire file from Connecticut for FA 02 0190291S, AC 25532, AC 27692, as it is cost and time prohibitive the the Plaintiff, being unable to pay for them to apprehend the entire file.
I very much appreciate your understanding of these matters.
Francis Knize
TO: U. S. SUPREME COURT; WASHINGTON
FRANCIS C. P. KNIZE PLAINTIFF PRO SE; SUI JURIS V.
WAVERLY M. KNIZE DEFENDANT
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
Feb 8 07
NOTICE TO CLERK ***IMPORTANT**** and Judges
Please consult with Gail Johnson, we talked over the phone that the clerk missed seeing the Statement of the Case and concise argument for reasons relied upon for Allowance of the Writ., and that the two requirements were placed together. She has accepted the explanation and confirms all is in order and timely for the WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS . Please process the Appeal and please immediately order a STAY of execution, and send back the Stay Order so that the plaintiff can have the possibility to rightfully obtain justice before a lower court executes post judgment. The Stay is an EMERGENCY.
Thank You,
Francis Knize
50 Sunset Pass
Wilton, CT 06897
203 544 9603
TO: U. S. SUPREME COURT; WASHINGTON
FRANCIS C. P. KNIZE PLAINTIFF PRO SE; SUI JURIS V.
WAVERLY M. KNIZE DEFENDANT
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
Statement of the Case and a statement of the facts, and a direct and concise argument amplifying the
reasons relied on for the allowance of the writ :
Essentially, this court should settle an important question of first impression about just how far acourt may go to limit grievances (Ist Am) to be heard though its limitations on brief sizes. Should it
be allowed through first amendment rights and Due Process that a court can consider the number of
cited plain errors from a given judge and justify a rightful need for parties to have at least 3 pages
for each numbered plain error? Mr. Knize found some 44 plain errors from the original trial court
judge, and he needed at least 3 pages for each issue. He believes the Constitution guarantees a right
to have ALL of one’s grievances heard BEFORE any court can seek to use administrative rules
2) to suppress any particular grievance. When Mr. Knize then requested that the various lower courts prove its burden to impede his fundamental rights under the STRICT SCRUTINY DOCTRINE, and produce a finding which will answer to such alleged deprivation, they simply denied and dismissed the case.
The original trial court judge (Winslow) failed so many legal precedents of divorce court rulings,
mostly concerning the VERY PUBLIC INTEREST of a citizen’’s rights to contract, that the defendant (I,Mr. Knize) felt compelled to address them all to settle the controversies and conflicts that the court itself created. J. Winslow, under so many (rumored) complaints by various lawyers, was soon after REMOVED from divorce court and was transferred to criminal court into another jurisdiction. The State of Connecticut was trying to hide the bad discretions of a judge by transferring her, and then tried to cover-up the problems of the KNIZE case by laying me victim to her inappropriate rulings, by being unwilling to overturn her unlawful judgments by denying my post judgment requests to Vacate her Orders, grant me relief to her void judgments, denying me rightful premises to have a new trial, denying me the clear probable causes to Open the Judgment. As a result, I have lost all of my property, which, under the Constitution’’s right to property clause, I was to be guaranteed a fair trial, yet Due Process was violated.at every turn. Most significant in all of this was the fact that I always pleaded that a certain Limited Liability Company I had shares in, secured my protection from being responsible for any underlying asset value it held, and that my Shareholder Agreement would upon my corporate demand be valued at a nominal value of $11,500. The contract was in evidence. Yet I was jailed until I had to sell public stocks I held, which Judge Winslow declared as my separate property, and give my ex-wife $400,000. Was this was not fraud as defined by Kenner? "Fraud upon the court" has been defined by the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals to "embrace that species of fraud which does, or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery can not perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication." Kenner v. C.I.R., 387 F.3d 689 (1968); 7 Moore's Federal Practice, 2d ed., p. 512, ¶¶¶¶60.23. The 7th Circuit further stated "a decision produced by fraud upon the court is not in essence a decision at all, and never becomes
final."
Were J. Winslow’’s judgments then to be considered NOT final? It seems the courts would rather hold to it’’s Unconstitutionally Vague 35 page limitation rule for brief size (I had motioned to exceed but was denied), and leave the issue unaddressed by Connecticut; than to obey its own laws on Limited Companies (C.G.S. 34-167) or the Florida equivalent laws; whereby a non-controlling member is not liable for the underlying assets of a company) and other laws it had in place.
In KNIZE there were so many violations of court procedure and against the right to the mutual Prenuptial Agreement, and a certain House Agreement of 1991, whereby J. Winslow pleaded for the plaintiff and acted on non-pleaded requests with highly questionable legal references. She ruled WITHOUT JURISDICTION concerning the Florida contract, of which the forum state was Florida. Connecticut was without jurisdiction, and this shows reason for the application of KENNER.
J. Winslow’’s response to my Articulations proved clearly and convincingly she ruled against RUBIN where she found that the Limited company was speculative, and yet ruled unresponsively that I was required to distribute the asset anyway.
This was preposterous and unfitting of a judge and served to defy the administration of justice, put the
integrity of the court into disrepute, and attacked the machinery of the court. The question is posed
to the U.S. Supreme Court how far should it go to protect lower court judges? Where should the rights
of contracts and citizens have precedent over a judge who exercised clear unlawful discretion? Does
the Supreme Court want to create conflicts of law by protecting one of its own, over the need to
exercise consistency of law? And how about Chief Justice Sullivan, as courts know around the nation
was found guilty for fixing Connecticut’’s judicial nominations, and who influenced in KNIZE the panel of State Supreme judges to not accept a Motion to file late because they found no probable cause around the fact that one’’s mother suddenly was in critical condition due to a car accident a few days before a motion was due? I was called by my family to go to my mother because she might not live the weekend. Yet, the court unethically denied that this was a probable cause to file late.
Connecticut’’s Judicial review Council didn’’t want to touch the question. The higher courts dismissed my case on that filing of a reconsideration. Yet, having timely filed in Superior Court with their promise they’d send it up to the Supreme Court, I found out when I got back from Florida that instead the Clerk threw the motion away. That incident coupled with the failure for the higher courts to answer for its proof of jurisdiction under Strict Scrutiny under what authority they functioned to deny me First Amendment rights to have ALL of my grievances heard, ruined my fair chance for a fair trial on the issues alleged, and they ignored my requests that Connecticut stop from breaking its own laws and those of the U.S. Constitutions’’, which led the case into Post Judgment proceedings. I have been enormously harmed by the court’’s actions. I ask the U.S. Supreme court to grant me Relief by Ordering that the case be Remanded for the reasons stated in this document. Important Federal
Questions must be answered in the U. S. Supreme Court as a last resort concerning the right to have
grievances heard, according to U. S. Constitution's Amendments 1,5,10,14, and Equal protection of the
laws concerning the Connecticut Constitution under Sec 8 Art 1,5,17/Sec 10 & 14, 28 U.S.C. 2072 (b)
and C.G.S. 51-14. I REQUEST that I may give ORAL ARGUMENTS AND TESTIFY TO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT.
Francis C. P. Knize; Plaintiff
TO: U. S. SUPREME COURT; WASHINGTON
FRANCIS C. P. KNIZE PLAINTIFF PRO SE; SUI JURIS V.
WAVERLY M. KNIZE DEFENDANT
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
Pages for Certified Questions:
1. Was “Color Of Law” violations in KNIZE lead to deprivation of fundamental rights to life, liberty, and property and thus motivated this Title 42 Section 1983/1985 claim. Did The Plaintiff have a constitutional right to submit and have accepted his over-limitation page briefs (Pleaded unconstitutionally vague laws) and have a guaranteed right to be fully heard under Rule 50 through 52 FRCP VI; TRIALS, and Connecticut Constitution Art? Did the plaintiff rest his case, and was he deprived of due process upon fundamental right claims? An untested Separation of Powers question must be certified on content/ associational rights. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220––21, 92 S. Ct. 1526, 32 L. Ed. 2d 15 [1972] . . . .’’’’ [Citations omitted.]); Keogh v. Bridgeport, 187 Conn. 53, 66, 444 A.2d 225 (1982) (‘‘‘‘[w]hen a statutory classification . . . affects a fundamental personal right, the statute is subject to strict scrutiny and is justified only by a compelling state interest’’’’).
2. Were Conn’s. Brief limitation and Argument time limitations rules “so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926) ? SEE App 1 about Vague Laws.
3. Does the vagueness doctrine require precise standards for enforcement? "A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application : Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972). The vagueness doctrine is particularly significant when a regulation or rule affects a fundamental right such as free speech. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 196 (1977) ("We have taken special care to insist on fair warning when a statute regulates expression and implicates First Amendment values."). The precision is necessary to prevent self imposed constraints on the exercise of fundamental rights. "Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to 'steer far wider of the unlawful zone' than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked." Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109 (quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964)).
4) Did violations exist of Title 18, U.S.C., Section 245 Federally Protected Activities A. Laws: Cases and Codes U.S. Code Title 18 Section 245? The existence of the conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence but may be inferred from all of the facts and circumstances of the case. United States v. Vergara, 687 F.2d 57, 61 (5th Cir. 1982). A common purpose and plan may be inferred from "a development and collocation of circumstances." Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). See United States v. Morado, 454 F.2d 167, 174 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 917 (1972). A conspiracy is a combination of two or more persons to accomplish some unlawful purpose, or to accomplish a lawful purpose by unlawful means. Thus, a conspiracy is a kind of partnership in criminal purposes in which each member becomes the agent of every other member. The gist of the offense is a combination or agreement to violate or disregard the law. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 11 (1954). The agreement between the co-conspirators need not be express or formal, but may be inferred by the defendants' conduct. See Direct Sales v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 714 (1943). The evidence must also show that each defendant knowingly and willfully participated in the unlawful plan with the intent to advance or further some object or purpose of the conspiracy. To participate knowingly and willfully means to participate voluntarily and with the specific intent to do some act which the law forbids. See United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 686-687 (1975) (intent for conspiracy is same as criminal intent required for underlying offense). If a defendant, with understanding of the unlawful character of a plan, intentionally encouraged, advised, or assisted for the purpose of furthering the undertaking or scheme, he thereby became a knowing and willful participant and co-conspirator. The third element requires proof that one or more of the co-conspirators knowingly committed one or more of the overt acts alleged in the Indictment in furtherance of the conspiracy. It is not necessary that the conspirators succeed in accomplishing their purpose and, in fact, they may have failed in so doing. United States v. Cuni, 689 F.2d 1353, 1356 (11th Cir. 1982). In addition, the United States is not limited to proving the overt acts alleged in the Indictment but can show any act of the conspirators occurring during the life of the conspiracy for the purpose of proving it. Reese v. United States, 353 F.2d 732, 734 (5th Cir. 1965).
5. Was there a violation of Section 2236 Laws: Cases and Codes |U.S. Code Title 42 Section 1983 and Sec. 1985: Civil action for deprivation of rights? 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473 (1961).,Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473 (1961). 6 Treatise on Constitutional Law, Section 19.16 (1999), pg. 64, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (1978), Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304 (1989).
9 Id. at 70, Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 112 S.Ct. 358 (1991), Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Company, 457 U.S. 922, 935, note 18, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2753, note 18 (1982).West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 108 S.Ct. 2250 (1988); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152-90 S.Ct. 1598, 1605
6. Did there exist an appearance and reality of impropriety for Pattern and Practice Laws: Cases and Codes U.S. Code Title 42 Section 14141? WAS THERE PROBABLE CAUSE BY ALL COURTS: PATTERNS OF VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY? Did Title 42, U.S.C., Section 14141, make it unlawful for state or local law enforcement agencies to allow officers of the court or public officials (judges) to engage in a pattern or practice of conduct that deprives persons of rights protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.? This law is commonly referred to as the officials’ Misconduct Statute. This law gives the U. S Supreme Court and DOJ the authority to seek reversals in cases where it is determined that state Judiciaries have policies or practices which foster a pattern of misconduct by employees and public officials. This action is directed against a unconstitutionally vague state judiciary and involve issues which initiate Pattern and Practice review. KNIZE falls under 14141 See cases in body.
7) Did the court act TO DEPRIVE A CITIZEN OF HIS FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS TO PROPERTY RELATING TO U.S. LAWS, State Laws, cannons broken upon the claims: Conn. Stat. 51-14? "Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right nor the jurisdiction of any of the courts." U.S . Const. Am 14. B) Automatic Presumption for Unconstitutionality of Stat. Sec. 51-15; within the authority of a judge to administer Statute authority to enforce PB rules, or STAT Sec. 51-164t. (a), in relation to and application of PB Sections 4-6 and 62-7, Judgment must use Strict Scrutiny, C) Violation: The U.S. Const. Equal Protection of the Laws D) Violation: Connecticut Constitution Sections 8, Articles 1st and 5th/ Section 14/ Section 10 concerning denials to increase brief size- associational and content rights are claimed/ justice administered to prevent an injustice through Const. examinations and PB 1-8 E) Subject Matter Jurisdictional proofs Violations F) Violation: Article VI of the U.S. Constitution/ Judge Cannons 1, 2, and 3: Const. Law/ PB 1-8 G) Violation: UNDER STATUTE Sec. 51-14, any judge had a duty to cast out Vague Laws reviewed through Strict Test. H) Violation: PB Sec 24-20 - lack of SMJ for superceding state laws upon non-negotiable associational rights {Am 10 U.S. Const.} Sec.10-33. Nestor v Hersey, 425 F. 2d 504 acts void absent proof of jurisdiction on record. Violation of 18 U.S.C, 242, 28 U.S.C.A. §§1332, 28 U.S.C.A. §§§§1332, 1332(c), U.S. 1st, 4th, 5th, 14th, 10th, Obstruction of Justice by undermining the government; U.S.C. TITLE 18 > PART I > CHAPTER 73 > § 1505?
8. Were there Judicial actions AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY (was policy frustrated) for “Spirit of Restraint”? 9. KNIZE showed violations of U.S. Const. Am. XlV; U.S. CODE Title 28, Part V, Chapter 131 Release date: 2003-05-1 §§ 2072. Rules of procedure and evidence; power to prescribe. “(b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.” Connecticut Stat. 51-14 reiterates the principle; showing an Equal Protection Claim. CERTIFY: WERE RULES ABRIDGING FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS?
10. Did the court violate Mr. Knize's rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Tenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; Article 1, Sections 10 and 12 of the Connecticut Constitution; as well as rights to be free from false habeas seizing, illegal imprisonment and gender discrimination under the laws of the United States and the State of Connecticut?
JURSDICTION
Concerning: Motion to Vacate Orders Sept 22, 05. Sept 6, 05 Demand, Oct 13, 05 Dismissal, Feb 28, 06 Demands for jurisdiction WHICH THEN RELATED TO March 31/April 5, 06 Dismissals for JURISDICTION, STAY, REVIEW and Motion for Reconsideration May 05, and on Oct 18th 06 AC 27692 Motion For Discretionary Stay.
Whereas this action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. ' 1983 and the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and the laws of the State of Connecticut. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the federal claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 1331, 1343 (3-4). Supplemental jurisdiction is asserted over state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C ' 1367.
Whereas Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 1391(b) in that the plaintiff's claims arose in the State of Connecticut. Whereas TITLE 42 > CHAPTER 126 > SUBCHAPTER IV > § 12202 State immunity A State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
Whereas Jurisdiction to grant declaratory judgment is conferred by 28 U.S.C. '' 2201, 2202. An award of court costs and fees is authorized pursuant to 42 U.S.C. ' 1988.
Whereas Jurisdiction of this court is invoked under the provisions of Title 42,CHAPTER 136 , SUBCHAPTER IX,PART B, Sec. 14141. - Cause of Action (a) Unlawful conduct) of the United States Code..
The U.S. Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction in cases involving questions arising under the Connecticut or United States Constitutions. The Supreme Court of the United States, highest court in
the United States and the chief authority in the judicial branch, one of three branches of the United
States federal government. The Supreme Court hears appeals from decisions of lower federal courts
and state supreme courts, and it resolves issues of constitutional and federal law. It stands as the
ultimate authority in constitutional interpretation through Constitution’s Article lll.
-
DOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO
List of the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of counsel indicating the name of the party or parties each counsel represents. It is not necessary that service on each party required to be served be made in the same manner or
evidenced by the same proof. Proof of service may consist of any one of the following:
Abuse of process. Malicious prosecution
TO: U. S. SUPREME COURT; WASHINGTON Docket 06-9419
FRANCIS C. P. KNIZE PLAINTIFF PRO SE; SUI JURIS V.
WAVERLY M. KNIZE DEFENDANT
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
MOTION FOR STAY UNDER RULE 23 AND 28 USC SEC 2101 (F)
Identifying a judgement: DENIED and DISMISSED: Stay on April 5, 06, Stay on Oct 18th 06 from the Appellate/Supreme Court. It is imperative that this court grant the Plaintiff a stay before an injustice will occur concerning assets that will unjustifiably be transferred to the Defendant, as issues are yet engaged by a dispute over a contract rights, which will be REOPENED should this court find in the Plaintiff’s favor. Also, the Plaintiff is under threat of paying addition lawyer fees to the defendant, but the Plaintiff is confident the U.S. Supreme Court will find that the Conn. Courts violated due process and its rulings were VOID and therefore all following judgments were Void. “{Voidness} occurs when the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction or jurisdiction over the parties, when the "court's action involves a plain usurpation of power or if the court has acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law." Id. at 224-25 (footnotes omitted); see also Orner v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1307, 1310 (10th Cir. 1994)
Why relief is not available (Rule 23.3) The Conn. Appellate/Supreme Court denied and dismissed every Stay requested, while at the same time did not prove their jurisdiction on the issues raised in all courts. J. Winslow ruled without jurisdiction on Florida contracts, did not follow the rule of law for Conn. Stat 33-167 or Florida equivalent. ("[A] judgment may be void for purposes of Rule 60(b)(4) if entered in a manner inconsistent with due process."). 18 US Code Sec. 2511 (d)(20) A conspirator is responsible for the acts of other conspirators who have left the conspiracy before he joined it, or joined after he left it; statutes of limitations tolled for previous acts when each new act is done. US v. GUEST, 86 S.Ct. 1170; US V.COMPAGNA, 146 F.2d 524. The Supreme court Panels which consistently denied and dismissed Jurisdictional challenges, did so under the appearance and reality of conspiracy or at least showed a historic Pattern of Improprieties, therefor fairness dictates RELIEF through this Motion For STAY until U.S. Supreme determinations. A True Copy of this Motion was delivered to the Defendant March 4, 2007
Francis Knize Plaintiff Pro Se 50 Sunset Pass, Wilton Conn. 06897 203 544 9603
To: CLERK OF U. S. SUPREME COURT; WASHINGTON
FRANCIS C. P. KNIZE
PLAINTIFF PRO SE; SUI JURIS
V.
WAVERLY M. KNIZE
DEFENDANT
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
PLEASE AKNOWLEDGE THAT THE CONTENTS OF THE FOLLOWING WERE AND ARE BEING SENT BACK TO THE U.S. Supreme Court AFTER CORRECTIONS WERE MADE. PLEASE OBSERVE THE RECORD OF GALE JOHNSON, CLERK WHO MADE A NOTATION THAT THIS WAS INDEED THE CASE, THAT THE COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE SENT THESE PAPERS BACK TO ME, WHICH IS FURTHER DELAYING THIS CASE. DO NOT SEND THESE PAPERS BACK, THEY ARE TIMELY SUMBITTED, READ THE RECORD, DO YOUR JOB PROPERLY. Enter documents into the file.
THANKS
Francis C. P. Knize
203 544 9603
DOCKET NUMBER:
U. S. SUPREME COURT; WASHINGTON
FRANCIS C. P. KNIZE
PLAINTIFF PRO SE; SUI JURIS
V.
WAVERLY M. KNIZE
DEFENDANT
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TABLE OF CONTENTS:
PREFACE: Statement of the Case and concise argument for reasons relied upon for Allowance of the Writ.
PG 1: 1. Whereas “Color Of Law” violations in KNIZE led to deprivation of fundamental rights to life, liberty, and property and thus motivated this Title 42 Section 1983/1985 claim. The vagueness doctrine
PG 3: Preliminary Statement:
PG 4: 2. Whereas the HISTORY of the KNIZE CASE shows the Conn. Supreme Court was not faithful to the Law.
PG 5: Concerning the Conn. Court’s failure to place on record proof of Its Jurisdiction
PG 5: 4. Whereas: Mr. Knize challenged the state’s brief size limitations on content and associational infringements in all the courts.
PG 6: Probable Causes
PG 7: 4b. Mr. Knize requests relief from the May 2004 Memorandum judgment and denials for proof of Subject matter Jurisdiction now invokes Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4), which provides relief from a judgment that is void.
PG 8: 5-5f. Whereas: Were there the following Violations through said denials? It is an abuse of discretion and perhaps power for one or more persons acting under color of law to willfully deprive or conspire to deprive another person of any right protected by the Constitution or laws of United States.
PG 16: 6. Wheareas:; Did the court act TO DEPRIVE A CITIZEN OF HIS FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS TO PROPERTY RELATING TO U. S. LAWS, State Laws, cannons broken upon the claims: Conn. Stat. 51-14? "Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right nor the jurisdiction of any of the courts." U.S . Const. Am 14.
PG 17: 7. Whereas: Were there Judicial actions AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY (was policy frustrated) for “Spirit of Restraint”?
PG 17: 8. Whereas: KNIZE showed violations of U.S. Const. Am. XlV; U.S. CODE Title 28, Part V, Chapter 131 Release date: 2003-05-1 §§ 2072. Rules of procedure and evidence; power to prescribe. “(b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.”
PG 18: 9. Whereas: Did the court violate Mr. Knize's rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Tenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; Article 1, Sections 10 and 12 of the Connecticut Constitution; as well as rights to be free from false habeas seizing, illegal imprisonment and gender discrimination under the laws of the United States and the State of Connecticut?
PG 22; Numbers 1-16; WHEREFORE, the plaintiff requests that this Court:
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES WITH PAGE REFERENCES AND WHERE FOUND IN DOCUMENT
Alexandru v. Strong, 81 Conn. App. 68, 79,837 A.2d 875, 268 Conn. 906, 845 A.2d 406 -04 Pg 10
Albrecht v U.S., 273 U.S. 1. Pg 5
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552. Pg 5 App 2
Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223, 233. Pg 4 App 2
Basso v. U.P.L., 495 F 2d. 906, Pg 5
Bernal v. Fainter 467 U.S. 216, 227 (1984)" Pg 18 Pg 22
Brookfield Const. Co. v. Stewart, 284 F.Supp. 94. Pg 5
Brooks v. Yawkey, 200 F. 2d 633 Pg 24
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 Pg 11
City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) Pg 1
Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) Pg 2
Cook County.v. CLIFFORD ANDERSON, 097 FIRST DIVISION September 27, 2004 No. 1-03-1615 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appeal from the Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 86 CR 16841 ) Pg 14
Colgate v. Harvey, supra, 296 U.S. at 428. Pg 3
Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926) Pg 1
City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 770 (1988). Pg 2
DISTRICT OF NEVADA CASE NO: CV - S-03-0281-LDG-RJJ U.S. V. SCHIFF, NEUN COHEN Pg 5
Dykes v. Hoseman, 743 F.2d 1488 (11th, 1984). Pg 21
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) Pg 1
Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109 (quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964)).
Griffin v. Mathews, 310 Supp. 341, 423 F. 2d 272, Pg 5
Huminski,173 Vt. at 520, 787 A.2d at 492; Pg 14
Jennings v. Hicklin, 587 F.2d 946, 948 (8th Cir. 19)
Joyce v. U.S. 474 2D 215. Pg 5
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983)
Latana v. Hopper, 102 F. 2d 188; Chicago v. New York 37 F Supp. 150 Pg 5
Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law 12-31, at 1033-35 (2d ed. 1988) Pg 5
Lease Partners Corp., 329 Ill. App. 3d at 76-77, 768 N.E.2d at 59. Pg 14
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 196 (1977)
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177, Pg 23
McNutt v. G.M., 56 S. Ct. 789,80 L. Ed. 1135,
Melo v. US, 505 F2d 1026. Pg 10
Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95, 97 (1948) APP 1
Morrison v State, Mo App., 252 S.W2d 97, 101.OLD WAYNE MUT. L. ASSOC. v. McDONOUGH, 204 U. S. 8, 27 S. Ct. 236 (1907). Pg 10
Munson, 467 U.S. 950, 967 (1985). Pg20
NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307. Pg 18
Nestor v Hersey, 425 F. 2d 504 Pg 17
Norwood v. Renfield, 34 C 329; Ex parte Giambonini, 49 P. 732.
OLD WAYNE MUT. L. ASSOC. v. McDONOUGH, 204 U. S. 8, 27 S. Ct. 236 (1907). Pg 24
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) Pg 19
Orner v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1307, 1310 (10th Cir. 1994) Pg 8
Osborn, 848 P.2d at 241; Pg 14
Palmer, 53 Ill. 2d at 484, 292 N.E.2d at 382 Pg 14
Riley, 487 U.S. at 795-98. Pg 20
Rosemond v. Lambert, 469 F 2d 416 Pg 5
Roth v. Weston 789 A.2d 431, 441 (Conn.2002). Pg 15
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, at 404); [476 U.S. 693, 707] Pg 11
Stuck v Medical Eaminers, 94 Ca.2d 751, 211 P. 2s 389 . Pg 5 Pg 24
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 553 (1975). Pg 2
Stump v. Sparkman Pg 22
Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 67 S. Ct. 810, 91 L.Ed. 967 (1947) Pg 17
Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717-718 (1981) Pg 11
Thomson v. Gaskiel, 62 S. Ct. 673, 83 L. Ed. 111, Pg 5
US v. GUEST, 86 S.Ct. 1170; US V.COMPAGNA, 146 F.2d 524. Pg 8
United States v. Lee 106 U.S. 196, 220 Pg 19
9 U.S. 115 United States v. Peters Pg 23
Valerie D., 223 Conn. 492, 534, 613 A.2d 748 (1992). Pg 18
Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982).
V.T.A., Inc. v. Airco, Inc., 597 F.2d 220, 224 (10th Cir. 1979). Pg 7
Wilkin v. Sunbeam Corp., 466 F.2d 714, 717 (10th Cir. 1972). Pg 3
Wilmer v. Board of County Comm'rs, 69 F.3d 406, 409 (10th Cir. 1995). Pg 7
Yapp v. Excel Corp., 186 F.3d 1222, 1231 (10th Cir. 1999). 100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980). Pg 3
June 30, 2006 TO UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT; WASHINGTON DC
FRANCIS C. P. KNIZE Plaintiff, Vs.
WAVERLY KNIZE Defendant
AC 25532 and FA 02 0190291S Connecticut Cases
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari; UNDER Rule 39. Proceedings In Forma Pauperis;
1. Whereas “Color Of Law” violations in KNIZE led to deprivation of fundamental rights to life, liberty, and property and thus motivated this Title 42 Section 1983/1985 claim. Did The Plaintiff have a constitutional right to submit and have accepted his over-limitation page briefs (Pleaded unconstitutionally vague laws) and have a guaranteed right to be fully heard under Rule 50 through 52 FRCP VI; TRIALS, and Connecticut Constitution Art? Did the plaintiff rest his case, and was he deprived of due process upon fundamental right claims? An untested Separation of Powers question must be certified on content/ associational rights.
Were Conn’s. Brief limitation and Argument time limitations rules “so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926) ? SEE App 1 about Vague Laws.
Does the vagueness doctrine require precise standards for enforcement? "A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application : Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972). A local ordinance or rule that vests too much discretion in those responsible for its enforcement is inconsistent with the second goal of the vagueness doctrine and is likely to be found to violate it. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) (holding loitering ordinance void for vagueness because it allowed virtually untrammeled discretion by the police in enforcement); Kolender v. Lawson, 461
1
U.S. 352 (1983) (striking down ordinance that requires persons to identify themselves and their purpose to police on demand); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) (rejecting a loitering ordinance in part because of its "obvious invitation to discriminatory enforcement against those whose association together is 'annoying' because their ideas, their lifestyle, or their physical appearance is resented by the majority of their fellow citizens."). The vagueness doctrine is particularly significant when a regulation or rule affects a fundamental right such as free speech. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 196 (1977) ("We have taken special care to insist on fair warning when a statute regulates expression and implicates First Amendment values."). The precision is necessary to prevent self-imposed constraints on the exercise of fundamental rights. "Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to 'steer far wider of the unlawful zone' than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked." Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109 (quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964)).
Thus, if Practice Book Rule "interferes with the right of free speech a more stringent vagueness test should apply." Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982).
Moreover, a vague law creates additional concerns with enforcement since "the danger of censorship and of abridgment of our precious First Amendment freedoms is too great where officials have unbridled discretion over a forum's use." Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 553 (1975). Accordingly, the courts will not presume that the public official responsible for administering a legislative policy will act in good faith and respect a speaker's First Amendment rights; rather, the vagueness "doctrine requires that the limits the [government] claims are implicit in its law be made explicit by textual incorporation, binding judicial or administrative construction, or well-established practice." City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 770 (1988).
Thus, a vague Practice Book law or policy has the potential to create significant constitutional problems for adjudication well beyond the realm of procedural due process. Conclusion: Due process of law is not only constitutionally guaranteed, but its basic concept of fairness in legal proceedings is an ancient one.
2
The ancient Egyptians required judges to hear both sides of a case. The Greeks and Romans used juries and professional orators. Due process of law is also a cornerstone of the American experience brought to this continent at the beginning of European settlement. It is a fundamental part of the compact between the American government, at all levels, and every American.
Thus, procedural due process is one of the most important legal concepts and duties for state government officials. A State cannot, per the Fourteenth Amendment, abridge the privileges of a United States citizen, even when a person is a resident of a State which tries to do so. Colgate v. Harvey, supra, 296 U.S. at 428. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits any State from abridging the privileges or immunities of United States
citizens. Id. The Fourteenth Amendment demands that each state honor each United States citizen's full privileges and immunities per the Federal United States Constitution. Id. The governments of the United States and of the several states that comprise the United States are distinct from one another. Colgate v. Harvey, supra, 296 U.S. at 429. The rights of a citizen under one government may be materially different
from those which he has under the other. Id. To each he owes an allegiance, and, in turn, he is entitled to the protection of each in respect of such rights as fall within its jurisdiction. Id. If a person claims a right that falls within his rights by virtue of his status as a United States citizen, per the Fourteenth Amendment, no State can abridge that right. Id., 429-430. Francis Knize asserted those rights in this case.
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