LACK OF SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION
As a matter of law, there is no presumption of subject-matter jurisdiction in a statutory proceeding, such as in divorce. Subject-matter jurisdiction has been denied in this case. Until and unless the original Petitioner proves that subject-matter jurisdiction in all of its elements and in all situations have been met, and at the proper time, the court is devoid of any subject-matter jurisdiction.
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D. Final Thoughts: Fraud and the Economic Loss Rule
Fraud—scienter or intentional misrepresentation—is an economic tort
primarily invoked in bargaining transactions, See 2 DOBBS ON TORTS, supra note 2, § 469. and has been recognized for
centuries as a ground for recovery. To the extent that the economic loss rule
forecloses a tort claim for scienter fraud, it seems to radically change the law as ithas been traditionally applied for a very long time. And perhaps not only the law
of fraud but also the law of mistake, because innocent mutual and basic mistakes,
whether generated by misrepresentation or not, would have traditionally warranted
rescission74 and in contemporary law would warrant damages that are more or less
equivalent to the costs of rescission. . 2 DOBBS ON TORTS, supra note 2, § 483.
Conversion of or trespass to intangibles, not possible in earlier law, are
now sometimes accepted as torts. Negligent interference with intangibles that
causes economic harm can easily be imagined.
., Fifield Manor v. Finston, 354 P.2d 1073 (Cal. 1960) (holding that
subrogation for a transferee’s loss would in effect permit assignment of a personal injury
claim in violation of law).mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm
"[S]peech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the
essence of self-government." Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75
(1964). Accordingly, the Court has frequently reaffirmed that speech on
public issues occupies the "`highest rung of the heirarchy of First
Amendment values,'" and is entitled to special protection. NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S.
455, 467 (1980).
the commands of King George III
still apply and to speak out against a judge of the Court
of King's Bench, is still considered treason because
it is lawful for a judge to violate your rights as underthe common law of England, a judge is granted this privilege
by the King and even Judges in Colorado are above the law
and even though the First Continental Congress revoked
the commands of King George III
still apply and to speak out against a judge of the Court
of King's Bench, is still considered treason because
it is lawful for a judge to violate your rights as under
the common law of England, a judge is granted this privilege
by the King and even Judges in Colorado are above the law
and even though the First Continental Congress revoked
immunity for judges in 1774 by a POSITIVE REVOCATION
OF SAME, immunity for judges in 1774 by a POSITIVE REVOCATION
OF SAME,
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is, in
> > fact, legally bound by her oath(s) as a public servant, officer of the
> court and as an attorney to the constitution of the United States of American and
> by the constitution of the state of Florida to be directly and fully
> accountable to me as "One of the People" of the state of Florida pursuant to her lawful
> > contractual obligation (by contract see: oath(s)) and public duty. See: "
lllllllllllllllllllllllbut government employees can be dismissed when the incriminating information that they refuse to provide relates to the performance of their job. Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 277-278, 88 S.Ct. 1913, 1915-1916, 20 L.Ed.2d 1082 (1968).
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government employees can be fired for that reason." Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 147, 103
> S.Ct. 1684, 1690, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983). "Equitable estoppel, and/or estoppel in pais, is applied in this case, because conduct committed by you and other officers of the court in your
willful failure to prove an otherwise important fact
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acting "corporately" as an officer of the court through the corporation
> > known as the Corporate State of Florida -
> > See: Brink's Inc. v. City of New York, 717 F.2d 700, 708-10 (2d Cir.
> 1983)
> > held that the employees' refusal to testify was akin to a vicarious
> admission by Brink's. And Cerro Gordo Charity v. Fireman's Fund American Life
> > Insurance Co., 819 F.2d 1471 (8th Cir. 1987). And HALE v. HENKEL, 201
> U.S. 43 (1906)
he certainly cannot set up the privilege of a
> corporation.
> > As the combination or conspiracies provided against by the Sherman> antitrust
> > act can ordinarily be proved only by the testimony of parties thereto, in
> > the person of their agents or employees, the privilege claimed would
> > practically nullify the whole act of Congress. Of what use would it
> be for
> > the
> > legislature to declare these combinations unlawful if the judicial
> power may
> > close
> > the door of access to every available source of information upon the
> subject?
> > Indeed, so strict is the rule that the privilege is a personal one that it
> > has been held in some cases that counsel will not be allowed to make the
> > objection. We hold that the questions should have been answered.".
Such
> > estoppel
> > arises where Dorothy Hauge is under a duty to another to speak or
> failure to
> > speak is inconsistent with honest dealings and is acting in bad faith.
> See:
> > Silence, to work "estoppel", must amount to bad faith, Wise v. United
> > States, D.C.Ky., 38 F.Supp. 130, 134; and, elements or essentials of such
> > estoppel> > include: change of position to prejudice of person claiming estoppel,
> > Sherlock v. Greaves, 106 Mont. 206, 76 P.2d 87, 91; damages if the
> estoppel
> > is
> > denied, James v. Nelson, C.C.A.Alaska, 90 F.2d 910, 917; duty and
> opportunity
> > to
> > speak, Merry. V. Garibaldi, 48 Cal.App.2d 397, 119 P{.2d 768; 771;
> ignorance
> > of the facts by person claiming estoppel to alter his position;
> knowledge of
> > facts and of rights by person estopped, Consolidated Freight Lines v.
> > Groenen,
> > 10 Wash2d 672, 117 P.2d 966, 968; misleading of party claiming estoppel,
> > Lincoln v. Bennett, Tex.Civ.App., 135 S.W.2d 632, 636; reliance upon
> silence
> > of
> > party sought to be estopped, New York Life Ins. Co. v. Talley, C.C.A.
> Iowa,
> > 72 F.2d 715, 718."
> > "Estoppel by Acquiescence" See: "Acquiescence is a species of estoppel.
> > An estoppel arises where party aware of his rights sees other party acting
> > upon mistaken notion of his rights. Injury accruing form> one's acquiescence
> > in
> > another's action to his prejudice creates "estoppel". Lebold v. Inland
> > Steel Co., C.C.A.Ill., 125 F.2d 369, 375. Passive conduct on the part
> of one
> > who
> > has knowledge of the facts may be basis of estoppel Winslow v. Burns, 47
> > N.M. 29, 132 P.2d 1048, 1050. It must appear that party to be
> estopped was
> > bound in equity and good conscience to speak and that party claiming
> estoppel
> > relied upon acquiescence and was misled thereby to change his position
> to his
> > prejudice. Sherlock v. Greaves, 105 Mont. 206, 76 P.2d 87, 91.
> "Silence is a
> > species of conduct, and constitutes an implied representation of the
> > existence of facts in question. When silence is of such character and
> under
> > such
> > circumstances that it would become a fraud, it will operate as an
> > Estoppel."Carmine v. Bowen, 64 A. 932
xxxxxsupreme
> > law of land and has previously ruled on in stating 'Such is the power, and> > therefore one would naturally expect that the law to warrant it should be
> > clear
> > in proportion as the power is exorbitant. If it is law, it will be
> found in
> > our books; if it is not to be found there it is not law. BOYD v. U S, 116
> > U.S.
> > 616 (1886) and Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391.
> > Notification of legal responsibility is "the first essential of due
> process
> > of
> > law."
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> Dorothy Hauge's silence is her admission of facts and of truth in my case.
> > See: U.S. Ex Rel. Bilokumsky v. TOD, 263 U.S. 149 (1923) "Conduct which
> > forms
> > a basis for inference is evidence. ... were proved by evidence to which
> > there was no objection. Silence [263 U.S. 149, 154] is often
> evidence of
> > the
> > most persuasive character." Runkle v. Burnham, _153 U.S. 216, 225 _
> >
> (
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?friend=nytimes&court=us&vol=153&invol
> > =216#225) , 14 S. Sup. Ct. 837; Kirby v. Tallmadge, _160 U.S. 379, 383_
> >
> (http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?friend=nytimes&court=us&vol=160&i
> > nvol=379#383) , 16 S. Sup. Ct. 349. Compare Quock Ting v. United States,
> > _140 U.S. 417, 420_
> >
> (http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?friend=nytimes&court=us&vol=140&invol=417#420)
>
> > , 11 S. Sup. Ct. 733, 851. As stated in
> > U.S. Ex Rel. Bilokumsky v. TOD, 263 U.S. 149 (1923) "Because the order is
> > unsupported by legal evidence; because the hearing was unfair; and
> because the
> > original warrant issued without probable cause" and governs my case on the
> > same grounds since the order of a "void" final judgment was issued and is
> > "void" of any evidence.
> > RULE 4-3.3 CANDOR TOWARD THE TRIBUNAL (a) False Evidence; Duty to
> Disclose.
> > A lawyer shall not knowingly:
> > (1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal;
> > (2) fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is
> > necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client;
> > (3) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling
> > jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the
> position of
> > the
> > client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or
> > (4) permit any witness, including a criminal defendant, to offer testimony
> > or other evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. A lawyer may not
> offer
> > testimony that the lawyer knows to be false in the form of a narrative
> unless
> > so ordered by the tribunal. If a lawyer has offered material evidence and
> > thereafter comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable
> > remedial measures.
> >
> > Nor has it ever been determined that the Sarasota Circuit Court ever had
> > proper jurisdiction in this matter. See: HANFORD v. DAVIES, 163 U.S. 273
> > (1896)> > "It is well settled that as the jurisdiction of a circuit court of the
> > United States is limited in the sense that it has no
> other jurisdiction than
> > that
> > conferred by the constitution and laws of the United States, the
> presumption
> > is that a cause is without its jurisdiction, unless the contrary
> > affirmatively appears, and that it is not sufficient that jurisdiction
> may be
> > inferred
> > argumentatively from averments in the pleadings, but the averments
> should be
> > positive."
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In addition, this letter will serve as an official notice of demand, not
> > request, for the Dorothy Hauge to respond within the next 20 days for the
> > production of law regarding her previous recommendations made in open
> court,
> > production of law that a public servant is not permitted to response
> pursuant
> > to
> > your letter dated 4/24/07, certified copies of her oath(s) and any
> official
> > reporting of any violations observed by her, against me by any judge,
> officer
> > of
> > the court and attorney to the proper authorities. She is hereby
> required to
> > produce any laws and statutes to support and validate your allegation in
> > stating "the magistrate is not permitted to respond to letters sent
> directly
> > to
> > her and, thus not able to take any action... If Dorothy Hauge continues to
> > remain silent, her willful non-compliance may be deemed as fraud upon
> herself
> > and upon the court and is applying the doctrine of Venire contra factum
> > proprium (No one may set himself in contradiction to his own previous
> > conduct) by
> > her continued silence as stated by the U.S. Supreme Court Rulings -
> U.S. v.
> > Tweel, 550 F. 2d. 297. "Silence can only be equated with fraud where
> there
> > is a
> > legal or moral duty to speak or where an inquiry left unanswered would be
> > intentionally misleading." And U.S. v. Prudden, 424 F.2d. 1021; We cannot
> > condone this shocking conduct... If that is the case we hope our
> message is
> > clear.
> > This sort of deception will not be tolerated and if this is routine it
> > should be corrected immediately." And Morrison v. Coddington, 662 P.
> 2d. 155,
> > 135
> > Ariz. 480(1983). "Fraud and deceit may arise from silence where there is a
> > duty to speak the truth, as well as from speaking an untruth." And "It
> may be
> > that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest form; but illegitimate and
> > unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way; namely, by
> > silent
> > approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can
> > only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional
> provisions for
> > the
> > security of persons and property should be liberally
> construed. A close and
> > literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to
> > gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in
> > substance. It is the duty of the Courts to be watchful for the
> Constitutional
> > Rights of the Citizens, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon.
> > Their
> > motto should be Obsta Principiis." BOYD v. U S, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
> If her
> > non-response is based on a local star-chamber decision then it is
> invalidate.
> >
> > Dorothy Hauge is a public servant by legal status and occupational title
> > pursuant to her oath(s). She has a public duty and legal obligation to
> > address
> > any type of correspondence addressed to her that she posses "first-hand
> > knowledge" of. As stated previously in open court and in front of two
> > witnesses (FL
> > Const. Art 1, sec 20) which was included on and for the record, that
> she had
> > read this entire case from beginning to end and in fact, can be a witness
> > for me in the contents of this official case file. See: _United States v.
> > California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947)_
> >
> (http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=case&court=us&vol=332&page=19)
>
> > "The Government, which holds its
> > interests here as elsewhere in trust for all the people, is not to be
> > deprived of
> > those interests by the ordinary court rules designed particularly for
> private
> > disputes over individually owned pieces of property; and officers who
> have no
> > authority at all to dispose of Government property cannot by their conduct
> > cause the Government to lose its valuable rights by their acquiescence,
> > laches,
> > or failure to act.
> > Dorothy E. Hauge need not worry in feeling that she is being singled
> out in
> > this matter out since all parties in this case from its inception,
> including
> > but not limited to, every judge, every hearing officer and every attorney
> > with be faced with addressing each and every question on each issue in
> > similar
> > letters that have been formulated that has reflected their specific
> conduct
> > in
> > this case. See: U.S. v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882) "No man in this country
> > is so high that he is above the law. No officer of the law may set
> that law
> > at
> > defiance with impunity. All the officers of the government, from the
> highest
> > to the lowest, are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it. It
> is the
> > only supreme power in our system of government, and every man who by
> > accepting office participates in its functions is only the more strongly
> > bound to
> > submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes
> > upon
> > the exercise of the authority which it gives."
> > If you disagree with anything in this letter, and with your
> admissions, then
> > rebut that with which you disagree, in writing, with particularity, to me,
> > within 20 days of this letter's date, and support your disagreement with
> > evidence, fact and law. Furthermore, you have been
> previously requested to
> > produce
> > a certified copy of your oath(s) which has not yet been received. Do not
> > send back this letter and the original admissions letter. In addition, the
> > admission letter was, in fact, sent by certified mail and was, in fact,
> > opened and
> > read. My official notification and demand to respond letter was sent on
> > March 26th 2007 which the 20 days has lapsed and now has become
> admissions by
> > Dorothy Hauge, which is a continuance of demand to respond letter. Do not
> > send
> > back the admissions letter because it is now, it fact, a legal and binding
> > agreement IN ANY COURT. Dorothy Hauge has within the required
> time frame to
> > respond as indicated in the April 23rd Admissions letter (by May 14th
> 2007)
> > and
> > make any corrections necessary. If no corrections are re-established or
> > rebutted within the required time frame then Dorothy Hauge's
> admissions will,
> > in
> > fact, become an affidavit of truth and of facts in this case based on
> > testimony through her willful silence which is evidence on its own
> merits and
> > behavior.
> >
> > Your failure to respond, as stipulated, is your agreement with
> and admission
> > to the facts and that everything in my previous letters are true, correct,
> > legal, lawful, and is your irrevocable agreement attesting to this, fully
> > binding upon you, in any court in America, without your protest
> or objection
> > or
> > that of those who represent you. Darren Michaels reserves the right to
> amend
> > the notice and demand to respond letter at any time.
> >
> > All Rights Reserved,
> >
> >
> > Darren Michaels,
> > A Florida state Citizen and "One of the People"
> > PO Box 18893,
> > Sarasota, FL 34276
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing has been furnished to be the
> > above-named
> > Respondent by certified U.S. mail # ___________________________________
> > this 23rd day of April, 2007
> >
> > By: __________________________________
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Footnotes:
> > Florida Rules of Professional Conduct - Preamble: A Lawyer's
> > Responsibilities
> >
> > Failure to comply with an obligation or prohibition imposed by a rule is a
> > basis for invoking the disciplinary process. The rules presuppose that
> > disciplinary assessment of a lawyer's conduct will be made on the
> basis of
> > the facts
> > and circumstances as they existed at the time of the conduct in
> question in
> > recognition of the fact that a lawyer often has to act upon uncertain or
> > incomplete evidence of the situation. Moreover, the rules presuppose that
> > whether
> > discipline should be imposed for a violation, and the severity of a
> > sanction, depend on all the circumstances, such as the willfulness and
> > seriousness of
> > the violation, extenuating factors, and whether there have been previous
> > violations.
> >
> > "Fraud" or "Fraudulent" denotes conduct having a purpose to deceive
> and not
> > merely negligent misrepresentation or failure to apprise another of
> relevant
> > information.
> > "Knowingly," "Known," or "Knows" denotes actual knowledge of the fact in
> > question. A person's knowledge may be inferred from circumstances.
> > "Lawyer" denotes a person who is a member of The Florida Bar or otherwise
> > authorized to practice in any court of the State of Florida.
> >
> > Rule 4-3.4 Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel
> > A _lawyer_
> >
> (http://www.law.cornell.edu/ethics/fl/code/FL_CODE.HTM#lawyer#lawyer)
> shall
> > not:
> > (a) unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence or otherwise
> > unlawfully alter, destroy, or conceal a document or other material
> that the
> > _lawyer_
> (http://www.law.cornell.edu/ethics/fl/code/FL_CODE.HTM#lawyer#lawyer)
> > _knows_
> (http://www.law.cornell.edu/ethics/fl/code/FL_CODE.HTM#know#know)
> or
> > _reasonably should know_
> >
> (http://www.law.cornell.edu/ethics/fl/code/FL_CODE.HTM#reasonably_should_know#reasonably_should_know)
>
> > is relevant to a pending or a
> > _reasonably_
> >
> (http://www.law.cornell.edu/ethics/fl/code/FL_CODE.HTM#reasonable#reasonable)
>
> > foreseeable proceeding; nor counsel or assist another person to
> > do any such act.
> > (b) fabricate evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or
> > offer an inducement to a witness, except (c) _knowingly_
> >
> (http://www.law.cornell.edu/ethics/fl/code/FL_CODE.HTM#know#know)
> disobey an
> > obligation under the
> > rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion
> that no
> > valid obligation exists.
> > (d) in pretrial procedure, make a frivolous discovery request or
> > intentionally fail to comply with a legally proper discovery request
> by an
> > opposing
> > party.
> > (e) in trial, allude to any matter that the _lawyer_
> >
> (http://www.law.cornell.edu/ethics/fl/code/FL_CODE.HTM#lawyer#lawyer)
> does
> > not reasonably believe is
> > relevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence, assert
> > personal knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a
> witness, or
> > state a
> > personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a
> > witness, the culpability of a civil litigant, or the guilt or innocence
> of an
> > accused.
> > (f) request a person other than a client to refrain from voluntarily
> giving
> > relevant information to another party unless:
> > (1) the person is a relative or an employee or other agent of a
> client, and
> > (2) it is _reasonable_
> >
> (http://www.law.cornell.edu/ethics/fl/code/FL_CODE.HTM#reasonable#reasonable)
>
> > to _believe_
> >
> (http://www.law.cornell.edu/ethics/fl/code/FL_CODE.HTM#belief#belief)
> that
> > the person's interests will not be
> > adversely affected by refraining from giving such information.
> > (g) present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present criminal
> > charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter.
> > (h) present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present
> disciplinary
> > charges under these rules solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter.
> >
> > Rule 4-8.3 Reporting Professional Misconduct
> > (a) Reporting Misconduct of Other Lawyers.
> > A _lawyer_
(http://www.law.cornell.edu/ethics/fl/code/FL_CODE.HTM#lawyer#lawyer)
> having
> > knowledge that another lawyer has committed a violation of the
> > Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a _substantial_
> >
> (http://www.law.cornell.edu/ethics/fl/code/FL_CODE.HTM#substantial#substantial)
>
> > question as to
> > that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other
> > respects
> > shall inform the appropriate professional authority.
> > (b) Reporting Misconduct of Judges.
> > A _lawyer_
> >
> (http://www.law.cornell.edu/ethics/fl/code/FL_CODE.HTM#lawyer#lawyer)
> having
> > knowledge that a judge has committed a violation of applicable
> > rules of judicial conduct that raises a _substantial_
> >
> (http://www.law.cornell.edu/ethics/fl/code/FL_CODE.HTM#substantial#substantial)
>
> > question as to the
> > judge's fitness for office shall inform the appropriate authority.
> >
> > Rule 4-8.4 Misconduct
> > A _lawyer_
> >
> (http://www.law.cornell.edu/ethics/fl/code/FL_CODE.HTM#lawyer#lawyer)
> shall
> > not:
> > (a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct,
> > _knowingly_
> (http://www.law.cornell.edu/ethics/fl/code/FL_CODE.HTM#know#know)
>
> > assist
> > or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another;
> > (b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty,
> > trustworthiness, or fitness as a _lawyer_
> >
> (http://www.law.cornell.edu/ethics/fl/code/FL_CODE.HTM#lawyer#lawyer)
> in
> > other respects;
> > (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, _fraud_
> >
> (http://www.law.cornell.edu/ethics/fl/code/FL_CODE.HTM#fraud#fraud)
> , deceit,
> > or misrepresentation;
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