UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
August Term, 1997
(Argued: November 25, 1997 Decided: July 15, 1998)
Docket No. 97-7355
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JOANNE MEDEIROS, Individually and
as Administratrix of Estate
of Joshua Sawicki,
Plaintiff-Appellant ,
- v.-
SHAWN O'CONNELL, JACK DRUMM,
SAMUEL IZZARELLI, ROBERT HART,
DAVID BRUNDAGE, MICHAEL DEMAIO,
RONALD BASTURA, RICHARD WHEELER,
JOHN DULY, and JOHN REARICK,
Defendants-Appellees .
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
B e f o r e: WALKER and JACOBS, Circuit Judges and BRIEANT, District Judge . 1
Appeal by the administratrix of the estate of Joshua Sawicki--a teenage boy who was taken hostage by an armed robber and then wounded by a stray bullet fired by a state trooper seeking to free the hostages--from a Ruling and Order of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Chatigny, J. ), dismissing this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim on the grounds that (1) the trooper's accidental shooting of Joshua was not a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment; and (2) the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity from suit on plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claim. The district court therefore granted summary judgment in defendants' favor, dismissed the federal claims, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.We affirm.
KERIN MARGARET WOODS, Anderson & Ferdon, P.C., Norwich, CT for Plaintiff- Appellant .
STEPHEN R. SARNOSKI (Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General, Hartford, CT, of counsel) for Defendants-Appellees .
JACOBS, Circuit Judge :
Joshua Sawicki was a teenager riding in a school van that was commandeered by an armed robber who was being pursued by the state police. Joshua was held hostage, together with the driver and another schoolchild, until the robber was shot dead by a state trooper. One bullet, fired by the same trooper, ricocheted off a metal part of the van interior and injured Joshua. Joshua died fifteen months later, although the parties disagree as to whether his death is attributable to the stray bullet or other causes. Appellant Joanne Medeiros brought suit, in her individual capacity and as administratrix of Joshua's estate, against the police officers who rescued her son, seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of Joshua's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
As to the Fourth Amendment claim, we affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants on the ground (stated by the district court) that Joshua had not been seized within the meaning of the Amendment. As to the Fourteenth Amendment claim, the district court dismissed on the ground that the defendants, all of whom are Connecticut state troopers, are entitled to qualified immunity. We affirm the dismissal of the Fourteenth Amendment claim, but in light of authority that post-dates the district court's opinion, we do so on other grounds.
On January 11, 1993, Dwight Pink visited a Ford dealership in East Lyme, Connecticut, and went with a salesman to test drive a 1990 Mustang. Pink shot and robbed the car salesman, who was found wandering along Interstate 95 by a passing motorist. The motorist notified the state police about the shooting and Pink's flight in the stolen Mustang.
A bulletin describing Pink and the stolen car was dispatched to all Connecticut state police. About an hour later, Trooper Jack Drumm (a defendant) saw the Mustang on Route 82 in East Haddam, Connecticut, and gave pursuit. Pink lost control of the car, ending up in a ditch near an intersection in East Haddam. Drumm emerged from his car and ordered Pink to throw down his gun and surrender. Pink responded by firing several shots at Drumm. Drumm took cover but did not return fire because he saw that a school van was approaching the intersection.
Pink also noticed the school van; he shoved his gun against the van's windshield and screamed, "I'll kill you, I'll kill you!" Pink then boarded the van and took hostage the driver and her two teenaged passengers. A gun to her head, the driver obeyed Pink's order to drive away.
Trooper Drumm followed and radioed for assistance; Pink repeatedly fired at him. Other state troopers, including the remaining defendants, joined a procession of vehicles that passed through several rural towns. Pink continued to fire on the troopers, repeatedly threatened to kill the hostages, and periodically held his gun to the driver's head. The troopers held their fire to avoid hurting hostages. Pleas to Pink to release the hostages were unsuccessful.
As ordered by radio, the troopers at first allowed the van to proceed unmolested; but as the van approached a more populated area, the troopers were ordered to halt the van at the intersection of Routes 66 and 17, a still-rural area where the road widened from two lanes to four with a grassy median. As the van neared the roadblock, Pink continued to shoot at the troopers and ordered the driver to evade the police cars. She obeyed by driving up the median and continuing westbound on Route 66.
The ranking officer on the scene, Sergeant Duley, then ordered the troopers to "take out" the van. This order meant that the troopers were to stop the van by blocking or ramming it and to arrest Dwight Pink, using force if necessary. As Pink continued to fire on his pursuers, the troopers received an order over the radio that, for the protection of the hostages, there was to be "[n]o indiscriminate shooting!"
Trooper Brundage managed to pin the van between his cruiser and the guard rail, and Trooper Drumm blocked it from the rear. From inside the van, Pink continued to shoot at the troopers. Trooper Drumm, with Trooper Izzarelli alongside, fired at Pink through the driver's side window of the van; Trooper Hart approached the front of the van as Trooper O'Connell approached from the rear. As all the officers fired at Pink, he fell; Sergeant Duley ordered the troopers to cease fire; and they immediately obeyed.
The troopers ascertained that Pink was dead and that Joshua, who had been in the right front passenger seat, had been struck once and wounded. The troopers gave Joshua first aid while awaiting the arrival of an ambulance.
Later investigation established that O'Connell had fired five times at Pink from his position at the rear of the van. Of the rounds that struck Pink, O'Connell had fired the fatal bullet. It was also O'Connell's bullet that passed through the rear passenger seat, was deflected off a metal support bar, and continued through the front passenger seat to strike Joshua, who was leaning forward with his head under the dashboard.
O'Connell undoubtedly knew that there were three hostages in the van at the time he fired. When he approached the van, he observed the driver in the front left seat, Joshua in the front passenger seat, and Pink crouching on the floor between them. O'Connell immediately identified Pink; at roll call that morning O'Connell was informed that Pink had said he would not be taken into custody again. In the moments before O'Connell killed him, Pink had pointed his gun at the driver, at Joshua, and at Trooper Drumm. O'Connell then hoisted himself up through the rear window of the van and shot at Pink. The investigation after the shooting revealed that Pink had two shots remaining in his gun and an empty 50-round ammunition box. 1
We review the grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo . See Aslanidis v. United States Lines, Inc. , 7 F.3d 1067, 1072 (2d Cir. 1993).
A. The Fourth Amendment Claim
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable seizures; it is not a general prohibition of all conduct that may be deemed unreasonable, unjustified or outrageous. See Carter v. Buscher , 973 F.2d 1328, 1332 (7th Cir. 1992). So the first step in any Fourth Amendment claim (or, as in this case, any section 1983 claim predicated on the Fourth Amendment) is to determine whether there has been a constitutionally cognizable seizure. See Michigan v. Summers , 452 U.S. 692, 696 , 101 S. Ct. 2587, 2590-91 (1981).
Seizure under the Fourth Amendment is purposeful conduct:
[A] [v]iolation of the Fourth Amendment requires an intentional acquisition of physical control. A seizure occurs even when an unintended person or thing is the object of the detention or taking, but the detention or taking itself must be willful. This is implicit in the word "seizure," which can hardly be applied to an unknowing act.
Brower v. County of Inyo , 489 U.S. 593, 596 , 109 S. Ct. 1378, 1381 (1989) (citations omitted). Appellant argues that Brower 's references to intention and wilfulness bear upon the deliberateness of the means employed, and that the troopers (particularly O'Connell) are liable to Joshua under the Fourth Amendment because they intentionally used their weapons. Defendants argue that the proper question is whether a claimant was the intended object of the officers' restraint or use of force, and that Joshua cannot state a claim under the Fourth Amendment because the troopers fully intended to seize Pink, but indisputably had no intention to curtail Joshua's freedom of movement.
We have not previously considered whether the accidental shooting of a hostage or innocent bystander can give rise to a claim under the Fourth Amendment, but other courts of appeal have had little trouble with the issue. In Landol-Rivera v. Cosme , 906 F.2d 791 (1st Cir. 1990), the First Circuit addressed the claim of a fast-food worker who was taken hostage by an armed robber and was shot in the jaw by a bullet intended for his captor. The court quoted Brower for the principle that:
a Fourth Amendment seizure does not occur whenever there is a governmentally caused termination of an individual's freedom of movement . . ., nor even whenever there is a governmentally caused and governmentally desired termination of an individual's freedom of movement . . ., but only when there is a governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied .
Id. at 794 (quoting Brower , 489 U.S. at 596 -97, 109 S. Ct. at 1381) (emphasis and alterations in original). Applying that principle to the hostage situation, the court stated:
We reject the notion that the "intention" requirement is met by the deliberateness with which a given action is taken. A police officer's deliberate decision to shoot at a car containing a robber and a hostage for the purpose of stopping the robber's flight does not result in the sort of willful detention of the hostage that the Fourth Amendment was designed to govern.
Id. at 795 (emphasis in original). The court reversed the jury's finding of liability and award of damages to Landol-Rivera.
Similarly, in Rucker v. Harford County , 946 F.2d 278 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied , 502 U.S. 1097 , 112 S. Ct. 1175 (1992), the Fourth Circuit analyzed a Fourth Amendment claim brought by the father of a bystander who was killed by police officers attempting to "apprehend[] a madman run amok, threatening the lives of everyone in his way." Id. at 281. That particular madman, who was high on drugs, almost succeeded in killing several of the police officers who pursued him in a long chase. Officers who attempted to shoot out the tires of the fugitive's car apparently struck Rucker accidentally. Id. at 280.
The court found that Brower foreclosed Rucker's Fourth Amendment claim, rejecting the identical argument asserted here: "[ Brower ] does not mean, as Rucker contends, that a seizure occurs just so long as the act of restraint itself is intended (here the act of shooting) though it restrains one not intended to be restrained." Id. at 281.
We endorse the logic of these cases. Joshua was never seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment "addresses misuse of power, . . . not the accidental effects of otherwise lawful government conduct." Landol-Rivera , 906 F.2d at 795 (quoting Brower , 489 U.S. at 596 , 109 S. Ct. at 1381) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original). The claim presented in this case vindicates no interest protected by the Fourth Amendment. So far from seeking to restrain Joshua's freedom, the troopers' every effort was bent on delivering all the hostages from deadly peril. See Medeiros v. Town of South Kingstown , 821 F. Supp. 823, 827 (D.R.I. 1993) (rejecting the Fourth Amendment claim of a passenger who asserted that he was imprisoned in the fleeing car by the police officers' high speed chase, stating that "the police did not intend to restrict the movement of the passenger by causing the driver to flee at high speeds. In fact, their intent was the exact opposite . . . .").
This case is easily distinguished from those in which the police shoot an innocent victim mistakenly believing that he is the suspect whom they are pursuing; in such cases, the victim was indeed the object of an intentional act of seizure, even if the police were mistaken as to the victim's identity. See, e.g. , Hill v. California , 401 U.S. 797, 802-05 , 91 S. Ct. 1106, 1110-11 (1971). But where the hostage is hit by a bullet intended for the hostage-taker, the mishap is the "unintended consequence[] of government action," and the governing principle is that such consequences cannot "form the basis for a fourth amendment violation." Ansley v. Heinrich , 925 F.2d 1339, 1344 (11th Cir. 1991). See also City of El Centro v. United States , 922 F.2d 816, 822 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. denied , 501 U.S. 1230 , 111 S. Ct. 2851 (1991).
We hold that no Fourth Amendment seizure occurred in the present case, because the police did not intend to restrain Joshua. The deflection of the bullet intended for Pink did not transform the troopers' rescue efforts on the hostages' behalf into a seizure.
B. The Fourteenth Amendment Claim
Medeiros also asserted a substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, alleging that the shooting of Joshua worked a deprivation of his "life, liberty or property" without due process. The district court disposed of this claim by finding that the troopers were entitled to qualified immunity. However, subsequent to the district court's opinion, the Supreme Court expressed its preference that courts address first the merits of the constitutional claims presented before turning to an analysis of qualified immunity. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis , ___ U.S. ___, 118 S. Ct. 1708, 1714 n.5 (1998) ("[T]he better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right at all. Normally, it is only then that a court should ask whether the right allegedly implicated was clearly established at the time of the events in question.") The district court decided the case on what was then the most expeditious ground, qualified immunity. The Supreme Court's unambiguous preference is that we consider the merits first, and that is the ground on which we affirm.
The first inquiry bearing on the merits is whether this Fourteenth Amendment claim is foreclosed by the principle that "[w]here a particular Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver , 510 U.S. 266, 273 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (quoting Graham v. Connor , 490 U.S. 386, 395 , 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1871 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The troopers argue that in this case that principle means that Medeiros is confined to a Fourth Amendment claim and cannot bring a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. In 1995, however, this Court construed Graham to permit a narrowly drawn Fourteenth Amendment claim only in the non-seizure, non- prisoner context. Rodriguez v. Phillips , 66 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 1995). Moreover, in County of Sacramento , the Supreme Court indicated that where no seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment has taken place, substantive due process analysis is appropriate. County of Sacramento , ___ U.S. at ___, 118 S. Ct. at 1715; see also United States v. Lanier , 520 U.S. 259 , ___ n.7, 117 S. Ct. 1219, 1228 n.7 (1997) ( Graham "does not hold that all constitutional claims relating to physically abusive government conduct must arise under either the Fourth or Eighth Amendments; rather, Graham simply requires that if a constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision, such as the Fourth or Eighth Amendment, the claim must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due process."). Medeiros therefore can bring a Fourteenth Amendment claim, but for reasons discussed below, that claim is doomed to fail.
The core of the concept of due process has always been an individual's freedom from arbitrary interference by the government. See Hurtado v. California , 110 U.S. 516, 527 , 4 S. Ct. 111, 117 (1884) (citing Magna Carta). See also Wolff v. McDonnell , 418 U.S. 539, 558 , 94 S. Ct. 2963, 2976 (1974) ("The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government."). Alleged abuses of the police power are sufficiently arbitrary to rise to constitutional magnitude only when the conduct at issue "shocks the conscience." County of Sacramento , ___ U.S. at ___, 118 S. Ct. at 1717; see also Collins v. City of Harker Heights , 503 U.S. 115, 128 , 112
S. Ct. 1061, 1070 (1992) (substantive due process is violated only when executive conduct "can properly be characterized as arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a constitutional sense").
Substantive due process, enforced by section 1983, does not afford a cause of action for police negligence. See Daniels v. Williams , 474 U.S. 327, 328 , 106 S. Ct. 662, 663 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon , 474 U.S. 344, 348 , 106 S. Ct. 668, 670-71 (1986). Further, because the police must act in high- tension situations "in haste, under pressure, and frequently without the luxury of a second chance," Whitley v. Albers , 475 U.S. 312, 320 , 106 S. Ct. 1078, 1084 (1986), even an intermediate level of fault, such as recklessness, is not enough to impose constitutional liability. In the context of a high-speed chase, the Supreme Court recently ruled that where "the officer's instinct was to do his job as a law enforcement officer, not to induce . . . lawlessness, or to terrorize, cause harm, or kill," County of Sacramento , ___ U.S. at ___, 118 S. Ct. at 1721, the officer's conduct did not shock the conscience; he was therefore not liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The heroic and selfless conduct of the troopers in this case is the very opposite of conduct that could be said to shock the conscience. As counsel for Medeiros conceded at oral argument, another person in her place might be moved to thank the people who risked their lives to save her son from an armed madman--rather than sue them for money damages. The conduct of the troopers was not merely constitutionally acceptable, it was objectively admirable. Appellant's Fourteenth Amendment claim must therefore fail.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
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[1]
Hon. Charles L. Brieant, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
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[1]
In support of the reasonableness of their actions, defendants submitted a report by retired Special Agent Lanceley of the F.B.I., a hostage negotiations specialist who now runs a private consulting firm that provides advice and instruction to law enforcement agencies. According to Lanceley, negotiations with Pink were a lost cause; Pink was bent on escalating the level of violence in order to commit "suicide-by- cop"; and the lives of the hostages were in the gravest danger throughout the crisis. Lanceley concludes that the troopers' actions were necessary to reasonably safeguard the lives of the public, the hostages aboard the van, and the troopers themselves.
Substitute House Bill No. 5933
AN ACT CONCERNING THE COMPENSATION OF WRONGFULLY CONVICTED AND INCARCERATED PERSONS, THE DUTIES AND DURATION OF THE SENTENCING TASK FORCE AND THE PREPARATION OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC IMPACT STATEMENTS.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in General Assembly convened:
Section 1. (NEW) (Effective October 1, 2008) (a) A person is eligible to receive compensation for wrongful incarceration if:
(1) Such person has been convicted by this state of one or more crimes, of which the person was innocent, has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment for such crime or crimes and has served all or part of such sentence; and
(2) Such person's conviction was vacated or reversed and the complaint or information dismissed on grounds of innocence, or the complaint or information dismissed on a ground consistent with innocence.
(b) A person who meets the eligibility requirements of subsection (a) of this section may present a claim against the state for such compensation with the Claims Commissioner in accordance with the provisions of chapter 53 of the general statutes. The provisions of said chapter shall be applicable to the presentment, hearing and determination of such claim except as otherwise provided in this section.
(c) At the hearing on such claim, such person shall have the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that such person meets the eligibility requirements of subsection (a) of this section. In addition, such person shall present evidence as to the damages suffered by such person which may include, but are not limited to, claims for loss of liberty and enjoyment of life, loss of earnings, loss of earning capacity, loss of familial relationships, loss of reputation, physical pain and suffering, mental pain and suffering and attorney's fees and other expenses arising from or related to such person's arrest, prosecution, conviction and incarceration.
(d) If the Claims Commissioner determines that such person has established such person's eligibility under subsection (a) of this section by a preponderance of the evidence, the Claims Commissioner shall order the immediate payment to such person of compensation for such wrongful incarceration. In determining the amount of such compensation, the Claims Commissioner shall consider relevant factors including, but not limited to, the evidence presented by the person under subsection (c) of this section as to the damages suffered by such person and whether any negligence or misconduct by any officer, agent, employee or official of the state or any political subdivision of the state contributed to such person's arrest, prosecution, conviction or incarceration.
(e) In addition to the compensation paid under subsection (d) of this section, the Claims Commissioner may order payment for the expenses of employment training and counseling, tuition and fees at any constituent unit of the state system of higher education and any other services such person may need to facilitate such person's reintegration into the community.
(f) Any person claiming compensation under this section based on a pardon that was granted or the dismissal of a complaint or information that occurred before the effective date of this section shall file such claim not later than two years after the effective date of this section. Any person claiming compensation under this section based on a pardon that was granted or the dismissal of a complaint that occurred on or after the effective date of this section shall file such claim not later than two years after the date of such pardon or dismissal.
(g) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent such person from pursuing any other action or remedy at law or in equity that such person may have against the state and any political subdivision of the state and any officer, agent, employee or official thereof arising out of such wrongful conviction and incarceration.
Sec. 2. (Effective from passage) (a) The advisory commission on wrongful convictions established pursuant to section 54-102pp of the general statutes shall monitor and evaluate the implementation of (1) the procedure for the compensation of wrongfully incarcerated persons established under section 1 of this act, (2) the pilot program to electronically record the interrogations of arrested persons, and (3) eyewitness identification procedures that, when practicable, use a double-blind administration wherein the person conducting the identification procedure is not aware of which person in the photo lineup or live lineup is suspected as being the perpetrator of the crime.
(b) Not later than January 7, 2009, the advisory commission shall report its findings and recommendations to the joint standing committee of the General Assembly on judiciary in accordance with section 11-4a of the general statutes.
Sec. 3. Subsection (d) of section 6 of public act 06-193 is repealed and the following is substituted in lieu thereof (Effective from passage):
(d) The task force shall:
(1) Identify overarching criminal justice and sentencing goals and policies;
(2) Define current sentencing models including sentencing guidelines, criteria, exemptions and enhancements;
(3) Analyze sentencing trends by offense types and offender characteristics;
(4) Review the actual versus intended impact of sentencing policies;
(5) Determine the direct and indirect costs associated with sentencing policies;
(6) Review the fines and terms of imprisonment specified for violations of criminal statutes that are classified or unclassified felonies or misdemeanors and make recommendations including, but not limited to: (A) Whether crimes that are currently unclassified should be classified; (B) whether certain classified crimes should be reclassified or the penalties for certain unclassified crimes should be revised in order to make the penalties for similar crimes more uniform; (C) whether the penalty or type of penalty for certain crimes should be revised or eliminated where such penalty or type of penalty is no longer deemed necessary or appropriate or is disproportionate to the severity of the crime; and (D) whether crimes that are obsolete should be repealed; [and]
(7) Make any recommendations for the revision of criminal justice and sentencing policies as deemed necessary; and
(8) Not later than January 7, 2009, make a recommendation as to whether a permanent sentencing commission should be established and, if so, make recommendations concerning the mission, duties, membership and procedures of such a commission.
Sec. 4. Subsection (g) of section 6 of public act 06-193 is repealed and the following is substituted in lieu thereof (Effective from passage):
(g) The task force shall report its findings and recommendations to the joint standing committee of the General Assembly on the judiciary in accordance with section 11-4a of the general statutes not later than [December 1, 2008] July 1, 2009. The task force shall terminate upon the completion of its duties.
Sec. 5. (NEW) (Effective from passage) (a) Beginning with the session of the General Assembly commencing on January 7, 2009, a racial and ethnic impact statement shall be prepared with respect to certain bills and amendments that could, if passed, increase or decrease the pretrial or sentenced population of the correctional facilities in this state.
(b) Not later than January 1, 2009, the joint standing committee of the General Assembly on judiciary shall make recommendations for a provision to be included in the joint rules of the House of Representatives and the Senate concerning the procedure for the preparation of such racial and ethnic impact statements, the content of such statements and the types of bills and amendments with respect to which such statements should be prepared.
Approved June 5, 2008
The above is the Steven G. Erickson Mugshot (taken Oct. 2001), former Political Prisoner, People's Republik of Corruptikut Inmate # 305662
I was so pissed off about being under seige by drug dealers, prostitutes, and other criminals on my property, I wrote the below to President Bush. Click on documents to make bigger.
::::::::
The State Police in many, or most, states are White and Male. Connecticut is no exception, and might just show what is most wrong with our nation's policing.
If women are raped, especially in downtown area, officers can threaten the victims with arrest for making a "false statement", if officers are too lazy to do an actual investigation. When officers rape, assault, rob, murder, and are responsible for murders and mayhem, officers aren't even investigated. [video of hearing testimony]
Bill Collins, the former mayor of Norwalk, Connecticut, talks about officers wearing ski masks abducting citizens to beat them at waterfront warehouses, officers throwing beer bottles on his porch, vandalizing his house, and putting up police union stickers on his vehicles and house. [video of official testimony]
In Connecticut, the State Police have a "100 Club", where an officer belongs to the special club, and can go on golf outings, if he has more than 100 driving while drunk, or impaired, arrests (DUI, DWI, OUI). [info on 100 club]
A false arrest can land a citizen in prison. It can mean job, home, and family loss. Taxes being paid in by an individual stop, and he, or she, is now a burden on taxpayers based on a false report, false arrest, lies to be part of a club!
A prison sentence can mean a citizen is ruined for life, never trusting authorities again. Maybe the citizen will never support a family, be productive, or even pay taxes, ever again. All over "fun in a club".
If police will lie, falsify and manufacture evidence to arrest citizens for driving while drunk and for drugs, they will alter and fix ANY case. If police, police themselves, police aren't policed.
A campaign manager for the rival party's governor choice, can mean being placed on the secret police "Enemies List". Kenneth Krayeske, also a journalist was placed on "the list", and arrested on sight. [story]
Connecticut State Police Colonel Lynch was allegedly asked to change an official police report. The heirs of Neil Esposito, wanted the millions of Neil's money. Esposito and been died driving drunk and Heather Specyalski was allegedly performing oral sex on him at the time of the crash. I assume there was evidence of this as Heather was in coma for months following the accident. [story]
So, if an important doner to former Republican Connecticut Governor John G. Rowland requests an official State Police investigation be changed, orders from the top will see that it will. These "law enforcement" can't be trusted when they come up with DNA and other lab results when they can just alter official reports. They're willing to put an innocent woman in prison for manslaughter at the request of the rich and powerful.
If a police officer breaks ranks with other officers by actually protecting and serving the public, caring about the law, he can get felony arrested and his sons can be hauled out of his house to be beaten at the State Police HQ. For police to retaliate against police who break ranks, the courts ALSO, have to be rigged. [story]
Judicial Branch employees can blow the whistle on judges and judicial managers rigging cases, racketeering, obstructing justice, nepotism, bid rigging, the altering of court hard drives, retaliation, and felonies committed. The "public comment" will then be sealed and the "mouthy" employees will be retaliated against. [CT Judicial Branch whistle blower video]
Every citizen who I know who has proposed Civilian Oversight of Police has been terrorized out of the state, into silence, and/or is falsely arrested and imprisoned. Richard "Ritt" Goldstein proposed Civilian Oversight of Police to the Connecticut Judiciary Committee assembling international experts on the subject and victims of Connecticut State Police misconduct and brutality. Ritt fled to Sweden seeking political asylum, so terrorized by police after making [this video].
Police use state registered confidential informants to kill, beat up, and terrorize citizens making misconduct complaints. [video of an informant under oath]
The police misconduct only gets worse with each passing year. There is more technology, more money, more of them, and less and less oversight and accountability. We have "Black Water"-style policing inside the US. God help us all ...
My beefs can be found in "Faces of a Police State".
-Steven G. Erickson
[links to police, attorney, prosecutorial, and judicial misconduct stories]
[video, witness to the basics of police retaliation]
Take action -- click here to contact your local newspaper or congress people:
[pass Private Atty Gen. bill in US Judiciary Cmmt]
Click here to see the most recent messages sent to congressional reps and local newspapers
I am a freelance cameraman, documentary producer, screenwriter, sometimes journalist, and can and will travel anywhere if the terms are right.
(New Haven-WTNH) _ At least five people, including two New Haven police officers, were arrested Tuesday. The charges include conspiracy and theft of government funds, and bribery.
The officers are identified as Lt. Billy White, Sr., the head of the department's Narcotics Division, and Det. Justin Kasperzyk.
"I'm disguested, I'm upset, frustrated," New Haven Police Chief Francisco Ortiz said.
White is accused of theft of government funds and conspiracy. In an afternoon court appearance, the FBI said they have video and audio evidence of White that was taken during a sting operation.
The officers are accused in part of taking money from drug scenes. In one piece of evidence, prosecutors showed a picture of someone they say is White holding a bag that contained $27,000 in cash.
Kasperzyk was charged with a misdemeanor crime of stealing less than $1,000.
Authorities say their investigation also led them to Jacobs Bondsman, a New Haven bail bonds business.
The three bondsmen face bribery and conspiracy charges. They are identified as Robert Jacobs, Paul Jacobs, and Philip Jacobs. They are accused of bribing White and other police officers to recapture fugitives who disappeared while on bond.
Both officers were put on administrative leave by Chief Ortiz, and an internal affairs investigation has been launched.
"There's a presumption here of innocence, but from what I've seen and what I hear and my experience tells me, um, folks ought to have known better."
A federal magistrate judge ordered White to undergo a psychological exam after learning that White made statements to police after his arrest indicating he might harm himself.
White is due back in Hartford federal court tomorrow for a hearing on whether he should be detained.
FBI Spokeswoman Marybeth Miklos says White has been with the New Haven Police dept. for about 30 years. His home was searched as part of the investigation.
New Haven Mayor John DeStefano, who was in Washington D.C., said in a news release, "We are attempting to learn more about the charges, and will be fully cooperating with the investigation," said DeStefano.
DeStefano said he's been in contact with Ortiz, and will hold a news conference about the arrests at 9:30 tonight.
HARRISBURG -- A former Pennsylvania state trooper tipped off pimps who ran a child prostitution ring in exchange for money and sex, federal prosecutors said today in announcing charges against him.
Kevin J. Coleman, 42, of Harrisburg, was accused of interfering with a nationwide investigation into a ring that used women and teenagers as prostitutes. He was accused of disclosing investigative details, wiretaps and police sweeps.
Prosecutors said Mr. Coleman was assigned to anti-prostitution patrols at the Gables Truck Stop near Harrisburg when pimps -- many from Toledo, Ohio -- were operating there.
The federal investigation known as Precious Cargo led to the conviction of 14 pimps and two lead prostitutes, all awaiting sentencing.
Mr. Coleman resigned as a state trooper after learning he was under investigation, prosecutors said. It could not immediately be determined if he has a lawyer.
The federal indictment in December 2005 that broke up the ring described it as a "loose confederacy" where pimps worked together to avoid police and run their business. The women and girls were moved from state to state and "sold" between pimps.
At least nine were under age 18 when they were forced into working as prostitutes, authorities said, and in one case a 12-year-old girl was forced to engage in prostitution to pay for her grandfather's crack cocaine.
The pimps were indicted in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Michigan, and the investigation was considered one of the largest coordinated efforts to break up child prostitution rings in the United States.
Investigators said they identified at least 125 women who worked as prostitutes for the ring in the Harrisburg area.
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The above [found here]
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